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Scandinavians

Selected Historical Essays

by

Erik Lönnroth

Göteborg 1977

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Editing committee:

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Preface

For one third of a century Erik Lönnroth has ranked among the outstanding figures in Swedish historical science and has been a leading spokesman for the humanities in Sweden's cultural life. His scientific influence has also been considerable in other Nordic countries. His concern has been throughout to introduce to the outside world his unorthodox interpretations of the history of Scandinavia and the Scandinavians.

This volume contains reprints of essays, published by Erik Lönnroth in non-Scandinavian languages, many of which are now difficult to obtain, and includes one previously unpublished study (No 2). The essays are followed by a bibliography of Erik Lönnroth's printed works compiled by O. Christensson, librarian at the Göteborg University Library.

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ERIK LÖNNROTH

on his retirement from the Chair of History
in admiration and gratitude
by colleagues, friends and pupils.

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Die Goten in der modernen kritischen Geschichtsauffassung

ERIK LÖNNROTH

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Für einen Historiker, der über das Thema Visigoten und Skandinavien zu sprechen hat, ist es natürlich den Ausgangspunkt im grossen und neuerschienenen Werk Rolf Hachmanns „Die Goten und Skandinavien" zu wählen. Dieses Buch hat die ganze Forschungssituation so radikal verändert, dass es keinen Zweck hat, die Hauptzüge der früheren Diskussion zu rekapitulieren, obgleich es von Anfang an klar steht, dass nicht alle Behauptungen Hachmanns unbestritten sein werden. Ich finde die allgemeinen Resultate seiner Arbeit so historisch überzeugend, dass ich mich ihnen vorbehaltungslos anschliesse, und nehme also an, dass die Goten der Völkerwanderungen frühestens im mittleren Polen, östlich der Weichsel lokalisiert werden können. Hachmann lässt die Frage offen, ob die von Jordanes vermittelte Tradition einer Verbindung von Goten und Skandinavien einen Kern der Wahrheit enthalten kann — das allgemeine Skandinavien-Topos dieser Tradition, die Vorstellung von Skandinavien als „vagina gentium" und Urheimat einer Reihe grosser Germanenvölker, die nach dem Süden ausgewandert sind, ist von ihm in überzeugender Weise zertrümmert worden.

Es bleiben einige skandinavische Völkernamen im Jordanestext, die in der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion oftmals als Namen von gotischen Stämmen aufgefasst worden sind, so auch bei Hachmann, der hier keinen eigenen Standpunkt behauptet. Er lässt sich daran genügen, das Problem konditional vorzulegen: „Wenn man gotische Stämme im Norden und auf dem Kontinent nachweisen kann — im Norden seit dem 2. Jh., im Süden mindestens ein Jahrhundert früher —, dann kommt man um die Annahme von Wanderungen vom Norden nach dem Süden oder umgekehrt nicht herum. Ob es sich um einen oder mehrere Wanderzüge handelte, ob die Wanderrichtung stets vom Norden nach dem Süden verlief oder umgekehrt, ob gar Rückwanderer heimkehrten und wann die Wanderung bzw. die Wanderungen erfolgten, das alles bleibt, wenn man nur die Zeugnisse der Namen in Betracht zieht, allerdings *vollkommen* offen" (S. 130).

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Von skandinavischem Gesichtspunkt aus ist es also sehr angelegen festzustellen, ob die Skandzabeschreibung von Jordanes sichere Belege dafür gibt dass Goten im kontinentalen Sinne — Goten derselben Art wie an der Weichsel, in Rumänien, Ukraine, Italien, Südfrankreich und Spanien, in Skandinavien gewohnt haben. Um die Frage zu beantworten muss man so gut wie möglich den Jordanestext kritisch schätzen und sich besonders darum bemühen, die Art seiner Quellen festzustellen. Dabei will ich prinzipiell behaupten, dass der Text soweit möglich ohne Emendationen verwendet werden muss. Es ist viel Unfug damit betrieben worden, Jordanes in dem Sinne zu verändern, dass der Text zu beliebigen Identifikationstheorien so gut wie möglich passt, was natürlich unzulässig ist. Ich möchte auch zum Quellenproblem des Textes bemerken, dass es mir unmöglich scheint festzustellen, in welchen Einzelheiten Jordanes von seinen Vorgängern Ablabius und Cassiodor abhängig oder ganz unabhängig ist. Ich bin aus stilistischen Gründen von den Argumenten Svennungs und von mündlichen Aussagen des ausgezeichneten Cassiodorkenners Åke Frid davon überzeugt, dass Jordanes als eine kurze und unselbständige Bearbeitung der Gotengeschichte Cassiodors zu betrachten ist, während die Beiträge des Ablabius zum Sachinhalt ganz unbekannt bleiben. Die Frage kann damit so präzisiert werden: welche Quellen Cassiodors sind in der Bearbeitung von Jordanes sichtbar?

Wenn diese Quellen auch nicht identifiziert werden können, scheint es doch nicht unmöglich, ihre Art zu erkennen. Nach einem kurzen Hinweis zu Ptolemäus folgt eine Beschreibung der arktischen Merkwürdigkeiten im hohen Norden, die mit der Thulebeschreibung Prokops Verwandtschaft zeigt. Zu den zwei arktischen Stämmen Adogit und Screrefennae werden auch die Suehans gefügt in einer kommerziellen Notiz, die zwei wichtigen Handelswaren erwähnen, die ausgezeichneten Pferde und die berühmten „sappherinas pelles", die von den Suehans durch Vermittelung unzähliger Völker zu den Römern exportiert wurden. Dann folgt die Aufzählung „diversarum turba nationum", eine itinerarische Verzeichnung kleiner Völkerkantonen der jetzigen schwedischen Westküste entlang die mit dem grösseren und kriegerisch gesinnten Volk der Gautigoth im Binnenland endet: die Aufzählung markiert den natürlichen, in allen Zeiten benutzten Handelsweg von Öresund bis zur Vänerebene. Darauf folgt wieder eine exotische Notiz von drei nicht identifizierbaren Völkern, die in ausgehauenen Felsenhöhlen wie wilde Tiere wohnten: schon die harte Konsistenz der Gneis- und Granitfelsen im westlichen und mittleren Skandinavien verweist diese Notiz zum Bereich der Schiffermärchen. Dann folgen aber die „exteriores", grössere Völker die meistens wirkliche Stammreiche gebildet haben: die Ostrogo-

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ten, die Romerikingen und Ringerikingen im südlichen Norwegen, wiederum die weichen Samen unter dem Namen Finni, „pares eorum" Vinoviloth, die nicht identifiziert werden können, und dann wiederum die Schweden unter der lateinisierten Namensform Suetidi, und die Dänen, von demselben Ursprung wie die Schweden und so hochgewachsen, dass sie die Herulen aus ihren Wohnsitzen vertrieben haben. Und schliesslich eine Notiz von Völkern die von ebenso hohem Wuchs sind, alle kleinen Völker an der Skagerrakküste insofern sie identifiziert werden können, die letzten Ranni, das Volk von Ranrike, deren König Roduulf nicht viele Jahre zuvor sein Reich verlassen und den Hof Theoderichs aufgesucht hatte. Mommsen hat hier den Text verändert und Roduulf zum König der Herulen gemacht, um ihn mit dem gleichnamigen Herulenkönig zu identifizieren, der im Jahre 491 gegen die Langobarden gefallen ist, wahrscheinlich annehmend, dass im fünften und sechsten Jahrhundert nur ein König namens Roduulf gelebt haben kann. Die Annahme ist willkürlich, die Identifikation aus kronologischen Gründen unmöglich und die Emendation durchaus unerlaubt, aber spätere Forscher haben Mommsens grosser Autorität gehorcht. Folgt man hier dem Text ohne Präjudizien so lernt man den Namen eines Mannes kennen, der dem Cassiodor allen Unterricht über die kleinen Stämme am Skagerrak gegeben haben kann.

In summa: die zentrale Quelle Cassiodors–Jordanes' wird ein Itinerarium für Handelsgebrauch gewesen sein, die von der grossen Kommunikationsader Südwestskandinaviens gut unterrichtet war und von deren aus weiter entfernt wohnende grössere Völker erwähnt werden. Eine einzelne Aussage nennt die Schweden als durch zwei Exportprodukten interessant unter ihrem gotischen Namen Suehans. Dazu kommen Bemerkungen über exotische Merkwürdigkeiten und eine komparative Aussage über Stärke und Höhe einer Reihe von Stämmen, die wahrscheinlich einem besonderen Gewährsmann zuzuschreiben ist. Das würde bedeuten, dass die ganze Skandza-Beschreibung auf Sonderquellen und nicht auf gotische Sagatradition zurückgeht.

Die ganze Beschreibung ist davon motiviert, die Insel Skandza als die Urheimat der Goten hinzustellen, und es ist daher selbstverständlich, dass der Verfasser alle Zeichen einer Stammesverwandtschaft der Skandzavölker mit seinem eigenen gotischen Volk wahrnimmt. Um so bemerkenswerter ist es, dass er niemals ein Gebiet der Skandza als das Land der ausgewanderten Goten angibt. Er gibt drei skandinavische Völkernamen, die mit dem Wort„-goten" zusammengesetzt sind: die Gautigoth, die Ostrogoten und das kleine Volk Vagoth in Schonen. Das letzte ist nicht in überzeugender Weise identifiziert worden. Die Namensform „Gaut-

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goten" lässt eine bewusste Identifikation des Verfassers hervortreten, was man als Reflexion, nicht als Tradition durchaus ernst nehmen muss. Nichts im Texte lässt vermuten, dass die Vagoth, die Gautgoten und die Ostrogoten in irgend einer Weise untereinander mehr verwandt oder verbunden gewesen sind als mit den anderen Stämmen der Skandza. Unter den gotischen Völkern der Skandza hat man auch die Greutinger aus dem Text hervortreten lassen durch Zusammenschlagen von zwei der in Felsenhöhlen wohnenden Völker: Evagre und Otingis. Die Idée dieser Konjektur geht auf Mommsen zurück, der sie als eine Mutmassung: „possis cogitare de Greutungis" im Textapparat anführt, sie aber doch nicht ernsthaft lanziert, da sie in den Handschriften keine Stütze hat. Da es keinen Anlass gibt hier dem Text Gewalt anzutun um unter den tierisch lebenden Felsenvölkern einen kontinentalgotischen Stamm zu erkennen, muss man sich damit begnügen, dass Cassiodor–Jordanes drei Völker mit Gotennamen nennt ohne mit einem Wort besondere Verbindungen dieser Stämme mit den Kontinentalgoten anzudeuten. Wenn man so will, kann man dazu die Goten auf Gotland fügen, die in der Getica nicht erwähnt sind. Das erste Gebiet, wo der Verfasser die Kontinentalgoten lokalisiert, ist Gothiscandza an der Weichsel.

Man kann auf Hachmann zurückgehen: die Frage einer Verbindung der Goten mit Skandinavien ist eine Frage der skandinavischen Gotennamen. Das ist wiederum eine Frage der Bedeutung von Gesamtbezeichnungen germanischer Stämme wie Goten, Vandalen oder Allemannen. Wieviel sagen sie von einer ethnischen Gesamtheit der unter einem Gesamtnamen zusammengeführten Völker?

Die Forscher haben bis jetzt hier, wie so oft auf anderen Gebieten, wo es sich um Völkermigration und um Entstehen und Auflösung von Reichen handelt, unbewusst mit Vorstellungen operiert, die vom Nationalbegriff des 19. Jahrhunderts stark beeinflusst sind. Die Idee dass eine Völkerwanderung der Völkerwanderungszeit eine einmalige oder in Etappen vollzogene Umsiedlung einer ganzen wohnhaften Nation gewesen ist, Männer, Weiber, Kinder, Vieh und Hausgerät, scheint allgemein verbreitet zu sein, ohne dass man sich darüber klar geworden ist unter welchen speziellen Bedingungen eine solche Umsiedlung sich verwirklichen liess. Gewiss sind solche Völkerwanderungen vorgekommen, aber das normale Muster der Völkerumzüge der alten Welt, in der Periode vom 3. bis zum 10. Jahrhundert ist doch ein ganz anderes.

Prokopios, der als Begleiter Belisars während vieler Jahre die Germanen durch direkte Kontakt studiert und viele Gespräche mit Offizieren aus verschiedener Germanenvölker hatte, gibt im Band III Kapitel 2 seiner Kriegsgeschichte eine Beschreibung der gotischen Völker, Γοτθικὰ ἔθνη, die man als Aussage eines Sachkundigen schätzen muss. Zu den

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gotischen Völkern zählt Prokop die Goten, die Vandalen, die Visigoten und die Gepiden; sie wurden früher Sauromaten oder Schwarzmäntel, μελάγκλαινοι, genannt und es gab auch Leute die Geten sagten. Alle diese Völker wurden nur durch den Namen, ὀνόματι, unterschieden, sonst war ihr Aussehen, ihre Gesetze, ihre Religion und ihre Sprache eins. In Band VI: 1 zählt Prokop zu den gotischen Stämmen auch die Skiren und die Alanen, die keine Germanen waren. Was hier geschildert wird sind keine nationale oder ethnische Einheiten sondern Verbände, die nach ihrer Lebensart charakterisiert und durch das Führertum verschiedener Befehlshaber oder Königsfamilien unterschieden wurden aber sonst derselben Masse der militarisierten germanischen Invasionsvölker angehörten. Waren diese Verbände mit dem Wandernamen des einen oder anderen Stammes überhaupt von einem bis zum anderen Jahrhundert identisch in ethnischem Sinne? Hachmann hat sich dieser Frage von archäologischem Gesichtspunkt aus genähert, wenn er betreffs der wandernden Germanenstämme die Unmöglichkeit konstatiert, „die gesamte, archäologisch fassbare Kultur 'nahtlos' an Vorformen anzuschliessen, die allesamt in einem klar abgrenzbaren Raum nachweisbar sind". Über die Goten hat Hachmann in dieser Hinsicht folgendes zu sagen, indem er sich den Resultaten von Wenskus anschliesst: „Die Gothi, die aus Südrussland heraus der Spätantike bekannt wurden; waren sie im strengen Sinne ausschliesslich die Nachfahren der ostmitteleuropäischen Gotones, Gutones oder Γύθωνεσ? Es ist bekannt, dass die Goten, als sie zum Balkan vorrückten, viele fremde germanische und nichtgermanische Elemente aufgenommen haben. — — — Die Ostgoten, die nach Italien zogen, inkorporierten erneut andere germanische Bevölkerungsteile. Wie soll man angesichts solcher Vorgänge Kulturkontinuität erwarten, selbst wenn der sog. „Traditionskern" erhalten geblieben sein sollte?"

In seinem 1967 erschienenen Werk „Studien zur Geschichte der Weltkrise des 3. Jahrhunderts nach Christus" gibt Andreas Alföldi ein kritisch gesäubertes Bild der Goteninvasionen in den 250iger und sechziger Jahren die eine Voraussetzung der gotischen Siedlung in Dakien gewesen sind. Man bekommt hier den Eindruck eines kontinuierlichen Stroms der „neuen Scharen vom Norden", zwar mit Bastarnen, Vandalen, Herulen, Jazygen, Carpen und anderen gemischt, die unaufhörlich im Gesichtskreis der römischen und byzantinischen Quellen auftauchen. „Es war ein sehr kräftiger Menschenschlag diese Goten; gewaltige Recken waren ihre Krieger", fasst Alföldi erstaunt seine Eindrücke zusammen. Wirklich erstaunlich wenn man bedenkt, dass diese Explosion unzähliger Kriegerscharen — „Heuschreckenschwärme" ist Alföldis Bezeichnung — aus dem begrenzten Gebiet der „masowischen Kultur" Hachmanns plötzlich stattgefunden habe. Der ganze Vorgang ist ausserordentlich unwahrscheinlich,

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so lange man die invadierenden Goten als Mitglieder einer wandernden Nation, einer ethnischen Einheit betrachtet, aber wird verständlich wenn man die Raubzüge der Goten als militärökonomisch lohnende Unternehmungen auffasst, die Rekruten aus der ganzen germanischen Welt mit angrenzenden slawischen, ugrischen und iranischen Stämmen angezogen haben. Ein siegreicher General wie der Gotenkönig Cniva wird seine Volksarmée vielfach verdoppelt haben; wahrscheinlich ist er auch als Befehlshaber ihr Alleinherrscher gewesen. Als die Verhältnisse ruhiger wurden und die Eindringlinge sich in ihrer dakischen Kolonie zurechtgefunden hatten, scheint ihre Gemeinschaft sich beträchtlich aufgelockert zu haben. Die Legende des heiligen Saba, die das Leben in den visigotischen Dörfern Rumäniens schildert, hat keinen Platz für irgendwelche staatliche Obrigkeit, für ein Königtum der visigotischen Nation. Die Machthaber sind die grossen Männer des Landes, ὅι μεγιστᾶνεσ; ein Kleinkönig, basiliskos, hat soviel Macht dass er Befehl geben kann einen Heiligen zum Märtyrer zu machen, aber die Dorfältesten beherrschen das tägliche Leben des Volkes. Erst seitdem die Visigoten von den Hunnen bedrängt über die Donau gegangen waren, hat ihr Grosskönigtum mit Fritigern angefangen.

Die Auffassung, die ich hier vertrete, ist also dass die Gotennamen die auf dem Kontinent vorgekommen sind, keine Stammnamen im eigentlichen Sinn, sondern Distinktionsnamen von Armeen und Kriegerhaufen gewesen sind etwa wie in der Wikingerzeit der Normannenname in verschiedenen Teilen Europas ganz verschiedene ethnische Einheiten gedeckt hat. Dasselbe gilt für die anderen kriegerisch berühmten Wandervölker, Herulen, Wandalen und andere, die dieselben plötzlichen Veränderungen an Grösse und Anzahl wie die Goten aufgewiesen haben. Es ist ein grosses Thema das ich hier leider nicht weiter ausführen kann; es dürfte ziemlich bedeutende Konsequenzen für die Beurteilung der Völkerwanderungen haben.

Und die Verbindung der Goten mit Skandinavien? Von einer ethnischen Verwandtschaft sagen die Namen der skandinavischen Stämme nichts; auch für sie dürfte der Gotenname einen Distinktionswert gehabt haben. Von einer Auswanderung oder einer Einwanderung eines gotischen Stammes wissen wir einfach nichts; man kann auch nicht die Möglichkeit ablehnen, dass die Anknüpfung der Wandersage von der Drei-Schiff-Wanderung mit Skandinavien ganz vom später verschwundenen Ortsnamen Gothiscandza inspiriert worden ist. Dass aber viele der gotischen Krieger, die in Rumänien und in der Ukraine gesiedelt haben aus Skandinavien stammten, ist wahrscheinlich. Wir kennen den Namen eines einzelnen skandinavischen Rekruts zur gotischen Wehrmacht: Roduulf, König der Ranen. Er dürfte weder der erste noch der einzige seiner Art gewesen sein.

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Genesis of the Scandinavian Kingdoms

There is no reason to believe that you should be especially interested in the question of the genesis of the Scandinavian Kingdoms as seen from the national points of view generally discussed in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. I could agree with you in this because I find them rather obsolete myself. But this doesn't mean that the question itself should be without interest from a more general point of view. In the period from the eigth century to 1066 the Scandinavian peoples expanded in a rather remarkable way to southern Russia in the east and to Greenland and the coast of Labrador in the west, with invasions and settlements in Normandy, England, Ireland and the Scottish Isles and with Norman chain reactions into Britain, Italy, Syria and the coast of North Africa. At least one of these invastions, that of England in the 11th century, was a regular conquest by the King of Denmark. You may look on this with the eyes of shocked christian annalists and chroniclers, but you can't regard Scandinavia in the earlier part of the middle ages as a sort of hole in the map of Europe, out of which barbarous but vigorous warriors came out in swarms from time to time. The activities of these warriors can't be explained without a background of social organization of some kind. And the problem of this organization is essentially the problem of the genesis of the Scandinavian Kingdoms.

For one thing, did the Scandinavian Kingdoms exist before the period of the great expansion and can the expansionist vigour be derived from the strength of the administrative and military organization of the Kingdoms?

This is indeed a controversial question, hotly discussed among Scandinavian scholars, and you will find almost absurd differences in the works discussing it. You will find apodictic statements about a Swedish Kingdom in the Bronze age, about 1000 years B.C., detailed descriptions of the state organization of the same Kingdom as it should have been about 100 A.D., when the Swedes were first mentioned in literature by Tacitus, enumerations of Swedish and Danish Kings from at least the 5th century, and on the other hand you will find marked scepticism about the continuous existence of any of these Kingdoms before the 10th century A.D. and about the possibility of mentioning the name of any Scandinavian King before the 9th century. These differences of opinion are due to the special character of the sources. The main sources are the Icelandic sagas, describing remarkable persons and deeds in in Scandinavian history, and they have until recently been regarded as reliable sources, or at least farily reliable. Nowadays all leading Scandinavian historians agree that the sagas are great specimens of imaginative literature, and the same is true of the flower of Danish medieval historiography, Gesta Danorum by Saxo Grammaticus. Together the sagas and Saxo are Scandinavia's literary con-

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tribution to the so-called renaissance of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but as sources to the history of the heathen ages of Scandinavia they are absolutely useless.

In spite of this result of historical research, archaeologists and philologists are in many cases strongly influenced by the sagas and have tried to adapt their interpretations of their respective research material to saga traditions. This is one of the main causes of the great differences of opinion among Scandinavian scholars nowadays: we have got at least three widely separate versions of Scandinavia's early history, owing to the inability of scholars from one field to accept and absorb the views and results of the representatives of the other fields. To this we have to add the eternal smoke-screen of wishful national thinking in efforts to construct a national identity for our Kingdoms as far back as possible.

The history of early political institutions in Scandinavia is complicated by one more major problem of sources. Our chief legal sources are the provincial laws of the main regions of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, codified in the period from the late 12th to the early 14th century. They reflect a primitive societly, indeed the same as that of the sagas, and this has been an argument for those who assume that both the sagas and the laws are more or less remnants of the heathen past. But the conformity of these two kinds of sources is a quite natural congeniality in anachronism: they both claim to reflect immemorial traditions and they both in fact reflect their own age, especially the societey of their own age, which was indeed basically agrarian, bucolic and undeveloped, but in their institutional superstructure distinctly of the high middle ages, late 12th and 13th century. It is true that the laws may contain elements of very old customs, but this doesn't affect the general conclusion that they can't be used as sources of the administrative structure of the Scandinavian Kingdoms in the pre-Christian age.

So much for the sources, to explain why a description of the early history of Scandinavia must be rather fragmentary even if built on a firm foundation, which I hope it will be.

In the first place: how long has Scandinavia been populated by our North-Germanic forefathers? We don't know. It is generally and dogmatically assumed that they are autochton or that they have at least been the dominating element of the population of Scandinavia since the stone age. It may be true and it may be totally false. The place-names of Germanic origin can't be traced earlier than to the first centuries A.D. There may be placenames of another linguistic origin, but this theory still has the quality of a daring heresy. Archeologically one can state that Scandinavia had a chiefly coastal population until the first centuries A.D., when the inland plains of clay soil were cultivated. Osteologically you can't build any reasonable theory about the racial origin of Scandinavians B.C. because you haven't got a statistically valid smaple of data. So we may conclude that Germanic tribes have lived in Scandinavia since the first centuries A.D. – if not earlier, which we don't know.

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From this starting point we will try to trace the origins of the Kingdoms or communities of the Danes, the Swedes, the Gauts and the tribal units of the fjords of Norway and by the inland lakes of the southern part of Norway.

The first Scandinavian tribe mentioned in written sources is that of the Swedes. Tacitus' Germania tells about "Svionum civitates", mighty in men, arms and above all in ships, ruled by one absolute king. They lived "in the Ocean", which could be anywhere in the Baltic region, but there is no reason to place the Swedes outside their later tribal region around the gulf, later Lake Mälar in the eastern central part of present Sweden. Beyond the very name Sviones there is one statement of Tacitus which may be taken for granted and not ascribed to literary construction of any kind: that is the plural form of the Swedish communities, which indicates a federation. The very fact that the fame of this commonwealth far beyond the continental Germans had reached the Roman author may signify its importance; his remarks about it are however so influenced by general geographical conceptions about peoples living at the ends of the earth that you can't pay any serious attention to them. Half a century later Ptolomy of Alexandria mentioned seven tribes in Scandinavia, of which three can be identified without reasonable doubt: the Gauts, the little tribe Firaisoi at a crossing of sea- and land communications, Fjärås, on the present west coast of Sweden, and the Lapps in the far north. But no Swedes – had their commonwealth disappeared or did Ptolomy's itinerary sources simply not mention people in that part of Scandinavia? Or is Ptolomy's information some hundred years late, as has been suggested in connection with his description of Scotland and Ireland? We will probably never get a satisfactory answer to these questions.

The next time we get any information about the Scandinavian tribes is in the middle of the sixth century, in Prokopios' history of the Gothic war and in Jordanes' Getica. What they have to tell about Scandinavia is a mixture of remarkably good sources and sailors' yarns. Prokopios had heard good witnesses, army officers in the Byzantine forces which he followed, talk about a tribe to which several of them belonged, the Herules: how after a crushing defeat against the Langobards they had departed northward, yielding to any pressure from strong tribes in their way, until they reached the country of the Danish nations, Δανων ζθνη, passed it without being molested, sailed over the Ocean to Scandinavia and settled as neighbours to the Gauts. As the Herules had earlier been driven away by the Varnes at the mouth of the Elbe it can only mean that their march went up through the peninsula of Jutland, whose inhabitants belonged to a Danish tribe. Jordanes, refering to a lost work of the reliable Cassiodorus Senator, mentions the Danes as a tribe of Swedish progeny, which had expelled the Herules from their own dwellings. This may mean that the passing of the Herules through Jutland in the 490-ies wasn't as peaceful as Prokopios asserts, or that the Danes had later expanded into the territory of the Herules. The really interesting

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fact is that in combining the statements of the two authors, the Byzantine and the Goth, you will get a picture of the Danes as an already strong and expanding nation, which is confirmed by the Frankish annals describing the raid by a Danish king, Hugleik, against Frisia in 515.

Now you may ask: how do these statements about the Danish nations and the expansion of the Danes fit in with the localisation of the Angles and the Iutes, who invaded England in the middle of the fifth century? It is obvious that the Danes were established in Angel and in Jutland in the 490-ies, and at least the Iutes invading England seem to have been so few, perhaps hardly more than the chieftain's family, that there shouldn't have been much room left on the peninsula for immigrating Danes. But there is no need to assume any sort of mass immigration of Danes. If their Swedish descent means anything beyond a symbolic connection of the two nations, it may have been a conquering body of warriors with Swedish chieftains, just as the Iutes in Kent and most of the wandering Germanic nations during the period of the great migrations.

Jordanes' compliation of Cassiodorus enumerates quite a number of tribes or nations in Scandinavia, most of them very small units living along the coasts of Kattegat and Skagerrak, roughly corresponding to later härads or hundreds. But there are also larger nations farther east. There are the Swedes, known for some remarkable export products: horses and furs, the later highly estimated by the Romans. There are the Gauts, "acre hominum genus et ad bella prumptissimum" and the Ostrogauts, some other nations corresponding to small inland counties and, of course, the exotic Lapps in the far north. The Swedes, probably situated in the later Suethioð around and chiefly north of Lake Mälar, and the Gauts south of Lake Wener in the later Västergötland seem to have been the most formidable nations. But their territories were limited and the larger part of the surface of Scandinavia was occupied by small and independent tribes. The Danes obviously hadn't yet become lords of Scania; it is uncertain where they had gained foothold outside Jutland at that time. In Norway not one dominating tribe or nation can be discerned. And in all this swarm of nations, "turba nationum" in the words of Jordanes, one single king is mentioned: Roduulf, king of the Rans, a little tribe in the present province of Bohuslän on the Swedish west coast quite near the Norwegian border. And he was observed by Cassiodorus because he had scorned his own Kingdom and hastened to the court of Theodoric the Great in Ravenna, where he obviously became one of the preys of the Senator's interviews. Certainly the larger nations had kings or dukes, but we don't know how they were governed.

In summing up the situation in Scandinavia in the sixth century we can conclude that nuclei of two of the later Kingdoms existed: that of the Danes and that of the Swedes. But the Kingdoms were not yeat created.

Two and a half centuries after the age of Prokopios and Jordanes the Viking period of Scandinavia began. Two and a half centuries after that, at the end of the Viking period, Scandinavia was divided between three

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fairly established Kingdoms, the three which still exist. The genesis has taken place somewhere between 550 and 1066 – that is the setting, into which any dating and any explanation has to fit.

We may fix some more framework dates. The first King of the Danes, mentioned in reliable sources, is Angantyr, whom the great missionary Willibrord visited in his own country in 725 – this with the exception of the erratic Danish King Hugleik, who was killed in Frisia two hundred years earlier and who may have been King anywhere. King Angantyr ruled in Denmark but we don't know if he was master of all the later Denmark. That may however have been the case of Godfred, King of the Danes at the beginning of the 9th century and the only strong opponent of Charlemagne at that time – he even dared to challenge the Emperor by invading Frisia.

The first known King of Sweden was Björn about 830, then visited by the missionary Ansgarius. With this statement I am denying the possibility of creating a history of Swedish Kings conquering Gautland in the 6th century by combining the tales of Beowulf about wars between Swedish and "Geatic" Kings with the Norse genealogical poem Ynglingatal and with the big mounds at Old Uppsala. Indeed three of the names of the Swedish Kings mentioned by Beowulf and by Ynglingatal are identical, but this doesn't mean that they are historical, only that they belong to the same folklor of legendary heroes. Still less does it mean that they are buried in the three mounds at Old Uppsala, whose chronology is most uncertain, or that the Geats of Beowulf have more than the name in common with the Gauts. So much for that. The Kings Björn and Olof, reigning at the time of Ansgarius, were on the contrary real and quite powerful Kings, masters not only of Suethioð, the Mälar-region, but also of the coast of Courland at the opposite shore of the Baltic and probably of all the eastern coastland of Sweden down to Scania. We don't know if they were masters of Gautland.

The first King of Norway was Harald Fairhair, a viking chieftain, probably from Rogaland at the southwestern end of present Norway, who united the coastal regions of this country by conqeust, ending with the big sea battle of Hafrsfjord sometime before 900. This Kingdom was, as its name indicates, a united sea-route and not a united territory dominated by a leading tribe such as the Danes or the Swedes. It proved less stable than the two older Scandinavian Kingdoms but became at times quite as powerful.

So the three Kingdoms emerged out of darkness in the first century of the Viking age – Denmark at the very dawn of that period. Their borders were still fleeting, their territories uncertain. The question is: what where the natural conditions of organizing national states with expansionist capacity in Scandinavia in the ninth century?

Aerchaeological research and place-name studies tell us that the population grew all through the first millennium A.D. in the whole of Scandinavia. The contemporaries of the vikings were convinced that Scan-

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dinavia was overpopulated, a rather natural idea derived from their experience of the steady stream of warriors leaving the Scandinavian shores for plunder and conquest. But the existence of an almost unlimited recruiting-market of competent warriors proves almost nothing about a demographic development as the viking armies at most counted some thousands of men. The emigration to Iceland, the Faroe Islands, the Shetlands, the Orkneys, the Danelaw, Normandy and the Russian cities tells us more: Scandinavia without question had a population which expanded overseas. But it is still impossible to estimate the number of the emigrants, which may have been far more modest than their activities. What remains unquestionable is that the population in the home countries was extremely sparse, with the exception of Denmark which may have been comparable to England or Germany in density of population. But on the Scandinavian peninsula the settled regions were isolated from each other by enormous forests, mountains and moors. Denmark on the contrary consisted of islands and peninsulas separated by water. The possibility of organizing these countries into states depended basically on communications.

The problems of creating land communications on the Scandinavian peninsula were tremendous. It was difficult enough to keep highways in the settled regions round the many lakes and moors and over the many streams and rapids. To keep tracks open for traffic through the virgin forests of one hundred miles or more was impossible without the constant pressure of a strong central power. The peasants' communities simply didn't want to – it would have meant not only hard unproductive work but a constant flow of hungry travellers depending on their larders. In spring and autumn the coming and going of the frost in the soil turned all tracks into a sea of mud, which anyhow made it impossible to travel on land in any other fashion than walking or riding. Only in the winter did all go well: the waters were transformed into open and comfortable roads for sledges. In summer water transport was far superior to any other form of communication.

The conditions of climate and of settling in Scandinavia meant that a natural regional community almost totally depended on easy water communications. The largest of these natural communities was the Kingdom of Denmark, linked togerther by the many sheltered narrows and fjords. The tribal region of the Swedes had the Gulf Mälar with its many branches as an artery of communication and trade. In the same way the settled regions of Norway grouped themselves around the Trondheim fjord, the fjords of the Westland, the Oslo fjord and the lakes Mjösa and Tyrifjord. And the country of the Gauts depended on Lake Wener and on the river system of the Wener. These were the real national units where people could get together at the Thing and deicde important matters under the leadership of their regional chieftains. For creating larger political units a strong central power was necessary, and a strong central power couldn't establish itself without a network of routes which could have made military and administrative control of larger territories possible. With this back-

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ground the existence of powerful Kings of Denmark, Sweden and Norway in the 9th century is something of a paradox. One explanation presents itself quite easily: they were Kings of the sea with territories controlled by sea. But as an explanation this one is of limited value because the system of control remains unexplained.

The sea power of the Scandinavians depended on their ships, the construction of which can already be studied in the 4th century boat of Nydam, later developed into sailing-ships and perfected in the Norwegian longships from the royal mounds of Oseberg and Gokstad from the 9th century and in the cargo vessels from Roskildefjord, C 14-dated to the 11th century. They were marvellous ships in many ways: swift, stable in high seas such as the sea of Greenland, handy in shallow waters such as the Russian rivers, creations of perfect functional beauty. But we know now that they had their optimum size, about 20 meters, which of course restricted their cargo capacity. Their rigging with sprit-sails and their steering by oar made it very difficult to sail against the wind. All this means that they were ideal craft for collective enterprises of an occasional nature but decidedly no ideal instruments for the exercise of royal power. If the King of Denmark stayed in Jutland and a rebellion broke out in Scania, it was a matter of wind if he could give his loyal subjects any help. If the King of Norway so journed in the Oslo fjord and his representatives in Tröndelag became unpopular, he wouldn't hear of it until they and their guards had been cold in their graves for a long time. The same was the case if and when the King of Sweden lost his strongholds in Courland. Without a constantly working local administration it must have been impossible to govern the dispersed dominions of the Kings of Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

The art of this administration has until now been unquestioned by the historians. From the various provincial laws of the Scandinavian countries we have known the institution of the "ledung", a detailed organization for keeping, manning and furnishing a certain number of longships in each country to the disposition of the King when he gives command. This, it has been agreed, was the backbone of the power of the Scandinavian Kings in the viking period. A levy founded on the selfgovernment of the communities of free peasants with a remarkably strict classification of the people into hundreds, keeping the ships of the community at the disposition of the King.

Regarding this belief I refer to what I said about the state and society reflected by the provincial laws: it is late 12th and 13th century, not the viking period. The "Ledung" organization of the laws is in reality not a military organization but a taxation of the soil relieving peasants of the traditional duty of military service. In the reliable, contemporary sources from the viking period we get glimpses of radically different conditions for naval warfare. We never hear about ships owned by the commons of the hundreds but in the scald-poems and on the rune-stones we read about chieftains who owned one or several longships and, of course about the King's own ships. The territorial organization of the hundreds vanishes

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from the picture of viking age Scandinavia when focused by critical research; it becomes secondary to the early christian organization of parishes and dioceses. There remain the natural units of tribal countries such as Suethioð, Westguatland, Scania, Seland, Jutland, Viken and Tröndelag, dominated by local chieftains in a way which makes this society distinctly aristocratic. The great Sea Kings of Denmark, Norway and Sweden don't fit very well into the social picture. Still they existed – the paradox remains.

If we examine what we are able to get out of their pattern of political behavior from the reliable sources, they show a striking lack of stability in power and position. Godfred's great Danish Kingdom, Björns and Olafs Swedish and Harald Fairhair's Norwegian ones weren't simultaneous – it may be a coincidence or it may signify that they couldn't exist in a Scandinavian system of balance of power. When a new great Danish Kingdom was created by Harald Gormson in the later part of the 10th century it meant conquest of southern Norway and a dominating influence in the northern part of the country. The King of Sweden Erik, contemporary of Harald Gormson, had to fight for his life against several invaders who attacked him in the heart of his Kingdom. Then the picture suddenly changed: Harald Gormson's son Swein Forkbærd was expelled from his Kingdom by Erik of Sweden, who appeared in command of a great navy and crushed all resistance. Swein Forkbeard had to ally himself with the King of Sweden, could with his help resist an attack on Denmark by the new King of Norway, Olaf Tryggvason – and some years later he conquered Norway and England. Canute the great had a rather poor existence in the beginning, until he became master of a North sea empire. At the end of the viking period the Norwegian Kings Magnus the Good and Harald the Hardminded had taken over the empire building from the Danish Kings and were masters of both Norway and Denmark.

In spite of this instability the Kings of Denmark at least must have commanded great forces of manpower. Godfred had the giant defence wall Danevirke built all over the peninsula of Jutland from Slesvig to Hollingsted. And the circular barrack-fortresses from the end of the 10th century must also have meant a real feature of commanding and organizing. Did there in spite of all exist some sort of territorial organization and civil administration in the viking period, or is any other explanation possible?

There is no trace of any other territorial organization than the conglomeration of tribal units, the natural provinces and counties. But there is a pattern of political focalization which may teach us where the nerve centers of royal power were situated. In the very dawn of the viking period King Godfred forced the inhabitants of the Slavonic port Reric to settle in Slesvig-Hedeby, which became a large city, by surface one of the most important cities of Europe north of the Alps. Here his successors were seated, and here an invading Swedish dynasty, that of Olof and Gnupa, reigned in the first half of the 10th century. In the same way the Swedish Kingdom of the 9th century was centered in and about

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the other great Scandinavian trading port of the Baltic, Birka, situated on an island of the Mälar. Both these cities suddenly sprung into life at the same time as the stream of Arabic silver coins was pouring into the Baltic countries over Russia, and both declined simultaneously with the stop of the flow of silver about 970. Birka was destroyed; Hedeby was deserted by the international transit trade, which obviously now preferred the uninterrupted water route through the Limfjord and down through the Belts of the Sound, perhaps owing to a development of heavier ships and cargoes. And around this new headway of trade the dramatic events of the 11th century phase of the viking period took place. Why did Eric the Victorious of Sweden conquer Denmark with Polish assistance? The seemingly desperate attacks on Denmark by the Norwegian Olafs in 1000 and 1026 were both aiming at the Sound, and so was the more successful expansionist policy of Magnus the Good and Harald the Hard-minded. It is obvious that the policy of the great Sea Kings was somehow bound to the headways of international trade in northern Europe. Stable power meant power over Denmark.

And in Denmark the important pieces of evidence o a military organization in the later period of the viking age are situated along the sea route of the Limfjord and the Baltic straits. They are the circular fortresses, discovered one after another in the last 40 years, constructed with an almost incredible geometrical regularity, planned for housing armed forces fifty times or a hundred times bigger than the garrisons of the later mediaeval castles in Scandinavia. Aggersborg at the Limfjord, the largest of these fortified camps, could keep 4.000 warriors, the smaller ones about 1.000. They were Fyrkat at the Mariager fjord, covering an alternative way out of the Limfjord, Nonnebakken at Odense fjord on the island Fyn, covering the waters north of Fyn and the entrance of the Little Belt, and Trelleborg on Seland, covering the Great Belt. The supply of these garrisons must have meant hard pressure on the surrounding country, which they must have dominated completely. The warriors must also have been well paid if their loyalty to the war lord was to remain unquestionable.

We have got some sporadic testimonies in contemporary sources of what this meant to common people in Denmark and elsewhere. Thietmar of Merseburg says of Swein Forkbeard that he boasted of governing his own people like an enemy. Adam of Bremen mentions in his geographical description of Seland, that it was the central region of Denmark with the King's residence at Roskilde, and here plenty of gold was stored, gathered by piratical robbery, because vikings paid tribute to the King of Denmark from their booty extorted from the barbarians of whom plenty lived around the Baltic. And Ailnoth's legend of King Canute the Saint, written by a man who had lived in Denmark since the last decade of the 11th century describes how the King's treasury was stored and guarded in Aggersborg, the largest of the fortified camps. This is evidence of a self-supplying war machine, disciplined and trimmed in the fortified camps,

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totally relying on the international trade passing through the Baltic. The exact form for marauding on the trade is unknown – temporary tributes laid on the ports, duties demanded in the sailing passages or gangsters' protection, basically it meant piracy as Adam of Bremen justly describes it. It worked as long as the international trade could easyly be drained in the Baltic and especially in Danish waters. After the middle of the 11th century it was starved – the fortified camps were deserted and decayed. The Sea Kings had to disappear or to transform themselves into landed national Kings in on way or another.

All through the viking period there existed two kinds of Kingdoms in Scandinavia: the small, provincial ones, where power has based on the good will of the local chieftains, and the Sea Kingdoms, whose pattern was totally apart from those of the feudal world of western European christianity. It was, if anything, a variety of an eastern European pattern, that of the Rurikides in Russia and of the Piasts in Poland. Cultural as well as economic impulses from the east may have played their part in the creation of these Scandinavian Kingdoms.

To survive in any other form than that of small tribal princes the Kings had to seek new support: that of the catholic church. The church depended on the help of the Kings to become accepted in the strange and primitive Scandinavian society. In return it could offer something invaluable: and advanced administrative organization. It its own interest the church began to convince the chieftains and the peasantry that they had to clear tracks and build bridges for their souls – the bishops planned the creation of highways, and monasteries were founded as stations on the roads through the vast forests. A new instrument of power, the heavy cavalry, was introduced on the Scandinavian highways. The ships and the mounted men of the bishops joint forces with those of the Kings.

All through the 12th century civil wars raged in the Scandinavian Kingdoms: the peasants' communities under their local leaders put up a hard and stubborn resistance to the new central powers in society. At last they were crushed and put under taxation. The Royal power of the Scandinavian Kingdoms had got its foundation, and christian civilization was firmly introduced.

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Erik Lönnroth:

Probleme der Wikingerzeit

Wir Skandinavier fühlen es als ein Privilegium, uns mit Kollegen aus anderen Gebieten des Ostseeraums über gewisse Probleme der Wikingerzeit einige Tage lang unterhalten zu dürfen.

Die Wikingerzeit war eine Periode des Schreckens und der Barbarei, eine Periode in der die skandinavischen Völker einen sehr schlechten Ruf in fast ganz Europa erworben hatten. Und doch enthält sie vielleicht einige der originellsten und erfolgreichsten Leistungen der nordischen Völker. Die Tätigkeit der skandinavischen Kaufleute und Krieger erstreckte sich vom Eismeer bis zum Schwarzen und zum Kaspischen Meer, von Grönland bis nach Spanien. Zentrum dieser Tätigkeit war die ganze Periode hindurch die Ostsee. Der Ursprung der ältesten Städte unserer Länder hat enge Berührung mit wikingerzeitlichen Verhältnissen. Zum Thema unserer Tagung scheinen mir deshalb einige Erwägungen über die Voraussetzungen der ganzen Wikingertätigkeit zu gehören.

In älterer Geschichtsforschung hat man diese Tätigkeit mit den Beute- und Eroberungszügen in Westeuropa einfach identifiziert und das Wirken der Skandinavier im jetzigen Russland analog mit diesen Zügen als eine leicht durchgeführte Okkupation aufgefasst. Seit den Tagen Adams von Bremen hat man Übervölkerung in Skandinavien in Verbindung mit heidnischer Raubsucht als Ursachen angenommen — alle beide zu verschiedenen Zeiten verschieden definiert. In der nationalromantischen Periode hat man in den skandinavischen Ländern die Wikinger als Vertreter der nordischen

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Heldenkraft aufgefasst und ihre Kriegszüge als eine Art naturbedingte Explosion des Heldentums geschildert, was auf die isländische und dänische Sagenliteratur des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts zurückgeht und die kriegerische Art des Wikingertums in einer gar närrischen Weise gepflegt und verfälscht hat.

Die Geschichtsforschung unseres Jahrhunderts hat das Bild geändert. Die literarischen Quellen zur Kriegsgeschichte der Wikingerzeit haben sich grösstenteils als unverwendbar erwiesen; diese Geschichte hat sich in ein unzusammenhängendes Mosaik von Notizen aufgelöst. Statt dessen hat das archäologische Material ganz neue Elemente des Geschehens der Wikingerzeit enthüllt. Grabstätten, Häuser, Stadtanlagen und Ackerfelder zeugen von friedlichem Leben; ganz besonders haben die Münzschätze neues Licht über die nordeuropäischen Handelsverbindungen geworfen. Die Forschungen meines in diesem Jahr verstorbenen Kollegen Sture Bolin waren hier grundlegend; seine Theorien prägen heute, zwar von anderen Forschern komplettiert und modifiziert, die ganze Diskussion über die Bedingungen der grossen skandinavischen Expansion in der Periode Ende des achten bis Mitte des elften Jahrhunderts. Die Raubzüge der Wikinger werden jetzt von den Handelszügen der skandinavischen Seefahrer überschattet. Man kann behaupten, dass die Gründe der expansiven Tätigkeit der Wikinger und ihrer skandinavischen Zeitgenossen heute fast eindeutig auf ökonomische Faktoren zurückgeführt werden.

Ich möchte hier auf die letzte zusammenfassende Arbeit über die Wikingerzeit hinweisen, die des Engländers P. H. Sawyer, die nicht nur an sich eine bedeutende Leistung ist, sondern auch dadurch interessiert, dass der Verfasser die grosse unpublizierte Untersuchung Bolins über Münzen und Münzschätze in Nordeuropa zur Zeit der Wikinger benutzt hat und dadurch über manche Resultate dieses Forschers eine erste Auskunft gibt. Sawyer lehnt die Übervölkerungstheorie nicht ab, obgleich die Siedlungen der Wikinger in eroberten Gebieten seiner wohlbegründeten Meinung nach, nur eine geringe Anzahl Leute absorbiert haben. Da die ersten Raubzüge nach den britischen Inseln von norwegischen Wikingern unternommen wurden, nimmt Sawyer an, dass diese Züge zu einer Zeit begonnen worden sind, als der Drang nach siedlungsbarer Erde in Norwegen zu einem kritischen Moment angelangt war. Der Zeitpunkt soll auch dadurch bestimmt worden sein, dass erst Ende des achten Jahrhunderts die nordischen Schiffe so entwickelt waren, dass man mit einer gewissen Sicherheit die Nordsee von Norwegen

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aus überqueren konnte. Das Beispiel der Norweger soll dann auch die Dänen zu Wikingerzügen angeregt haben. Als allgemeiner Stimulus zur Aktivität und Raubgier wird der schwedische Russlandhandel angeführt, der grosse Reichtümer an Silber nach Schweden und nach Dänemark angezogen hat, was wiederum Dänemark zu einem beliebten Ziel deutscher, schwedischer und norwegischer Eroberung gemacht hat. Die Verarmung nach dem Aufhören des arabischen Silberstroms seit dem Jahr 965 soll den Anstoss zu den letzten grossen Zügen nach Westen gegeben haben, mit denen die Skandinavier Kompensation für das Schwinden ihrer Einkünfte suchten.

Die Erklärungen Sawyers liefern keinen endgültigen Standpunkt der Forschung; sie zeigen vielmehr trotz aller Erfindungsgabe und allem Weitblick des Verf., wie wenige wirkliche Tatsachen zu diesen Fragen wir heute besitzen. Wir wissen viel zu wenig von der Situation landhungriger Neusiedler in Norwegen am Ende des achten Jahrhunderts, aber man kann soviel annehmen, dass die Situation in den verschiedenen Teilen des Landes nicht dieselbe gewesen sein kann. Die Annahme, dass die skandinavischen Segelschiffe gerade zu dieser Zeit neue Takelage bekommen haben, bezieht sich auf ein einziges Exemplar, das Schiff von Eskekärr, das nunmehr in die frühe Wikingerzeit verlegt wird, und weiter auf Abbildungen von Schiffen mit grossen Segeln auf den gotländischen Bildsteinen. Das Schiff von Eskekärr zeugt unter allen Umständen nicht davon, dass man nicht früher schon Schiffe mit ähnlicher Takelage gebaut haben kann, und die Bildsteinmeister dürften von der navigatorischen Wirklichkeit nur mässig beeinflusst gewesen sein, wenn sie ein dekoratives Motiv ausmetzelten. Die Reichtümer, die aus dem schwedischen Russlandhandel geflossen sind und die vorzugsweise in schwedischer Erde bewahrt sind, hätten wohl eher Schweden als Dänemark zu einem verlockenden Ziel der Eroberungen gemacht. Die grossen Eroberungszüge am Anfang des elften Jahrhunderts schliesslich wurden von dänischen Grosskönigen, nicht von ruinierten schwedischen Kaufleuten ausgeführt und hatten als Voraussetzung eine sehr teure militärische Organisation. Wäre das primäre Motiv der Wikingerzüge kolonisatorischer Landhunger gewesen, so hätte es wohl nicht zwei Menschenalter gedauert: vom ersten Anfall der Wikinger in Grossbritannien 789 bis 851, ehe die Angreifer zur Überwinterung bereit waren. Hätte die Entwicklung des Schiffsbaus den Zeitpunkt für Angriffe über See von Skandinavien aus bis zum Ende des achten Jahrhunderts bestimmt, so wäre es wohl unerklär-

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lich, dass der dänische König Hugleik, der Hygelac Beowulfs, schon Anfang des sechsten Jahrhunderts die friesische Küste invadiert hat — ganz davon abgesehen, dass die skandinavische Tätigkeit in Russland eher Tragbarkeit der Schiffe über Land als Stabilität in raumer See zur Voraussetzung gehabt hat.

Die Lage der Problematik dürfte zu grosser Vorsicht und zum Vermeiden einseitiger Erklärungen auffordern. Wir kennen mehr haltbare Tatsachen als je zuvor zur frühen Geschichte der Wikingerzeit, aber wir wissen einfach nicht, welche Tatsachen für die Erklärung des grossen Geschehens wirklich relevant sind. Um hier weiterzukommen, muss man meines Erachtens damit anfangen einige Vorstellungen auszuschalten, die mehr oder weniger anachronistisch sind und die einer wahren Erkenntnis im Wege stehen.

Erstens kann man, wenn man von Verhältnissen der frühen Wikingerzeit spricht, nicht mit einem Dänemark, einem Norwegen oder einem Schweden im Sinne der späten Wikingerzeit oder gar des Hochmittelalters rechnen. Es bestand ein dänisches Königreich am Anfang des neunten Jahrhunderts, ein schwedisches um die Mitte und ein norwegisches am Ende desselben Jahrhunderts, aber es bestanden keine Reichsorganisationen, keine Reichsinstitutionen und erst recht keine Nationalitäten. Es hat daher keinen Sinn, von einem speziell norwegischen Drang nach neuen Siedlungsgebieten oder von einem speziell schwedischen Interesse am Osthandel zu sprechen, und die dänische Schlüsselstellung des Transithandels galt in erster Linie dem heutigen Schleswig, nicht dem ganzen späteren Reichsgebiet. Eine bewusste Handels- oder Eroberungspolitik kann einzelnen Königen oder Häuptlingen zugeschrieben werden, den späteren dänischen, schwedischen oder norwegischen Völkern aber nicht. Es könnte den Forschern, die sich mit wikingerzeitlichen Problemen beschäftigen, eine gewisse politische Begriffsauflösung empfohlen werden.

In der heutigen Lage ist es vielleicht wichtiger zu bedenken, dass die ökonomischen Gesichtspunkte, die so viel neuen und fruchtbaren Stoff in die Diskussion hineingeführt haben, mit nationalökonomischen Schablonen späterer Zeiten vermengt sind, die allzu leicht die Perspektive in unrealistischer Weise verlängern. Es hat einen nordeuropäischen Fernhandel gegeben, aber seine Bedeutung für die verschiedenen Gebiete Europas hängt von seinem quantitativen Umfang ab, der uns ganz unbekannt ist. Natürlich kann man aus den Münzfunden Statistik machen, aber was zeigen die Zahlen? Nicht den Umfang des Handels, auch nicht wieviele arabische, deutsche und

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andere Münzen im Umlauf gewesen sind, sondern nur wieviele Münzen zu gewissen Zeiten thesauriert, in der Erde versteckt wurden und nicht wieder ausgegraben sind. Natürlich geben diese Quantitäten Hinweise auf Zahlungsverhältnisse und Handelswege — natürlich ist der jähe Umschlag von arabischen zu westeuropäischen Münzen in den skandinavischen Schätzen in den Jahren um 970 bedeutsam. Aber rein quantitativ gesehen zeugen die Münzfunde von kriegerischen Verheerungen, nicht von friedlichem Warenaustausch. Der Umstand, dass die Hauptmasse der arabischen Münzen auf Gotland und im schwedischen Kerngebiet rings um den Mälarsee gefunden wurde, beweist darum nicht endgültig, dass diese Länder Zentren des Osthandels waren. Die Leute aus dem Volke Rhos, die 839 mit einer byzantinischen Gesandtschaft am Kaiserhof in Ingelheim anlangten, waren Schweden, wie es die Annales Bertiniani bezeugen. Aber der Volksname Rhos stammt, wie es Erland Hjärne festgestellt hat, aus einem altnordischen Wort für „Schiff" und hat nichts mit der mittelalterlichen schwedischen Provinz Roden zu tun. „Das äussere Rhos", ἡ ἔξω Ῥωσία, von dem Konstantin Porphyrogennetos spricht, umfasst einige nordrussische Städte und vielleicht auch Länder jenseits Novgorod, von Konstantinopel aus gesehen, aber von Schweden ist bei ihm keine Rede. Zwar liegt es nahe anzunehmen, dass Schweden und Gotländer vor anderen nordischen Völkern mit dem Russlandhandel beschäftigt waren, aber dass dieser Handel ein exklusiv schwedisches Unternehmen gewesen sei, wird von keiner Quelle bezeugt. Nordische Kaufleute fuhren in Russland stromabwärts, um ihre Waren zu verkaufen; nordische Herrscher sassen in den russischen Handelsstädten, geradeso wie in Birka und in Haithabu, aber dass ihre Interessen mit den Interessen eines Volkes oder mehrerer Völker identisch gewesen wären, muss erst bewiesen werden, ehe man es glauben kann. Waren überhaupt die Interessen der Kaufleute einmal identisch mit denen der Herrscher? Wir wissen es nicht — es kann für uns keineswegs axiomatisch sein.

Ich glaube, dass wir im grossen und ganzen viel zu oft geneigt sind, die Wikinger mit skandinavischen Seefahrern und mit Skandinaviern der Wikingerzeit zusammenzuschlagen. Die Skandinavier, die als Seeräuber auftraten, sind doch auch in ihren Heimatländern als Seeräuber bekannt gewesen. Ihre Lebensform und ihre Ziele waren ganz andere als die der Kaufleute, für die es katastrophal gewesen sein muss, als Wikinger verdächtigt zu werden. Erst wenn wir einen radikalen Unterschied zwischen Wikingerzügen und friedlichem Verkehr machen — zwar damit einverstanden, dass dieselben

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Leute zu verschiedenen Zeiten Langschiffe und Handelsschiffe haben bemannen können — erst dann wäre uns eine Möglichkeit gegeben, eine ernste Diskussion über die Voraussetzungen der skandinavischen Expansion der Wikingerzeit anzufangen.

Es gab unzweifelhaft einen internationalen Handel von gewissem Umfang, der wenigstens in einigen Punkten auf skandinavischem Boden zusammenstrahlte — den grossen Städten Haithabu und Birka. Wieviel diese internationalen Gesellschaftsbildungen für die Bauerngemeinden der umgebenden Länder bedeutet haben, kann diskutiert werden — dass Stadt und Land sozial gesehen einander fremd gegenüber standen, kann wohl kaum bestritten werden. Ob die Bauern der ländlichen Dörfer fremde Silbermünzen thesaurierten, weil sie reich waren, oder weil diese Münzen im täglichen Verkehr durch weniger wertbeständige Zahlungsmittel ersetzt wurden, ist eine der Fragen, vor denen wir vorläufig stehen bleiben. Unter keinen Umständen dürfen wir den Bauerngemeinden eine lebhafte sozialökonomische Überzeugung von der Notwendigkeit einer aktiven Kolonialpolitik des Fernhandels wegen zuschreiben.

Wir wissen aber, dass die ersten Königreiche, die in zuverlässigen Quellen erwähnt sind, mit den Städten in nahem Zusammenhang stehen: das dänische Reich Godfreds und später das Reich Gnupas mit Haithabu, das schwedische Reich Björns und Olofs mit Birka, und das kleine norwegische westfoldreich mit Skiringssal. Godfreds Massnahmen vor dem Konflikt mit Karl dem Grossen, die Bevölkerung Rerics zwangsweise nach Haithabu zu überführen und danach das Danewerk zum Schutz des Transportwegs zwischen der Schlei und der Trene aufzurichten, zeigen deutlich, wie vital der hier pulsierende Handel für seine Herrschaft gewesen ist. Die Birkakönige, Ansgars Zeitgenossen, haben versucht, sich in den kurländischen Seestädten festzusetzen und haben zugleich mit den Dänen um Birka kämpfen müssen. Die skandinavischen Seekönige des neunten Jahrhunderts haben offenbar den internationalen Handel und die Städte exploitiert, was wohl die einzige Erklärung ihrer Seekriegsmacht sein muss zu einer Zeit, in der die praktischen Voraussetzungen einer regelmässigen Besteuerung oder Militäraushebung der wohnhaften Bevölkerung fehlten.

Die Gleichzeitigkeit vom beginnenden Strömen des arabischen Silbers durch Russland nach Skandinavien, vom Entstehen der Königreiche und von den ersten Seeräuberplünderungen in Westeuropa dürfte kein Zufall sein. Dass der internationale Handel der Skandinavier älter als die Wikingerzeit war, bezeugen die reichen Grab-

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stätten der Vendelzeit und vor allem das neuerdings enthüllte Lager importierter Gegenstände auf Helgö im Mälarsee — die arabischen Münzen und das Entstehen der grossen Handelsstädte deuten aber auf neue und günstige Konjunktur des Handels. Das Seekönigtum wurde vom Grosshandel ernährt. Wohin in diese Zusammenhänge gehören aber die Wikinger?

Die Anfänge der Wikingertätigkeit sind Raids begrenzten Masstabs, die sich seit 789 fast ausschliesslich gegen Nordengland, Irland und die atlantischen Inseln richteten und von wenigen Schiffen ausgeführt wurden. Hiergegen kontrastiert aber der grosse Kriegszug des Dänenkönigs Godfred gegen Friesland, gegen den Karl der Grosse sein Land nicht hat verteidigen können — hier war von Seekrieg grossen Masstabs und nicht von Wikingerzug die Rede. Es waren die kleinen Raubzüge, die sich in den 830er Jahren zu grossen Expeditionen und daraus stufenweise zum permanent marodierenden „grossen Heer" entwickelten. Sie scheinen anfangs hauptsächlich von den norwegischen Küsten ausgegangen zu sein. Primäre Voraussetzungen dieser Züge waren, dass sie von einem kleinen Häuptling oder von einigen Häuptlingen angeführt wurden, die geeignete Schiffe besassen und die so viel Vertrauen erweckten, dass sie geeignete Mannschaft bekommen konnten. Als Kleinbetrieb gesehen entsprach es dem Grossbetrieb der Seekönige und war, wie schon lange erkannt, von politischen Konjunkturen abhängig.

In den Hochflutsperioden der Wikingertätigkeit befanden sich mehrmals aus der Heimat vertriebene Könige und Königssöhne an der Spitze der Invasionsflotten. Es liegt nahe, daran zu denken, dass die ersten Wikingerhäuptlinge Kleinpotentaten gewesen sind, die in einer oder anderer Weise vom ersten skandinavischen Grosskönigtum, der dänischen Herrschaft Godfreds, von der Heimatküste verjagt wurden — der Dänenkönig herrschte bekanntlich am Anfang des neunten Jahrhunderts über die Kattegatt- und Skagerrakländer, das norwegische Westfoldreich darin einbegriffen, woher die ersten Wikingerscharen ins Frankenreich kamen. Jedenfalls scheint die private Seeräubertätigkeit durch den Zerfall des dänischen Königreichs stimuliert worden zu sein; dänische Wikinger spielten danach eine führende Rolle in den westlichen Raubzügen.

Das Eigenartige der Wikingerzüge besteht wohl nicht so sehr darin, dass mehr oder weniger desperate Häuptlinge ihr Glück als Seeräuber versuchten, sondern darin dass ihre Schiffe immer kompetente Mannschaft fanden — Männer die das harte und komplizierte Zusammenleben in einem Langschiff beherrschten und dabei auch

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zu Land gefürchtete Krieger waren. Die sozialen Bedingungen des skandinavischen Rekrutenmarkts, die man voraussetzen muss, gehören leider zu den unbekannten Grössen der Wikingeräquation. Hat etwa die grosse Veränderung der Bauernsiedlungen, als die Grossfamilien in den Jahrhunderten vor der Wikingerzeit zersprengt und von Dorf- oder Einzelsiedlungen abgelöst wurden, eine Unruhe und Beweglichkeit geschaffen, die den fliessenden Verhältnissen des Spätmittelalters ähnlich waren, als man auch ohne Schwierigkeit Söldner werben konnte? Waren die ersten Wikingermannschaften ehemalige Teilnehmer an Handelsfahrten? Haben zufällige Missernten die ersten Berufswikinger über See getrieben, und hat deren Erfolg allmählich den Rekrutenmarkt ins Leben gerufen? Nach allen Mutmassungen bleibt uns nur übrig, die erstaunliche Tatsache festzustellen, dass die spärliche Bevölkerung Skandinaviens der Wikingerzeit fast unerschöpfliche Reserven brauchbarer Seekrieger zuliess. Will jemand diese Erscheinung Übervölkerung nennen, so steht es ihm natürlich offen; die Definition müsste jedoch näher motiviert werden.

Meine Damen und Herren, ich habe keine Rätsel gelöst, nur einige Rätsel vorgelegt. Ich habe nur feststellen wollen, dass fast alles in der Geschichte der Wikingerzeit neu geprüft werden muss, darin mit einbegriffen die Hauptfrage: welcher Zufall es eigentlich ist, dass die Rhos des Ostens und die Wikinger des Westens gleichzeitig aufgetreten sind.

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ERIK LÖNNROTH

COMMUNICATIONS, VIE ECONOMIQUE ET MODÈLES POLITIQUES DES VIKINGS EN SCANDINAVIE

Il faut, pour commencer, présenter quelques problèmes de définition. La notion de normands, « Northmanni », est claire et univoque d'un point de vue italien ou français ou même anglais après 1066, mais elle ne l'est pas du tout d'un point de vue scandinave. En Scandinavie, un « nordman », « northmannus » et un Norvégien ou un Scandinave de Normandie, mais jamais un Danois ou un Suédois. Un « Viking » est un pirate: le mot désigne une profession, et non une nationalité. Le mot semble d'ailleurs être resté presque inconnu en Suède: une seule pierre runique suédoise, parmi des milliers, en porte référence, et elle a été érigée à la gloire d'un homme de famille norvégienne. Il y a bien eu des royaumes, des duchés vikings, etc., mais il faut distinguer entre Vikings et habitants de la Scandinavie.

Un autre problème de définition: on a beaucoup parlé des expéditions des Vikings à l'ouest et à l'est, et l'on a généralement pris pour un fait que les Vikings de l'ouest ont été des Danois ou des Norvégiens, et les Vikings de l'est des Suédois. On a même supposé, de la part du peuple suédois en Russie, et de la part des peuples danois et norvégiens dans la mer du Nord, des desseins de politique commerciale. Mais les Scandinaves qui ont pénétré en Rus-

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sie à l'époque des Vikings ne furent pas des Vikings: ils sont appelés « rus », en grec « ρῶσ ». Il est probable que la plupart des Vikings ont été des Danois et des Norvégiens, et que la plupart des « rus » ont été des suédois, mais il n'y a pas eu, dans les activités des uns et des autres, de division à proprement parler nationale, pour une simple raison: il n'a pas existé de nationalités différentes dans la Scandinavie de cette époque. Un grand nombre des pierres runiques trouvées en Suède évoquent les hommes qui ont fait partie de la grande armée d'occupation, en Angleterre, de cette armée qui, au onzième siècle, était commandée par les rois de Danemark. D'un autre côté, le chroniqueur allemand Thietmar de Merseburg appelle les Scandinaves de Russie des « Danois », ce qui témoigne seulement d'une absence naturelle de distinction nationale. Car le mot « rus » ne désigne aucunement une nationalité: nous savons, depuis les savantes recherches de mon ancien collègue d'Uppsala Erland Hjärne, que « rus », exactement comme « Viking », est un terme de métier scandinave: il désigne un homme de vaisseau, un marin. Plus tard, le mot « rus », « Rusia » a servi à désigner deux nationalités différentes: en Russie, il désigne la Russie même, et dans les formes finnoises et esthoniennes « Ruotsi » et « Rootsi », il indique la Suède. Mais c'est là une évolution qui n'a rien, à voir avec la situation qui existait à l'époque où les peuples scandinaves ont démontré leur capacité d'expansion. Les « rus », c'étaient alors des Scandinaves, marchands et marins en Europe orientale, comme les Varègues étaient alors des membres assermentés d'une confrérie, plus tard des soldats à Constantinople; les Vikings, des pirates scandinaves dans l'Europe de l'ouest, et les Normands, des Scandinaves occupant la France et s'y installant, aussi bien que des Français de Normandie, les occupants de l'Italie et de l'Angleterre où ils s'implantaient.

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Le phénomène le plus frappant, c'est ici, en effet, l'étendue de l'activité des peuples scandinaves, au cours de la période 800-1066. Activité à la fois pacifique et guerrière, elle est celle de peuples très peu nombreux, exclus de la communauté de la civilisation chrétienne. Il faut lui trouver une explication suffisante, et qui ne soit ni romantisée ni trop complexe.

Une explication classique, aussi vieille que les expéditions des Vikings, consiste à invoquer le surpeuplement de la Scandinavie. C'est une explication naturelle pour les peuples de l'Europe de l'Ouest tourmentés par les invasions, et fondée sur l'impression qu'un flot incessant de guerriers scandinaves se recrutait et se formait en armées puissantes. A l'époque moderne, on a souvent pris comme une preuve du surpeuplement de la Scandinavie l'émigration scandinave dans certains des territoires occupés, et surtout au nord-est de l'Angleterre, en Normandie, en Islande, et dans les Orcades. Mais à mesure qu'étaient connus les résultats des recherches entreprises sur cette émigration, grâce surtout à l'étude des noms de lieux dans les territoires mentionnés, l'impression a progressivement prévalu que les immigrants n'ont été qu'en nombre limité: des capitaines, avec leurs familles et leurs compagnons, qui se sont installés dans ces pays nouveaux. En fait, deux générations ont passé entre les premières expéditions des Vikings contre l'Angleterre, et leur premier hivernage dans ce pays, et cela n'indique vraiment pas que le manque de terre ait été la cause de cette expansion scandinave qui commence aux alentours de l'an 800.

Cela n'exclut pas la possibilité d'un surpeuplement de la Scandinavie à cette époque. Mais comment définir le surpeuplement, dans les conditions régnant en Scandinavie au IXe siècle ? Si l'on excepte le Danemark, les régions peuplées, dans cette partie du monde, se trouvaient iso-

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lées les unes des autres par de vastes forêts et des chaînes de montagne, en sorte que ni la Suède ni la Norvège ne formaient de pays cohérent. Il a bien été possible, là, que une gorge de fjord, ou une plaine, autour d'un des grands lacs, soit frappée de famine, ou ait accrû sa population jusqu'à avoir un excédent de main d'œuvre en une période féconde, quand une situation différente régnait dans la région voisine. Le Danemark était, certainement, un pays d'aspect relativement homogène, mais au Danemark le défrichement sur sol forestier avait déjà commencé à cette époque, donnant une garantie à l'absorption d'une éventuel surplus de main d'œuvre. En tout était de cause, la Scandinavie avait certainement une population clairsemée par rapport au continent européen et aux îles britanniques. Le fleuve de guerriers a bien été une réalité, mais c'est un phénomène qu'il faut expliquer malgré la situation démographique, et non pas comme sa conséquence.

Il est vraiment prodigieux que les capitaines Normands-Vikings aient, durant toute cette période, réussi à trouver des recrues compétentes dans leur pays natal. Et compétence signifie en ce cas que ces jeunes hommes furent des marins éprouvés, et spécialement des rameurs bien exercés, des guerriers féroces et loyaux, et, le cas échéant, de patients participants à des voyages d'exploration. Disposition qui laisse, en somme, supposer un milieu natal et une formation assez singuliers.

Tout d'abord, la plupart des Scandinaves de cette époque ont été, pour ainsi dire, naturellement, des marins, parce que l'eau a été pour eux la seule voie de communication possible. La Scandinavie de l'ère des Vikings est caractérisée par un manque presque totale de grand'routes. Le Danemark, fait d'une multitude d'îles et de péninsules, reliées par la mer, possédait une seule voie de com-

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munication terrestre importante: celle qu'on appelle la route des armées en Jutland, et qui suivait la ligne de partage des eaux en direction nord-sud. Dans la péninsule scandinave, les régions habitées devaient être reliées entre elles par des voies de communication terrestres, mais il n'y en avait en réalité que très peu. Aucun pouvoir d'état, supérieur et organisateur, n'avait dans ces pays ordonné la construction de grand'routes comparables aux voies romaines. En outre, le terrain et le climat scandinaves sont très peu favorables au maintien de routes terrestres. Le grand nombre des lacs, des rapides et des marais, le gel du sol dès l'automne et le dégel au printemps, processus qui sont, l'un et l'autre, d'assez longue durée, lui offrent assez d'obstacles naturels, qu'il aurait fallu pour surmonter les mesures énergiques d'un organisateur, surtout si l'on considère la médiocrité des ressources techniques aux IXe et Xe siècles. Et il n'y avait, pour prendre ces mesures, aucun organisateur. Jusqu'au XIIIe siècle, le contrôle des grand'routes appartenait à de petites communautés de paysans, aux cantons « härad » en Suède, et il semble en être allé de même en Norvège. Les paysans avaient tout simplement intérêt à empêcher les voyageurs d'arriver dans leur canton et solliciter leur hospitalité. Ils ne pouvaient donc nullement avoir l'intention d'ouvrir et d'entretenir des grand'routes à travers les forêts désertes: la charge qu'eût été pour eux l'hospitalité en serait devenue incessante et écrasante. En conséquence, les petits pays, les provinces scandinaves – Jutland, Seland et Scanie pour le Danemark, Vestergautland, Ostergautland et Suède proprement dite pour la Suède, le Vik, le pays des fjords de l'ouest (Vestlandet) et Tröndelag pour la Norvège – ont tous communiqué entre eux par voie maritime. En matière de relations, dans la Scandinavie du Moyen-âge, la règle est que l'eau a lié, et que les forêts ont séparé les pays

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et les provinces. Toutes les terres cultivées, en Suède et en Norvège, se sont trouvées groupées autour d'un lac, autour d'une baie ou d'un fjord. En hiver, c'est la multitude des fleuves et des petits lacs, pris par la glace, qui constituaient un ensemble de chaussées naturelles: en été, c'est elle qui permettait la navigation, et toute la population a dû se familiariser avec la navigation sur grands et sur petits bateaux.

Les Scandinaves, à l'époque des Vikings, ont possédé des bateaux remarquables; la construction du bateau à rames apparaît dès le IVe siècle: c'est le bateau de Nydam, au Slesvig. Il est probable que son développement en bateau à voiles est intervenu au cours des siècles immédiatement postérieurs, bien que les exemplaires connus soient trop rares pour autoriser des conclusions typologiques certaines. Ce développement a abouti, aux alentours de l'an 1000, à la construction d'un grand nombre de navires, de types variés, comme nous le savons depuis la découverte de six vaisseaux à Roskildefjord, au Danemark, voici quelques années. Le vaisseau scandinave a eu ses limites: il avait une longueur optimale de vingt mètres, il était mince et léger, et en conséquence sa capacité de charge était modique. Mais c'était un navire très rapide, à très faible tirant d'eau et parfaitement adapté à la navigation en haute mer, ce que prouvent avant tout le trafic régulier établi avec les colonies d'Islande et du Groenland, et les voyages hasardeux au Labrador. En même temps, il était idéal pour la navigation fluviale, et il est mentionné à ce titre comme les « μονόχυλα » des « rus » par Constantin Porphyrogennetos.

En somme, les Scandinaves des IXe et Xe siècles étaient réduits à la navigation, dans leur vie journalière, pour presque toute communication, et ils possédaient des moyens de transports supérieurs, des navires utilisables au besoin

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comme vaisseaux de guerre. Il faut ajouter à cela un autre facteur: une évolution sociale que nous connaissons très mal encore, et qui n'a été observée que tout récemment. Au VIIe siècle, un changement fondamental semble avoir eu lieu dans les habitudes domestiques des peuples scandinaves: l'abandon des grandes maisons collectives, habitées par de grandes familles, au profit d'une multitude de petites maisons groupées en villages. Des changements sociaux de cette sorte ont dû occasionner une instabilité anormale, ce qui, ajouté à l'habitude de la navigation, doit expliquer l'existence de ce marché inépuisable de recrues vikings et la tendance à l'émigration, malgré le fait que la popoulation de la Scandinavie ait été très clairsemée.

Cela ne suffit pas, cependant, pour motiver une expansion limitée à la période 800-1066. Les capitaines, les ducs et les rois des vikings ont disposé des ressources nécessaires pour entretenir leurs hommes, et préparer méthodiquement de grandes expéditions. Leur activité demande une explication spéciale.

On a vulgarisé, à ce propos, une théorie selon laquelle l'activité commerciale de l'Europe du Nord se développait dans des conditions spéciales, précisément au cours de la période oú les Vikings et les « rus » ont manifesté leur capacité d'expansion. Cette théorie a été formulée par mon collégue, le regreté Sture Bolin, de l'Université de Lund. Selon son opinion, les marchands scandinaves se sont trouvés, au cours de cette période, favorisés par une nette différence dans la valeur de l'argent entre l'Europe de l'ouest et le caliphat arabe. Des mines d'argent nouvelles et très importantes ont alors été mises en exploitation, dans la partie orientale du caliphat. Les Scandinaves qui vendaient des esclaves et des fourrures aux Arabes, ont été payé en argent, obtenu ainsi à un cours assez bas. Les Scandinaves se sont servis de l'argent arabe, comme d'une mon-

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naie d'échange, lors de leurs transactions en Europe de l'ouest, et ils ont obtenu des armes et d'autres produits manufacturés à des prix favorables; il est probable qu'ils les ont, en partie, revendus aux Arabes. Ce trafic a duré jusqu'à la fin du xe siècle. C'est alors, en effet, qu'on à commencé d'exploiter de nouvelles mines d'argent dans le Harz, en Allemagne, que la balance du cours de l'argent a été rétablie entre l'est et l'ouest, et que les marchands scandinaves ont perdu leur position privilégiée.

La théorie de Sture Bolin a été contestée. Elle est brillante sur plus d'un point, mais présente certainement aussi des défauts. Les preuves de l'importation en Scandinavie d'argent arabe sont des preuves archéologiques, impressionnantes en elles-mêmes: le plus grand nombre des monnaies du caliphat trouvées dans un pays quelconque du monde ont été trouvées en Suède. On en a recensé jusqu'à 52.000 il y a quelques années, et depuis, en 1966 et 1967, on a découvert les deux trésors d'argent les plus importants de tous, dans l'île de Gotland. Des quantités plus modestes de monnaies arabes de la même époque ont été trouvées en Norvège et au Danemark, en Allemagne du Nord, en Pologne et en Russie, avec une concentration remarquable autour de la mer Baltique. Elles ont été frappées au cours de la période qui va de 800 aux environs de l'an 970. A ce moment, elles disparaissent soudain, et ce sont des monnaies allemandes et anglaises qui les remplacent. Tous ces points donnent de la force à la théorie. Mais il se trouve que les monnaies en question sont amassées en trésors, situés à une majorité écrasante dans la Suède centrale, autour du lac Mälaren et surtout sur l'île de Gotland, tandis que l'on en trouve très peu dans la région du Slesvig, au point de convergence véritable du commerce scandinave de cette période. En outre, l'existence de ces trésors ne prouve pas indubitablement l'existence d'un commerce.

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Ils ont appartenu à des hommes qui ont amassé des trésors, qui ont enterré leurs biens les plus précieux et qui ne les ont pas déterrés. En conséquence, l'existence des trésors prouve avant tout des dévastations et montre secondairement que cet argent thésaurisé n'a pas été employé comme moyen de paiement dans le cadre de l'activité commerciale quotidienne de la Suède et de Gotland, mais bien épargné en vue de quelque entreprise spéciale. La présence de ces monnaies arabes prouve certainement une importation d'argent, mais ne fournit aucun élément sur l'extension de l'activité commerciale et n'en fournit que très peu sur l'importance des relations établies entre le caliphat et la Scandinavie.

Mais pendant les deux siècles considérés, c'est à dire au cours du IXe et du Xe siècle, deux villes importantes ont existé en Scandinavie: Hedeby, près du Slesvig, au sud du fjord Sli, et Birka, sur une petite île du Mälaren, au milieu de la Suède. Elles avaient l'une et l'autre une superficie considérable, par comparaison avec d'autres grandes villes de l'Europe du Nord, et, l'une et l'autre, elles ont brillé soudain au commencement du IXe siècle. Birka fut dévastée et disparut à la fin du Xe siècle. Le déclin de Hedeby commença vers l'an 1000. Leur site géographique – Hedeby, sur l'isthme le plus étroit du Jutland, sur la voie naturelle de transit de la mer du Nord à la Baltique, et Birka, sur une voie de passage traditionnelle, entre le golfe de Finlande et l'entrée de la Baltique – indique ce que les sources écrites confirment: que ces villes ont été des ports internationaux, que leur existence a dépendu d'une importante activité commerciale en direction est-ouest. La prosperité simultanée de ces deux ports et de l'afflux très important de monnaie arabe dans la région de la Baltique est un fait qui doit établir la preuve de l'importance du commerce

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des Scandinaves avec les marchands du caliphat et avec les bourgeois de l'empire franc et des îles britanniques.

Voici l'explication des ressources dont ont disposé les Normands-Vikings pour leurs entreprises coloniales. Mais ce n'est pas une explication simple. Les Vikings étaient des pirates de profession, et la piraterie est toujours l'ennemie mortelle du commerce régulier, ce qui laisse à penser que les marchands-navigateurs et les pirates-navigateurs dirigeaient des entreprises qui n'avaient rien de commun, même si leurs équipages pouvaient changer de rôle. La piraterie a suivi le commerce en y maraudant, comme toujours, et nous savons maintenant que les débuts de ces deux activités scandinaves sont antérieurs à la période qui s'ouvre vers l'an 800. M. Jankuhn a découvert deux petites cités dont l'essor a précédé celui de Hedeby dans le fjord de Sli, et Wilhelm Holmqvist a pu trouver les traces d'un comptoir de commerce à Helgö, près de Birka. Il s'agit d'un petit port qui date du IIIe siècle, et où l'on a entre autres trouvé une crosse irlandaise et un Bouddha indien du VIIe siècle, qui montrent l'importance des distances couvertes par l'activité commerciale de la Suède pré-Viking. Notons d'ailleurs que des sources anglo-saxonnes du VIIe siècle contiennent le mot « Viking » dans l'acception qu'il devait avoir plus tard, et que, en conséquence, le phénomène recouvert par le mot remonte au moins à cette époque. Et cependant, les expéditions des Vikings ont commencé à se succéder, de façon incessante, à partir de l'an 800. Elles furent des événements aux graves conséquences politiques pour de vastes régions de l'Europe, et elles aboutirent rapidement à des actions politiques proprement dites.

Il serait ici nécessaire de considérer le milieu politique de la Scandinavie, où les capitaines des Vikings ont été élevés. Pour ce faire, il convient d'abord d'effacer de notre

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mémoire l'image bien connue – bien connue au moins en Europe du nord – l'image, dis-je, des rois et des héros vikings répandue par les sagas islandaises, qui sont des romans très suggestifs, mais sans valeur historique réelle. Cette image d'une monarchie et d'une société assez stables et relativement civilisées, est, en réalité, une image des conditions régnant au XIIIe siècle, époque à laquelle a existé une organisation militaire, une administration bien que encore primitive, et où apparaissent les débuts de la perception de taxes régulières dans tous les pays scandinaves. La verité est tout autre: nous n'en connaissons guère que des fragments, tirés du petit nombre des sources dont on peut se servir pour obtenir des informations certaines: ce sont des scald-poèmes d'époque, récités à la cour d'un roi ou d'un duc, des annales franques et anglo-saxonnes, des chroniques allemandes, et quelques légendes, peu nombreuses, portant sur la vie des saints. Ces sources présentent à l'évidence un manque d'organisation politique et sociale presque total. Les petits pays – Jutland, Scanie, la Suède propre, etc. – ont été pris en main par les capitaines locaux; en temps de guerre ces capitaines ont équipé des vaisseaux, et leurs forces combinées auraient constitué une force nationale, si l'on peut parler de nations scandinaves à cette époque. Car il n'a existé aucune organisation d'état, et l'absence de voies de communication terrestres l'aurait définitivement ruinée, si quelqu'un avait essayé d'en établir une.

En l'absence de toute organisation d'état, il a cependant existé, occasionnellement, des tentatives d'organisation. Des empires formidables se sont aussi crées. Il y a eu des paradoxes: des explosions de commandement, dans un pays incontrôlé et sans organisation. Et ces explosions commencent à se produire à l'époque des Vikings, simultanément avec l'extraordinaire développement qui inter-

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vient autour de l'an 800. Notons quelques traits de l'histoire des monarchies scandinaves au cours de cette période.

Autour de l'an 800 apparaît en Scandinavie le premier pouvoir monarchique à grande échelle: il s'agit de la monarchie danoise du roi Godfred, le grand ennemi de Charlemagne. Il est certain que Charlemagne a vu en Godfred une menace contre son empire, vue d'ailleurs confirmée par les événements. Godfred s'est préparé aux hostilités en faisant construire le premier Dannevirke, un rempart énorme couvrant la frontière méridionale du Danemark, et qui s'étendait du fjord Sli, sur la Baltique, jusqu'au littoral marécageux de la mer du Nord, à Hollingsted. C'est ensuite que Godfred a attaqué l'empire en Frise, mais sa mort interrompit la campagne. Ce royaume de Danemark comprenait non seulement les provinces danoises, mais aussi Vestfold, en Norvège du sud; mais il s'est démembré après quelques décades. Au milieu du IXe siècle, on entend parler d'un autre royaume scandinave, en pleine expansion, la Suède: ses forces navales ont contrôlé quelques ports sur la côte lettone, mais sa puissance sembla avoir été vulnérable, et dans les sources, ce royaume a disparu dès la fin du siècle. A la fin du IXe siècle aussi, on sait qu'Harald aux beaux cheveux a tué ou chassé les petits rois et les capitaines installés le long de la côte norvégienne, ce qui témoigne de l'unification du royaume de Norvège. Après la mort de Harald, son royaume se défit. Au commencement du Xe siècle, une dynastie venue de Suède s'est installée à Hedeby et dans la partie centrale du Danemark; mais, dans la dernière partie du siècle, une autre dynastie, de Normandie, la dynastie de Gorm, a unifié le Danemark et pris le contrôle de la Norvège, en sa partie méridionale surtout. Les grands rois vikings, Harald à la dent bleue, Sven à la barbe fourchue, et Knut le grand ont édifié l'em-

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pire danois autour de la mer du Nord, périodiquement interrompus dans leurs entreprises par d'autres conquérants scandinaves, comme lorsque Erik le Victorieux de Suède arracha le Danemark à Sven, ou lorsque les capitaines vikings norvégiens Olaf Tryggvason, et plus tard Olaf Haraldsson le Saint se rendirent maîtres de la Norvège, et attaquèrent sans succès le Danemark. Vers la fin de l'époque des Vikings, les rois de Norvège Magnus le Bon et Harald le Sévère ont contrôlé et la Norvège et le Danemark; Harald essaya de reformer l'empire angloscandinave de Knut le grand et périt à Stanfordbridge en 1066.

Ce rapide aperçu doit permettre de constater que toutes ces puissances ont changé rapidement et ont été très instables. Les grands rois vikings ont dépensé toutes leurs forces sur mer; débarqués, à terre, ils se sont sentis mal assurés par rapport aux capitaines locaux, chefs naturels des petits pays et des paysans libres. Harald le Sévère, qui était bon poète à ses heures de loisir, décrit ainsi cette situation: il voit le chef légendaire de Tröndelag, Einar Tambarskâlver, venir rendre hommage au roi, et il dit: « Voici le vaillant Einar au sein de ses parents et de ses amis – jamais je ne me sentirai assuré avant qu'il ait baisé la bouche mince de la hache ».

La sécurité des grands rois vikings devait presque toujours être mal assurée, parce que mal fondée. Elle était fondée sur la violence des armes, et sur rien d'autre. En l'absence de toute organisation, il leur fallait des bases militaires passablement sûres, les moyens d'équiper et d'approvisionner ces bases, et de l'argent, pour payer leur solde aux guerriers.

L'histoire des rois vikings en Scandinavie montre que aucun d'eux n'a pu conserver le pouvoir sans contrôler l'entrée de la mer Baltique. Les rois danois ont été naturellement favorisés à cet égard, mais cette position a aussi été

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leur point vulnérable, et les efforts des autres rois scandinaves qui avaient l'ambition de dominer la mer le montrent à l'évidence: la dynastie de Gnupa a conquis Hedeby, Erik le Victorieux tout le Danemark. Les deux Olaf de Norvège ont lancé des attaques désespérées contres les rivages du Sund, et Magnus le Bon, comme Harald le Sévère ont réussi à s'emparer de toutes les voies de passage reliant les deux mers du Nord. Lorsqu'ils n'ont pu contrôler le grand commerce international, leur pouvoir s'est fané comme une fleur dans un vase. Tous les grands rois des Vikings ont pris le pouvoir grâce à un capital amassé par piraterie; il a fallu le renouveler en protégeant le commerce, protection qui s'apparente à celle que les gangsters ont exercé de tous temps.

Leurs bases ont été découvertes et mis à jour dans les dernières décades; nous en connaissons quatre au Danemark, toutes placées dans des positions stratégiques. Ce sont des camps fortifiés, entourés de remparts absolument circulaires, construits avec la même régulairité sévère que les camps romains, et l'on a donné à leur sujet une théorie: ils seraient inspirés par l'imitation des casernes que l'on trouvait alors à Bagdad. Leurs dimensions sont énormes, si l'on pense à l'ordre habituel des mesures au Moyen-âge: le camp de Trelleborg, en Seland, a pu héberger 1.000 guerriers, Aggersborg, au Limfjord, 4.000. Leurs équipage ont dominé le pays et protégé le roi et ses trésors.

Voilà, en somme, le caractère des royaumes scandinaves à l'époque des Vikings: ils avaient exactement le même caractère que les royaumes et les duchés des Vikings en Normandie, à Dublin, et en Angleterre: occupation d'un pays conquis. Les structures politiques des Vikings ont été fortement marquées par la prédominance des éléments colonialistes, remarquables pour leurs qualités de marins, de guerriers, de constructeurs, d'artisans et de poètes, –

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mais cependant dépourvus de toute culture et de toute notion humanitaire. Ces hommes, en adoptant la civilisation chrétienne dans les pays conquis, ont perdu leur identité.

Plus tard, la civilisation les a atteints chez eux aussi, en Scandinavie, et en a fait peu à peu des êtres assez paisibles. Mais c'est une autre histoire.

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SWEDEN'S COASTAL DEFENCE FROM THE VIKINGS TO THE PERIOD OF LASTING PEACE

INAUGURAL LECTURE AT THE OPENING CEREMONY

When Sweden became a united Kingdom out of several provincial units in the Viking age, it was a vast, very sparsely populated country without any important highways. Practically all heavy transports had to use boats, rafts or ships on the many rivers and lakes within the country or on the narrows and creeks of the Baltic, sheltered by the archipelago along the coast. In winter, when the waters were frozen, they offered the only convenient transport routes for sledges. Consequently the loose community of early Sweden was tied together by water routes. It is dubious if this had been possible at all had not the majority of the population lived on or near the Baltic coast, which at that time meant not only the present coast line but also the present Lake Mälaren, which until the 13th century was a part of the Baltic. This meant that command of the sea was a question of life and death for the Kingdom of Sweden as for the other two Scandinavian kingdoms. The economic and social life of Sweden was extremely vulnerable to enemies or merely pirates strong enough to attack over sea. On the other hand the people of this country were a people of natural sailors, capable of extending their everyday sailing to other countries over sea and into river systems of other countries, peacefully or as armed conquerors, as they did in the Viking age.

The primary condition for the creation of all the Scandinavian kingdoms — as for the Viking age expansion over sea by the Scandinavian peoples — was the Scandinavian ship. It was an almost perfect construction in its art : swift in rowing and in sailing with or by the wind, light to roll or carry over land, stable in high sea, shallowdraught and sculptur-

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ally beautiful. Its limitations were limitations in size and thus in carrying capacity and in rigging for sailing against the wind. For inshore sailing these ships remained unequalled almost until modern time; small descendants of them are still used. In the high sea the heavier species of the Scandinavian cargo ship, the « knarr », kept its importance until about 1200, when it was surpassed and cut out by the bigger Hanseatic Cog. The species for military purposes, the longships, could still be used in the later Middle Ages, but generally the Cogs were too big and too high for being successfully attacked by the more agile longships. This meant that the Scandinavians kept the instruments of superiority in the Northern seas from the late 8th until the late 13th century. As for the Kingdom of Sweden, it was during this period of 500 years a maritime power of considerable strength whenever the king could collect under his command a fair number of the longships existing in his country. But this depended on the good will of the local chieftains, who owned most of the ships and who might or might not consider it a matter in their own interest to rally round the king in common military enterprises. Thus the naval power of Sweden was always a matter of internal unity and balance of power. In periods of internal conflicts and disintegration, which were as common as the periods of peace and order, the coast was open to troublemakers, and even in the reigns of strong kings unexpected attacks from the sea were likely to have devastating effects before the Swedish longships could have time to be equipped, manned and gathered. A primitive organization of coast watchers, who were ready to alarm the country by fire signals was the only counter-measure until in the 12th and 13th centuries a more developed administrative organization made more permanent strongholds for coastal defence possible.

The nature of the Swedish coast, specifically the coast of the Swedish Kingdom of the 13th century, made the demands on naval armaments and coastal defence rather a question of concentration than one of covering the total range of shore. Sweden had at that time totally integrated the provincial Kingdom of Västergötland and obtained a corridor to the North Sea at the mouth of the Göta river. It had also by infiltration and conquest obtained the greater part of southern Finland and secured a somewhat unstable dominion of the peasant traders' community of Gotland with the Hansa town of Visby. This meant that the main sailing routes of the Baltic, the vital arteries of northern European trade, to a greater extent than before went through Swedish waters. Especially the most important of all, the inshore route, preferred by all smaller vessels, was protected by Swedish islands or skerries from the bottom of the Gulf of Finland to the sound of Kalmar with exception of the narrow passage of open sea between Aland and the archipelago of Stockholm. In such waters small and swift ships always had advantages

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over larger and more deepdrawing ones : a constant fact in Swedish naval history. The high sea routes from the eastern shores of the Baltic via Gotland and the Sound to the North Sea demanded on the contrary large vessels, and here the resources of the Swedish crown may have been identical with those of the Gotlanders themselves, if and when the Gotlanders chose to identify their interests with those of Sweden.

During the 13th century a thin string of fortresses were erected along the Baltic coast of Sweden, mainly in connection with earlier « kastals », watchtowers built on especially vital points on the main sailing routes. First of all such a fortress was built on the island of Stockholm, the lock of Lake Mälaren where the central provinces of Sweden and several of its most important cities were located, among which the fortified city of Stockholm itself soon became the leading one and the capital of the Kingdom. But in the south the castles of Nyköping, Stegeborg, Borgholm on Öland, and Kalmar served not only as defensive strongholds but also as bases for limited naval enterprises. And in the east the two important castles of Abo and Viborg secured the Swedish dominion of the coast of Finland and served as stations on the route of Swedish offensive on the river Neva and the water system of Lake Ladoga.

One chief aim of the foreign policy of the Swedish Kingdom was to control the Novgorod trade and to cut out the German Hanseatics from this vital part of the commercial exchange between eastern and western Europe, while the Hanseatics at the other hand tried to close the outlets of the Baltic to the Gotlanders and thus to cut them out from the sailing to western Europe. They seem to have used the civil war raging in Denmark at the end of the 13th century for this purpose quite successfully. The « jarl » of Sweden attacked the Neva region in 1240 but was thrown back by Alexander Nevskij. In the 1290's the Marshal of Sweden Tyrgils Knutsson, the real regent of the Kingdom, led a new « crusade » against the Russians and the Karelians and for several years made himself master of the Neva, erected a Swedish fortress there and put up a blockade against the Hanseatics in the Gulf of Finland. But in the long run Sweden lacked the resources for such an expansive and imperialistic policy, and a dynastic struggle, lasting during the first two decades of the 14th century, made it impossible to concentrate the forces of the Kingdom on the great enterprise in the east. A lasting peace between Sweden and Novgorod, concluded in 1323, confirmed the final retreat of the former power from the Neva region. The time for commercial competition between the Scandinavians and the Hanseatics was running out : the superiority of these last in economic resources, in ships and in trade connections all over Europe was out of question.

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And as the active Swedish trade over sea languished, its policy of naval and coastal defence changed its aims : the king of Sweden had no longer an effective navy at his disposal — enemies with good ships could reach the Swedish shores unopposed. It was only on land that a real defence could be organized.

This meant a decisive weakening of the military power of the Swedish Kingdom, whose strength had always been its naval resources. This primitivness of its economic and social structure made it impossible to take up any competition with the continental powers or even with Denmark in organizing trained and equipped cavalry forces. A period of dissolution and of foreign dominance began — Gotland was conquered by the Danish king in 1361, and three years later the dukes of Mecklemburg conquered most of Sweden and made one of themselves, Albrecht, king of the country. In 1389 Albrecht was vanquished by Queen Margaret of Denmark, and from this year for more than a century Sweden was united with Denmark and Norway in a union, dominated by Denmark but often shaken by efforts of various members of the Swedish nobility to reestablish national independence. In the 14th century period of instability a number of new castles were built along the coastal sailing route on the Baltic : Stäkeholm between Kalmar and Stegeborg, Täljehus between Nyköping and Stockholm, Kastellholm on one of the Aland islands, Raseborg between Abo and Viborg, further Älvsborg in the corridor to the western sea, and a number of small fortified houses on both sides of the Gulf of Bothnia. They served as footholds of defensive forces but also as bases of piracy. This form of selfsupporting guerilla warfare at sea was commonly used in this period, especially when the Wendish or the Prussian Hanseatics belonged to the enemies of Sweden, and its effects in harrassing the common sailing and upsetting normal trade were indeed considerable. On the other hand it was a rather double-edged weapon owing to its political effects, especially as Lübeck and the other Wendish Hansa towns as a rule were the natural supporters of Swedish independence policy against the Danish kings. Against a determined foe with a navy, piracy was, of course, of a very limited use, and most of the castles were not able to keep up an effective resistance to a long siege. In the internal wars of the Scandinavian united Kingdom, the Danes were always able to strike directly against the heart of Sweden — Stockholm and the Mälar provinces — in their major efforts to re-establish the union against Swedish resistance.

The decay of Swedish naval power had been a consequence of the decay of Swedish active trade over sea and of the economic weakness of the Swedish Kingdom. When the national Kingdom was restored by Gustavus Vasa in 1523 it was built on a solid financial ground, which

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made the construction of a royal navy possible — the first one in Swedish history. At first, the ships were bought from abroad, later they were built in Sweden, and in the 1530's this navy was able to make a decisive contribution to the war against Lübeck, which forever broke the privileged position of the Hanseatics in Sweden. Technically the ships were of common international species, but their commanders and crews were competent enough to make use of their knowledge of their home waters. In the later part of the 16th century a great deal more was demanded of the Swedish navy, as the expanding foreign policy of the sons of Gustavus Vasa, aiming at a « Dominium maris Baltici » in hard competition with Denmark, included the need of sea power for keeping open the commerce with the ports on the German shore of the Baltic, from where necessary supplies were imported. In the socalled Seven Years War in the 1560's the Swedish navy succeeded in getting the upper hand over the allied navies of Denmark and Lübeck. Later the Swedish expansion aimed at the conquest of the Russian ports on the inner shore of the Gulf of Finland — a revival of the medieval dream of dominating the Russian trade — which rather stressed the need of a strong army but only to a limited extent that of a strong navy. In the wars against Poland and Denmark in the reign of Charles IX Sweden lacked adequate naval forces, which meant heavy costs in men and money for avoiding loss of Swedish land.

The rise of Sweden to a great power in the reign of Gustavus Adolphus and the conquests of his immediate successors are part of common European history — there is no need now to follow the events leading to the establishment of Sweden as the leading military power of northern Europe. It is self-evident that the new position necessitated the building of a navy, able to protect the communications over the Baltic against any other Baltic power, of which only Denmark was a serious rival in maritime strength. It is also evident that the strength of the Swedish military power lay in the army, and that its navy could never challenge any one of the great naval powers of Europe with interests in the Baltic trade. It may, however, be stressed that the new borders of Sweden after the great conquests in southern Scandinavia and northern Germany demanded new bases for the navy and new strongholds for the coastal defence. Of the medieval castles only a few had survived the introduction of artillery in Scandinavian warfare : in the 16th century not only the royal castle of Stockholm but also those of Abo, Kalmar, Borgholm and Älvsborg were rebuilt as renaissance castles with modern fortifications, but proved to be far from impregnable, as Älvsborg and Kalmar were taken by the Danes in 1611. In the 17th century new fortresses took up the border defence of new Swedish provinces and new Swedish coasts. The new fortified city of Gothenburg got its role changed from that of

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a bar of the western corridor to that of a base of defence of the west-coast of Sweden, and the fortified cities of Malmö and Landskrona became advanced strongholds at the Sound. In the 1680's a new base for the navy, Karlskrona, was planned and built in the conquered province of Blekinge in the south. It was, above all, important for the reason that the capital base of the navy was transferred from Stockholm and the archipelago east of this city to a part of the Baltic which is rarely frozen and where in any case the ice breaks up early in the year, which guaranteed a maximum length of the active season of naval operations.

Until the beginning of the 18th century the navy of Sweden and its coast defence were organized against one single potential enemy, Denmark, and with the chief aim of rendering the communications over sea with the German and Baltic provinces safe. The creation of a Russian navy on the initiative of Peter the Great was too late acknowledged by the Swedish Admirality, which was unprepared for the problems born out of the new situation. The neglect of the defence of the sailing routes of the Gulf of Finland may have essentially contributed to the disasters of the last years of Charles XII. The situation of Sweden after the losses of its over-sea empire was a strategically impossible one : with Russia and Denmark permanently allied it was obvious that Sweden in case of war was opposed by two powerful navies, while the army units on the chief front at Finland's eastern border must be essentially supplied by sea transports. The position of the navy based at Karlskrona had strategic advantages, especially in keeping the Danish navy cut off from the main part of the Baltic, but had the serious disadvantage that the Russian navy and especially its shallow-draught galleys could sweep on through the Finnish archipelago as in its home waters and easily reach the archipelago of Stockholm, which in 1719 had proved to be a serious threat to the capital of Sweden. After the long war against practically all important powers in northern Europe Sweden was exhausted and its leading politicians were rather defeatist and disposed to concentrate the defence against Russia to Stockholm and the coast of the Swedish mainland; this meant that they more or less gave up Finland in case of a resolute Russian attack. The galleys of the Swedish navy were based in Stockholm, and the small and neglected fortress of Vaxholm was strengthened by some new fortlets on the main passages of the Stockholm archipelago. In 1723, however, the director of fortifications, Axel Löwen, presented a new plan of defence to the Riksdag with the main thought that the best defence of Sweden would be to meet the enemy already in Finland. As it was financially impossible for Sweden to keep two full navies of ships of the line, one against Russia and one against Denmark, the best strategy would be to develop the Stockholm unit of galleys into a special navy, the « navy of archipelagos » equal to

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the Russian galleys and based at two new coast fortresses in Finland, one near the border and one as a main base at Helsingfors. Thus the Russian advantage of the proximity of its base at Kronstadt would be eliminated, transports along the coast secured, an advance of the Russian army on the coastal road seriously hampered and the Russian ships of the line forced to risk a fight against the Swedish ones on equal or less favorable terms if they attacked the Swedish mainland. The defence plan of Löwen met very little approval when it was presented, as it certainly demanded a great financial effort from the Estates of Sweden, and it was not until after the unsuccessful war against Russia in 1741-43 and the experience of total political dependence upon this power in the next few years that the opinion turned in favour of a new and more effective grip on the defence problem of the eastern frontier. In 1747 a new plan of defence was adopted by the Riksdag, mainly in accordance with the Löwen plan, and its leading champion in the House of the Nobility, the Artillery Colonel Augustin Ehrensvärd, was made responsible for the fortifications. Ehrensvärd, one of the most prominent men in the history of Swedish coastal defence, outlined and carried out a great scheme : a border fortress on skerries outside the little town of Lovisa and a giant fortress on islands outside Helsingfors : Sveaborg, « the Gibraltar of the North », the impregnable base and defence center of Finland. But the fortresses were only one part of the plan — the navy of the archipelagos, cooperating with the army in Finland, was a necessary complement and indeed the main part of the defence of Sweden against Russia. Ten years after the adoption of the plan of defence it became organized as Ehrensvärd wanted it : as the « navy of the army », independent of the great navy and of the Admiralty and with Ehrensvärd himself as its commanding general. The main part of the navy of the army was kept in Finnish waters and based at Sveaborg.

With the creation of this navy, adapted to the special conditions of maritime warfare in Swedish and Finnish waters, something of the constructing initiative of early Scandinavia was reborn, at least in one man, the ingenious ship-designer Chapman, picked out by Ehrensvärd for making the small ships of his navy superior to the Russian galleys in artillery and sailing, and manned by smaller crews than the ships of the enemy. Guided by experiences of the insufficiency of galleys in the Swedish operations against Prussian small ships during the war of 1757-1762, Chapman constructed several daring innovations, the largest ones a type of fregates with oars, which were superior to former smaller ships in firing and demand of crew but insufficient in shallow-draught, and in manœuvering ability in narrow waters. In the 1770's, Chapman launched his most revolutionary invention, the gun-sloop, which rapidly became the characteristic ship of Sweden's navy of the army and was taken over

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not only by the Russians but also by the leading navy of the world, that of Great Britain. With regard to fortifications and ships the plan for the defence of Finland thus was effectively followed up, hampered only by the constant deficiency of financial resources in 18th-century Sweden.

The defence organization was tested in two wars against Russia : 1788-90 and 1808-09. On the first occasion it proved to be satisfactory : in spite of the almost constant superiority of the Russian great navy in the open Baltic and in spite of obvious deficiencies of the Swedish army in Finland, the navy of the army was able to supply the army and to check the Russian efforts to break through the front lines at the border; in the last phase of the war it inflicted a crushing defeat on the Russian navy of galleys in the battle of Svensksund, which was a final cause of the Russian willingness to accept peace shortly afterwards. By 1808 the navy of the army had been neglected and was unable to support the land defence, which soon gave way to the Russian pressure. And when the Russian army occupied southern Finland, the weak spot of the «impregnable» fortress Sveaborg was discovered; vulnerability to attacks from land if the bay was covered with thick ice. With the naval base lost, Finland was lost to the Russians.

The Russian conquest of Finland in 1809 and the enforced union of Norway with Sweden in 1814 totally changed the situation of Sweden; all former plans of defence became obsolete. Soon also technical development broke the formerly constant connection of coastal defence with the inshore routes for sailing-vessels. One constant factor remained : the many archipelagos outside the coasts of Sweden and as a consequence the importance of small craft for coastal defence.

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THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE

VOLUME III

IV. *The Baltic Countries*

(1) GOVERNMENT FINANCE

The history of government finance in the countries of the Baltic area in the later Middle Ages suffers generally from a lack of sources. It is normally impossible to express economic realities for this area in statistical terms. Financial records were poor from the beginning and have been preserved only in a fragmentary fashion; but even if they had been preserved without loss, they would probably still have told only an unsatisfactory tale of what really happened. It is not before the period of centralized royal governments that we first have the chance of surveying financial development with any degree of certainty. Even at this stage, however, although some figures are available, they are scarcely ever of a sort which would permit safe deductions about the rise and fall of revenue.

For our knowledge of government finance we are consequently thrown back for the most part upon legal and political documents and what we know of the political circumstances of the time. Such material, clearly, provides only glimpses of economic conditions and hints about the crucial economic problems of government. On the other hand, it does reveal the relationship between needs and resources—the activities of kings and dukes and their counsellors which called for expenditure, and the measures they took to obtain some sort of financial balance. It is

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in any case impossible to estimate the taxable capacity of a medieval people; at least in the political sources we get evidence of the limits of its willingness to pay taxes. So the history of government finance in the medieval states of northern Europe is the history of state administrations wrestling with economic difficulties of which we only now and then get a clear view.

A. *The Economic Background*

In the period from the eleventh to the thirteenth century the countries of Scandinavia and on the shores of the Baltic became members of European society and civilization. Poland and the Scandinavian countries, and later the border countries on the southern and eastern Baltic, were won over to Christianity. Only Lithuania remained heathen after 1300. German, Danish and Swedish colonization carried with it not only the Christian religion, but also the ways of living, the social organization and the economy of central and western Europe, into areas sparsely populated by Slav, Baltic and Finnish tribes. The gradual incorporation of all this part of Europe into the economic community of Catholic civilization is the major trend which underlies all the varied aspects of its economic and financial history.

Part of this development was the bringing of new land into cultivation from the forests of all these countries. New settlements were established on the light, sandy soils, which a more primitive agrarian technique or a drier climate had previously excluded from the boundaries of cultivation. In Scandinavia this movement gradually created whole new populated districts, which in Norway and Sweden ate into the barriers of virgin woodland that had separated the largely independent provinces. In Poland it created new communities under German law. In the areas east of the Elbe it was one of the principal vehicles of German colonization, and was closely connected with and in some respects dependent upon the growth of German cities. On both sides of the gulfs of Finland and Bothnia, the rather more sporadic and agricultural Swedish colonization was a prolongation of the general movement for settling the forest lands, and went hand in hand with the intensified maritime enterprise of the Scandinavian countries in the age of medieval economic expansion.

Socially this movement created a large number of small tenements, less subject to the influence of the nobility than those in the older settled areas. In the non-feudal countries the new settlers were free landholders; in the feudal countries their land was under the control of kings or princes rather than that of the local nobles. In either case, agrarian expansion in northern Europe furthered financial centralization, for the free Scandinavian peasantry, both politically and economically, provided the

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material upon which the representatives of the Crown could work. In the general development of society in all these newly Europeanized countries, the movement of settlers out into the less fertile areas counterbalanced the normal dependence of men upon the privileged estates.

The period in question was also the great era of town foundation in northern Europe. The Hanseatic cities of the Wendish, Prussian and Baltic coasts became the great centres of trade and cultural exchange in this part of the world. Under their influence, the towns of the Danish coast (especially along the Sound), those along the coasts of Norway and Sweden, and also those of the interior of Germany, Poland and Scandinavia, flourished and grew. The stimulus given by these towns to the economic and social life of the countries in which they lay can hardly be over-estimated. On the other hand, it is difficult to assess their importance in the history of government finance. The larger towns, members of the Hanseatic League, were self-governing political units which, by investment outside their walls, contributed indirectly to the resources of the territorial princes, and sometimes contributed directly in the form of tribute or military aid; at the same time they lived and acted as independent political communities side by side with the monarchical states. The smaller towns, which acknowledged membership of a territorial state and obeyed the laws of their overlord, were modest in size and of limited fiscal importance. Even though charges on trade provided rulers with much-needed cash revenue and the financial capacity of the towns represented a reserve of credit of the greatest importance at moments of crisis, this does not alter the fact that the territorial states of northern Europe during the Middle Ages were predominantly agrarian in character. Nor does it alter the fact that government finance depended mainly upon the countryside. Lordship over large towns might be all-important financially; lordship over the smaller towns did not count for much.

Two basic features of economic development should also be remembered as a background to the history of economic policy in this region. The first is that the colonizing movement continued during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, thus making these centuries a period of continuing economic expansion, even though the same signs of agrarian difficulties and economic stagnation as in western Europe are found in the older cultivated districts. The further east we look, the more marked is the expansive character of economic life in the later Middle Ages. The second fact is that this part of Europe continued to be generally backward, which accentuated the importance of even small amounts of liquid capital in the hands of a prince or a lord. Relatively the northern countries gained in importance in the common life of the Christian world during this period, but they still held rather a peripheral position as outposts of civilization.

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B. *The Early Kingdoms of Poland and Scandinavia*

There was from the beginning of the thirteenth century a striking contrast between the small feudal principalities of north Germany and Poland on the one hand, and the vast, sparsely populated Scandinavian kingdoms on the other. Obviously the former were the normal and the latter the abnormal political units in Europe in the high Middle Ages. Finally, the state of the Teutonic Order was a unique form of political organization, modelled on the non-territorial organization of the international orders of chivalry.

Denmark, Norway and Sweden had come into existence as unified kingdoms in the eleventh century, and the kingdom of Poland, too, flourished politically for a time; the other Baltic states of later times, on the other hand, had not yet been formed. At the same time, the picture of early consolidation in the Scandinavian viking kingdoms, and also in Poland, is to a considerable degree an illusory one. Very little is known about the economic basis of government under such kings as Sven Forkbeard of Denmark, Olaf Haraldsson of Norway or Olof Eriksson of Sweden; but certain deductions are possible from their political activities and from archaeological data. Their political activity and authority depended directly on their military power, which tended to vary between extremes of strength and weakness from one year to another. They also took desperate risks in their attempts to gain control over the North Sea and Baltic trade routes. Olaf Tryggvason of Norway was killed in one such attempt; Olaf Haraldsson and Amund of Sweden challenged Cnut the Great in Scania and not in their own home waters. Danish excavations at Trelleborg, Aggersborg and other viking 'bourgs' show that the warriors of the Danish kings of this age were concentrated in great fortified camps near the central seaways. The viking kings must have had their troops—or at least the pick of them—strictly organized as a permanent force under regulations similar to those which are implied by accounts of the law of the 'hird' of Cnut the Great a century later. These troops, like mercenary soldiers of all periods, must have been paid in cash and fed by regular supplies from the country around their camps. The kings obtained cash by levying tribute or by piracy along the trade routes; and supplies were probably delivered rather as 'protection' paid to gangsters than as taxes in our sense of the word. The system worked so long as kings could dispose of supplies of cash; when these failed they fell easy victims to rivals or rebellious chieftains. In short, the viking kingdoms of Norway, Denmark and Sweden were concentrations of seapower rather than territorial dominions, and their fiscal organization was that of a self-supplying body of mercenary troops rather than a properly constituted state. They were composed of a host of peasant communities

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held together by but few institutional bonds. At periods of dynastic change in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Scania, Seland and Jutland easily fell apart and acclaimed different Danish kings; more than one king ruled at the same time in Sweden proper—in the Mälar valley and in Västergötland; and Norway was divided into completely independent coasts and valleys, nominally dominated by a royal family, some of whose members, each with the name of king, resided in different parts of the country. These provincial kings had little of the glory of pirate emperors like Erik the Victorious, Sven Forkbeard or Harald the Hard-minded; but at least they were rooted in the territorial organization of society.

There are remarkable parallels between the earliest Polish kingdom and the viking kingdoms of Scandinavia, though Poland was less primitive and more densely peopled. Poland was unified by Mesco I at about the same time as Denmark and probably Sweden. There may have been direct connection between viking military organization and that of Mesco's warriors; at least vivid traditions in Norse sagas tell of a fortified viking camp at the mouth of the Oder at the end of the tenth century, i.e. at a time when the first Polish king was becoming master of this region. But Norse influence in early Poland should not be exaggerated. Mesco and Boleslav I were neither viking leaders nor viking puppets. At the same time, the military force which kept the tribal units of early Poland together was an organized royal guard, numbering 3,000 men and paid in cash 'from the market places' according to the Arab writer, Ibrahim ibn Jacub. The later chronicle of Gallus Anonymus tells us that Boleslav the Valiant drew his warriors from Poznan, Gniezno and the 'castle of Wloclawek'. As Poznan and Gniezno were the two centres of the kingdom and both had castles at this period, we may assume that Mesco and Boleslav ruled with the support of a mercenary army, established at centres of trade and paid for by levies on trade in much the same manner as were the viking 'hirds'.

Regular taxation cannot be assumed for this early period in either Scandinavia or Poland. The earliest taxes in Scandinavia, like the Polish *narzaz*, were paid in kind, as was natural enough in view of the agrarian economy of the region. On the other hand the military budgets of the viking and early Polish kings were based upon payments in cash or unminted silver. We may conclude that these kingdoms flourished as by-products of the trade of north-eastern Europe round the year 1000, and withered as the main trade routes shifted in the course of the eleventh century. Political life reverted to the more natural provincial units, which were kept together by dynastic tradition, sometimes by the exigencies of external policy, and everywhere by ecclesiastical organization—established in Poland in the tenth and eleventh centuries and in Scandi-

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navia in the eleventh and twelfth. A more stable economic basis for government was gradually built up, rooted in the rural communities of the provinces and tribes.

The Polish kingdom disappeared in the eleventh century: it succumbed to the centrifugal force of tribal feudalism within and the political pressure of the German Empire from without. For a time the tribal duchies represented the largest political units of Poland until the Grand Duke Boleslav Wrymouth, just before the middle of the twelfth century, created the nucleus of a Polish state in his own central grand duchy with its capital at Cracow. The kingdoms of Denmark, Norway and Sweden continued to exist during this period, but politically they were weak. In the peasant communities of these countries no form of feudalism had taken root and, with the temporary exception of the Danish earldom of Schlesvig, they lay outside the influence of the Empire. The Scandinavian kings, therefore, were faced with less powerful opposition than the Polish rulers. In the latter's sphere of influence in the Baltic region, progressively subjected to German colonization, no real monarchical authority was recognized. The only change was that local chieftains were replaced by German counts.

How far the social life of the Baltic countries in the tenth and eleventh centuries made any normal demands for the regular exercise of a central authority is problematical. In times of peace the Scandinavian kings exercised a kind of supreme judicial and police power, but their exercise of this function could clearly be interrupted for longer or shorter periods. When the Polish kingdom disappeared, there is no sign that these social functions of the ruler were greatly missed. The real and urgent task of kings at this period was leadership in war. Where no supreme military authority was permanently recognized, the problems of war finance had to be solved by lesser authorities. In such circumstances, it was more difficult to justify the need for a properly organized state financial system.

In feudal Poland the traditional tribal society was transformed under influences from the neighbouring countries of Moravia, Bohemia and Germany. Imperial pressure on Poland inevitably made it necessary for the Polish princes to create military resources comparable to those of the dukes and margraves west of the indeterminate frontier. The forces of the first Piast kings were based on castles built to replace the older tribal fortresses, and their castellans were appointed governors of the surrounding territories. Gradually the country was divided into districts controlled from the castles. To them were attached *opoles*, serf villages, peopled to a large extent by prisoners of war, who thus represented valuable spoils of victory for the prince. The *opoles* provided the labour force required by the castles in their character of military and administra-

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tive centres; in them lived the farm workers, artisans, fishermen, miners, etc. of the state. A shortage of serfs in the *opoles* seems to have been endemic. This organization seems to have been adequate to permit the castellans to carry out their governmental and judicial duties, but the great mercenary armies of the earlier kings could not be replaced by the small and scattered garrisons of castles of a feudal type. The original duty of all free men to man and defend the fortresses of the land was transformed into one of making a contribution to their maintenance. The Polish armies of the feudal age became armies of knights, cavalrymen drawn from the privileged classes and exempted from common public obligations. The privileges of the knights were established by 1200, though it is impossible to pin down the date of their origin more precisely. As a military force this cavalry was composed of the mail-clad lords of the larger estates, who led the provincial forces in war and co-operated politically with the ecclesiastical aristocracy to check any tendency on the part of the princes to establish a real authority over their subjects.

In the absence of reliable statistics, it is of course impossible to estimate the strength or weakness of the dukes of Silesia, Cracow, etc. in relation to their own nobility. Everything depended on the size of the force of paid soldiers the princes were able to maintain, and the extent to which they could buy the service of knights. We know something of their sources of revenue, but not the relative importance of different sources or the relation of their revenues to their needs. The political results in twelfth- and early thirteenth-century Poland, however, are evident enough: the central power was weak and constantly on the retreat in face of German pressure on the west and on the north.

The oldest Polish tax, the *narzaz*, was paid originally in cattle and pigs, but in the thirteenth century in corn. The *stroza* was a charge in lieu of garrison duty in the castles, and the *stan* replaced the obligation to feed the prince and his court when they visited the district. These and similar less important taxes were clearly designed for the sustenance of the prince and his men in their castles, and probably allowed little scope for extraordinary government action. They could hardly develop into an adequate central financial system, and the same is true of revenue from judicial administration and similar sources. Moreover, the proceeds of these taxes fell off in the thirteenth century in consequence of the immunities conceded to the privileged classes.

Town revenues, market dues and mint profits may have offered the princes a better opportunity to buy services with hard cash. The extent to which this was true must have depended on the volume of trade. There is no possibility of setting a figure to revenue drawn from these sources or of evaluating the opportunities it opened up; but the expansion of the grand duchy of Boleslav seems to point to a tendency in the early twelfth

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century to establish administrative districts dependent upon important trading centres. In this respect, the separation of Silesia from Poland and the loss of the Baltic ports to the Teutonic Order not only demonstrated Poland's political weakness but also prolonged it.

Feudal Poland, then, was an agrarian land with a social structure modelled on that of the more economically developed European states but relatively poor in supplies of liquid resources created by trade. In some respects the same is true of the Scandinavian countries, despite the part they played in the eastward colonizing movement. They were distinguished, so far as the economic basis of government is concerned, in that they were seafaring, and not inland, nations. In the latter government is swayed mainly by the ambitions of princes; in a seafaring country it is much more a matter of general interest.

When the period of 'crusading' and colonization began in the Baltic region in the twelfth century, the Danish state of the Valdemars was the leading power. Its economic system provided a model for Sweden and Norway; it was rather an original system, for it was based fundamentally on the principle of political and military co-operation on the part of peasant communities organized in self-governing provinces.

Scandinavian military forces, since the viking period, had consisted of fleets of 'long ships' manned by warriors who rowed them and fought on board or on land according to circumstances. In principle all men owning land had to contribute to maritime expeditions. Danish, Swedish and Norwegian provincial laws, most of them codified in the thirteenth century, show that all of these countries were divided into districts each of which had to equip one 'long ship'. As these sources are comparatively late and derive from a time when maritime expeditions of the traditional sort were out of date, we must be careful not to exaggerate the antiquity of the organization they describe. According to the laws, the free peasantry of a district was responsible for maintaining, equipping, provisioning and manning a ship. This responsibility was a communal one, for the ship only came under the command of a royal captain in time of war. In fact, however, this picture probably departs as far from reality as the general one given in the laws of a society of free and equal peasants governing themselves communally under the leadership of men chosen only for the confidence they commanded. The Danish chroniclers of the age of the Valdemars and the contemporary Norse sagas make it clear that the ships and men of the bishops and magnates were of decisive importance. Even in the laws we get evidence that the peasant communities, at least in Denmark, were not expected to own their 'long ships'. The provincial aristocracy certainly provided not only the leaders but also the backbone of the *ledung* or naval contingents. They were, of course, not paid for their services, but the success of an expedition largely depended

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upon their political engagement in it. They owned their own ships and furnished the crews for them; they were, like their viking ancestors, more or less habitually engaged in trade and seafaring; and they took the lead in the affairs of their districts in peace and war. Thus we may assume that their followers were not only men of their households, but of whole districts; and that their authority was the effective force behind the communal obligations of all free men in naval expeditions. Valdemar I could have founded neither a dynasty nor the beginnings of a Baltic empire without the support of the powerful noble family of the Hvides; and the rival royal dynasties in Sweden and the pretenders to the Norwegian throne were no less dependent upon the good will of aristocratic factions, whose interests could never be ignored.

If the Scandinavian kings were to achieve military emancipation from the noble families, who really governed the rural communities of the provinces, they needed to acquire resources of their own. They disposed of royal estates scattered over their dominions—vast agglomerations of tenements unsuited to regular exploitation under central control or to serve as the basis for an effective and loyal local administration. This meant that kings had to ride round their country with their followers, consume the stores accumulated on their estates, and to a certain extent rely on the hospitality of the local inhabitants. Thus, under favourable circumstances, the king was master of that part of the country where he was residing for the time being, but the people of the rest of the land could be confident that in the meantime they would not feel the weight of his authority. Without an effective administrative system, based on a regular royal revenue, the king could never control the whole country at any one time. This was a general problem in feudal Europe in the early Middle Ages, but in Scandinavia it operated in a distinctive form of society with a very limited range of economic opportunity.

The first known attempt by a Scandinavian king to substitute a tax for the general obligation of service in the fleet was made by St Cnut of Denmark in 1086, in an endeavour to allay rebellion in parts of his land at a time when a viking expedition to England was being organized. The details are unknown, but a later chronicler emphasizes the point that Cnut's demand was a novel one. It led to a general rebellion and the king's death at the hands of his enraged subjects. He may have wished to revive the viking garrison at Aggersborg, where his fleet was ordered to assemble; and also to create a military force of some other sort to hold his people down. At any rate, the project was premature, and the outcome clearly shows that the king lacked the means to carry it out. More than a century later, about 1213, Cnut's plan was finally put into effect in Denmark; and Norway and Sweden followed this example in the 1260's or 1270's. This reform, however, implying the establishment of regular taxation, was

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carried out in quite a different social milieu from that in which St Cnut had planned to revive the Anglo-Danish viking empire.

In the twelfth century German colonization reached the Baltic and German feudalism began to exercise a strong influence upon the Scandinavian peoples. In the first instance this influence was naturally strongest in the field of military organization and the outward forms of upper-class life. Heavy cavalry was introduced into Danish warfare in 1134 when Erik Emune, with a mounted mercenary army, crushed the combined forces of King Niels and the Church at a single blow at Fotevik. During the whole of the twelfth century, however, this kind of warfare could be only of incidental or secondary importance in Denmark. The king, the bishops and some magnates were able to retain small forces of mounted men, but generally speaking resources were lacking for this expensive type of retinue. Still, following upon the appearance of these mounted forces, came the first castles of a continental type which were able to house permanent garrisons.

During Barbarossa's rule over the Empire, Denmark began to win a position as the leading power east of the Elbe, a development culminating in the reign of Valdemar II the Victorious, whose supremacy over the German territorial princes in this region was recognized. In Holstein, as in Mecklenburg, a normal system of taxation had come into being in the course of the twelfth century, as an outcome of a general claim to levy taxes made by the emperors, but of which their territorial vassals had been the main beneficiaries. The main tax, the *petitio* (in German *bede* or *grevenscat*), appears originally to have been connected with the position of the prince as the judicial head of his dominions and probably took the form at first of hospitality afforded to the count when he visited a district to hold his court. This system and the terminology associated with it were exported eastwards from the older German territories west of the Elbe. In the last decades of the twelfth century the tax was sufficiently recognized for the count of Holstein to grant exemption from it to churches. The counts of Ratzeburg and Schwerin had also made good their right to levy it in the late 1190's and in 1200. It formed part of that feudal order of society which spread eastwards with German colonization, but to the Danish overlord of the lands beyond the Elbe it would also appear to be a more advanced method of organizing the resources of the state than the non-feudal order of his own country, based upon the co-operation of the provincial leaders. When moreover, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, the grandiose policies of the Danish king involved military clashes with German feudal armies, an urgent need arose for a military reorganization that would enable the king to pay for a cavalry force equal to that of the German chivalry.

So the common obligation of the Danish people to equip and man the

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ledung fleet was transformed into a system of ordinary taxes, paid chiefly in corn or other natural products. The large payments received in oats are clear evidence for the use of one of the taxes, the *stud*, for feeding the king's horses. Exempted from these taxes were the men who served the king as mounted warriors at their own expense, and who were thus marked off from the common people as a privileged nobility.

The social consequences of this reform, however, were not limited to this process of differentiation. The *ledung* organization had been based upon the principle of communal action. Groups of peasants, probably in most cases village communities, had been the basic units in the traditional division of the country for this purpose, each of them responsible for manning one oar of the 'long ship'. The new system of taxation had to be based on individuals, each economically capable of being regarded as a unit for purposes of paying taxes. In northern Germany the hide (*mansus*, *hufe*, in the Scandinavian languages *bol*) had been the basic unit for assessing the *bede*. The hide also became a land measure in Denmark; in Sweden and Norway it had the general connotation of a family holding; while in certain parts of Finland in the later Middle Ages it was used as a unit of taxation. In connection with the commutation of Danish *ledung* obligations into taxes, a new assessment of the land was felt to be necessary; it was given a money valuation which bore a fixed relationship to its purchase price and rent. This taxation of the land helped to bring land onto the market: in that sense it was a reform which mainly furthered the interests of the Church and the nobility. This may be regarded as the price demanded by the old aristocracy in the peasant communities for accepting the commutation of the *ledung*, by which the king gained in military power and the aristocracy lost its independent control over the provinces. Perhaps the Church gained even more than the nobility from the system of land taxation. The fixed assessments of their lands took on the air of a *justum pretium*, officially unchangeable, at a time of rapid agricultural expansion. This period, too, saw a great enlargement of ecclesiastical estates in Scandinavia.

When Sweden and Norway half a century later, after a lengthy period of slow adjustment, finally followed the Danish example and commuted the *ledung* into a general tax (except in Västergötland in Sweden, where no *ledung* obligation existed, and the new tax replaced the duty of feeding the king's followers visiting the province) it was, as in Denmark, the political result of an alliance between the monarchy and the Church. As in Denmark again, the peasant communities paid the price economically and politically. Their traditional leaders, the great landowners, coalesced with the king's followers to form a new privileged nobility which soon found many interests in common with the clergy. At the same time the Scandinavian landed nobility was never transformed into a class of feudal

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landlords of the continental sort. All through the Middle Ages there existed links of mutual loyalty, based on equality before the law, between the nobility and the peasantry of the various provinces—more marked in Norway and Sweden than in Denmark, where geographical conditions did not impose the same degree of separatism. Thus the basis of Scandinavian government was never a strictly feudal one.

C. *Feudal Decentralization in Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-century Scandinavia*

In the thirteenth century the Danes subjugated the Esthonians, and the Swedes the Finnish tribes west of Lake Ladoga. These conquests, like the stabilization of Norwegian dominion over the Scottish isles and Iceland, were manifestations of the *ledung* fleets still in action. These could still get the upper hand over sufficiently primitive, divided or otherwise weak adversaries. But in the 1220's the greatest power of Scandinavia, the Denmark of Valdemar II, met a crushing defeat at the hands of a coalition of small German princes headed by the counts of Schwerin and Holstein. The weakness of the Scandinavians in heavy cavalry, by comparison with the Germans, was demonstrated for the first time. King Valdemar's resources in men and money, which the new financial system had been meant to assure, had proved inadequate.

A new system was introduced after the defeat at Bornhöved—a feudal system. Several peripheral Danish provinces (Schlesvig, Halland, the islands of Als and Langeland) were given as hereditary fiefs to King Valdemar's legitimate sons and his bastards. After the thirteenth century only Schlesvig remained a separate duchy, but all the same, the system meant the division of the country into smaller units which had to organize individually their finances and military resources. In the kingdom proper little more appears to have been expected of the castellans than the fulfilment of the military duty of maintaining and equipping a certain number of soldiers in their castles and following the king with these men when required. The political result was the king's dependence upon the fidelity of his vassals when he needed their service.

The economic reason for the decentralization of Denmark implied by the feudal experiment was the acute shortage of ready money in the Scandinavian countries. One instance illustrates what this shortage meant in terms of military weakness. In 1275 the Swedish duke, Magnus Birgersson, rebelled against his brother, King Valdemar of Sweden, and obtained aid from King Erik Glipping of Denmark in the form of 100 armed men *cum omni bellico apparatu* for a cash payment of 6,000 marks. To obtain this sum he had to mortgage one of Sweden's richest districts, including its only western port, Lödöse. The 100 men gave Magnus vic-

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tory, whereupon he tried to avoid payment of the sum he had offered and even made war against Denmark to this end. The latent strength of the Scandinavian peoples, the strength which made their expansion and colonization to the east of the Baltic possible, depended upon the agrarian improvements of this period. At the same time, the amount of surplus wealth from the land of Denmark or Sweden which the Crown was in a position to exploit fell far short of meeting the cost of an army of the latest European model. The nobleman ruling a district as a castellan could afford to keep a handful of soldiers out of peasant taxes, but it was impossible for the king to squeeze money out of the castellans to feed and pay a central military force.

The political conduct of the Scandinavian kings at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries clearly shows their indifference to control over land and their intense interest in control over trade and the resources they could derive from it. Erik Menved of Denmark built up a phantom empire in north-western Germany, but struggled to keep in his own hands only the protectorate over the Hanse towns (Lübeck especially) and the customs of the international market at Skanör. The violent inter-Scandinavian war which raged throughout his reign, centring on the internal opposition in Denmark of the party of the Outlaws to the party of the king, seems to have been rooted in a fight over different ways of controlling maritime trade in the Skagerrak, Kattegat, Sound and the Belt. Norway, ruled by King Erik the Priesthater or rather by his advisers, made a desperate effort to maintain by force Norwegian dominance in home waters against the German Hanse. The Swedish duke, Erik Magnusson, made a brilliant and daring bid to create a new Scandinavian state out of Norway, the western provinces of Sweden and Danish Halland—obviously in order to prosecute the struggle for control over the trade going westwards by sea. His elder brother and opponent, King Birger of Sweden, risked his throne in an unsuccessful expedition to Gotland to subdue the Swedish Hanseatic town of Visby.

During this long period of war, many castles were built and garrisoned. The maintenance of these new castles still further strained government finances, for effective royal control and financial resources were continuously shrinking. From a military point of view, this meant that the forces of the Scandinavian countries were put increasingly on the defensive. In the thirteenth century employment of foreign mercenary troops had been a somewhat desperate throw to avert disaster; in the fourteenth century desperation became the rule, first in Denmark and later in Sweden. The counts of Holstein had already played the part of condottieri in Scandinavian wars in the 1270's, and in the 1330's they gradually took Denmark over on mortgage for unpaid military services. In the 1370's the duke of Mecklenburg interfered in Sweden's dynastic

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troubles, conquered the country in virtue of his military superiority and made his son king of Sweden.

The economic realities behind these events can be discerned in the continual disputes about new taxes, imposed as temporary expedients and then demanded again and again. They can also be read in the cold figures of the accounts of two Swedish fiefs held by a knight of Mecklenburg, which in the years 1365–6 were in the hands of King Albrecht. Although one of the fiefs was in the mining district of Dalecarlia, one of Sweden's chief financial resources, the account shows a loss of more than 9,000 Swedish marks. Out of this sum, 6,500 marks represented military expenses incurred during war by thirty soldiers. It is also evident, however, that the income in kind, which represented the greater part of the taxes paid by the peasantry, lay outside effective royal control and was never subjected to proper audit. The castellans were free to make what profit they liked from trading with the proceeds of the taxes; and this explains the eagerness of the castellans to retain their positions which, on the face of it, seem to involve such heavy financial burdens for them. Under such conditions the difficulty for kings of exercising effective financial administration over the castles and their territories is obvious enough.

The small German princes profited from their nearness to the great Hanse towns. They and their nobility were a military force of considerable importance in northern Europe, and they gained wealth by making war their profession. Their superiority was the superiority of German trading capital and, to some extent, that of a feudal society in a period of agricultural boom. They did not balance their budgets much better than the Scandinavian kings: the dukes of Mecklenburg, for instance, largely mortgaged their income from the *bede* at the very time when they were building up their power in the fourteenth century. On the other hand, their war machine worked. The limited extent of their territories was in itself a source of strength at a time when military effectiveness first and last depended on the loyalty of vassals. The prince's and the knight's common interest in the exploitation of conquered lands did the rest.

D. *The Establishment of the Teutonic Order*

In the thirteenth century, when the Polish dukes were fighting for hegemony in the absence of any central authority in that kingdom, and when the Scandinavian countries were experimenting with feudal decentralization, a new and vigorous major power made its appearance in the Baltic area. This was the state of the Teutonic Order. Until its defeat by the Poles and Lithuanians at Tannenberg in 1410, it was the best organized and best endowed power in the region.

Our knowledge of its financial organization is limited by the fact that

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its surviving fiscal records are comparatively late in date. A clear picture only becomes available for the years around 1400, when we have to deal with the results of a long process of development. These sources, however, permit us to draw some conclusions about the character of the financial system of the Order as far back as the thirteenth century and at the beginning of the fourteenth.

The Order, in its purpose and organization, was a militant power in a much stricter sense than any of its neighbours. It preserved the original features of the orders of chivalry which had fought for Christianity in the Holy Land. A network of castles belonged to the Order, each of which was governed by a *komthur*, who was responsible for the management of an annexed territory and maintained the 'brothers' in the castle from its revenues. Decentralization and great independence for the individual *komthurs* were characteristic of the system, which was designed to operate over vast regions of varying economic structure. The unity of the brotherhood was meant to be of a spiritual character, with an elected Grand Master as the executive authority and a Grand Chapter of the Order as its representative assembly.

When the Teutonic Order concentrated its missionary warfare on Germany's north-eastern frontier, it conquered Prussia and (in succession to the Order of the Sword in Livonia) took over the Livonian dioceses. By imperial privilege it became master of the state composed of these subjugated territories. Naturally this gave the Order its solid base, though it maintained in principle its character as a supra-national order of chivalry with castles and *komthurs* elsewhere in the Empire than in the Prussian-Livonian area. The Grand Master acquired the position of a feudal prince and the Grand Chapter, through which the collective will of the Order was in the main expressed, faded gradually into honorary passivity. Instead, the local *komthurs* and especially the 'grand *komthur*' of Königsberg, who managed and controlled the revenues of the Order, gradually came to hold the key political and financial positions. The local *komthurs* collected the *bede* and rents for land, and used with great freedom for their own purposes these payments in kind which were made to them. They were all responsible, however, to the central authorities in the Order, of whom the treasurer audited their accounts and appropriated the surpluses of local budgets for common purposes.

What were the special sources of strength which gave the Order its power? It may be assumed that the collection of taxes and rents from subjects of non-German nationality would be fairly ruthless, though the amounts known to have been paid by individuals do not seem to have been extraordinarily heavy as compared with other north German states. Nevertheless, the political conduct of the Order proves that it controlled financial resources exceeding those of its neighbours. It not only kept up

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an efficient army, but was able to buy the Danes out of Esthonia in 1346. At the end of the fifteenth century, the treasury of the Order played its part in international finance, although its Christian ideals prohibited it from taking usury of any kind. The budget of the Order must have shown a favourable balance and it must have enjoyed opportunities of investing its income. The semi-clerical nature of its organization may explain some of its discipline and the speed of communication which enabled a highly developed central control to be exercised over local revenues; but this does not explain the existence of these resources themselves.

A primary cause of the early strength of the Order was a spiritual asset, which in this age could almost have a money value set upon it: the readiness to fight loyally and the military competence of a chivalric brotherhood. The Grand Master got for nothing a military force which would have involved any contemporary ruler in heavy charges. One consequence of the spiritual authority of the government of the Order was the preservation of older and stricter rules of succession to fiefs. In Prussia down to the end of the Middle Ages they passed by inheritance only to men capable of serving in person, enabling a much firmer hold to be kept on vassals than elsewhere. The fact that the Baltic territories fell to it by conquest made it easy for the government of the Order to establish regalian rights over mills, inns, the trade in amber. This gave it control over day-to-day transactions amounting in aggregate to large sums of money, though probably difficult to supervise effectively.

An important reason for the resources of which the Order disposed may have been the integration of the Prussian Hanseatic towns into its financial system. These towns emerged as large trading centres later than their Wendish and Saxon sisters, and the Order was able from the beginning to secure recognition of its overlordship. The Grand Master received a share of the important Hanseatic customs duty, the *pfundzoll*, levied in these Prussian towns. He was also owner of the mint situated in Thorn, which served him as a bank. Although he had to pay close attention to the wishes of the towns in exercising his minting rights, his possession of them clearly conferred economic power. The towns also contributed to the *usrichtungen* (equipping of important military expeditions) which are thought to have been one of the principal means of centralizing the Order financially. The political co-operation of the towns was a prerequisite for the Order's own commercial activities which will receive mention later, and which in their turn must largely explain the Order's capital resources. The political loyalty of the towns clearly counted tremendously in the financial balance as a guarantee of credit, and when this failed in the fifteenth century political disaster was not far away.

At the end of the fourteenth century the power of the Order was at its height. Its administration had been turned into that of a highly central-

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ized state. To the outside world it was a greater power than the new united kingdom of Poland-Lithuania, and its influence was far-reaching. It interfered in the internal affairs of Lithuania and tried to annex the island of Gotland from the piratical survivors of the Mecklenburg dynasty in Sweden. The decline which followed was sudden, and must be viewed in connection with the development of the other Baltic powers in the decades round 1400. It was part of the general recession of the smaller German powers after the peak of their military superiority in the fourteenth century. This in turn was a result of the new capacity displayed by the larger non-German kingdoms of the north to grapple with the problems of financial disintegration.

E. *The Re-emergence of Poland and the Decline of the Teutonic Order*

In the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries Poland slowly developed economically, and its new sources of wealth were subjected to fiscal exploitation. The older forms of taxation were commuted into money payments. Underlying these developments was the expansion of corn growing and of the corn trade. Agrarian progress and assarting from the woodland were turning Poland into the granary it was to be in the future. Markets grew into towns, and a new social class of merchants made grain an article of commerce of the first importance. Down to the fifteenth century, when Polish grain was established as a major commodity of international trade, there was a steady growth in the capital resources of the country.

In the political field, this growing wealth of the Polish countryside intensified the decentralizing tendencies of the thirteenth century as the resources of the nobility and local princes expanded. In the fourteenth century, however, when the kingdom of Poland was re-established, the Crown found methods of exploiting the wealth of the nation in the interests of the central power. The reign of Casimir the Great was epoch-making in this respect. A prerequisite of financial centralization was the establishment of a network of local officials, the *starosts*, each governing his own district as full representative of the king. Supported by the burghers of the towns and by the nobility (some of whom had been brought to heel while others were attracted by the royal policy, which offered the chance of military glory and the annexation of the Ruthenian provinces to the south-east), King Casimir was in a position to lay financial burdens on his subjects.

In the first place, the new and efficient administrative system enabled the revenues from the royal domains, for which money rents were established, to be collected effectively. In particular, the mills of the domain were developed into a well organized service. A measure of the king's

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political strength was the establishment of extraordinary taxes which were nominally freely granted. A corn tax (the *poradlne*) was imposed on the bishops and knights, and particularly on the monasteries, whose estates were twice as heavily taxed as those of the ecclesiastical and lay aristocracy. The free towns, too, agreed to pay a voluntary *poradlne* as proof of their willingness to co-operate politically. By strictly regulating trade routes King Casimir made the customs administration effective, and income from this source naturally expanded with the expansion of trade within the country. An important role was played by the royal monopoly of mining, especially salt mining, which besides its financial importance gave the king a hold over his subjects through his control over a vitally important article of consumption. The central financial administration also developed in order to keep pace with the problems presented by the control of the local network and the management of the revenues flowing into the centre. The treasury at Cracow became the grand treasury of the kingdom, and was ordered by Casimir to make all its payments in cash. The king's treasurer also became master of the mint, which was re-formed and used to establish a good domestic currency.

This rapid development and strict centralization, of course, was only partly a spontaneous result of a rising national income. Its stability can be measured by the fact that, after the authoritarian reign of King Casimir, the estates of Poland regained political control over extraordinary taxation. Domanial revenues (monopolies, ordinary charges and customs, and the profits of the mint) were carefully distinguished from revenues which could only be raised with the consent of the estates and which became in consequence of diminishing importance.

In the country districts the hide was the basic unit of assessment for the *poradlne*. In the towns one of the extraordinary taxes of the fifteenth century, the *szos*, was levied on the basis of a valuation of the burgher's real and personal estate, indicating a thorough assessment of taxable property and thus an efficient fiscal system.

Although the hold of the Crown upon its subjects slackened at the end of the fourteenth century, the resources of the Polish monarchy made an expansive foreign policy possible. The union of Poland and Lithuania in 1389 removed a rival on Poland's eastern frontier and at the same time put the considerable military resources of the Lithuanian empire at the king's disposal. These combined forces were strong enough to win a great victory over the Teutonic Order in 1410. Although the union with Lithuania created for the Crown new problems in relation to the Russians and the Tartars, it also greatly increased the power of Poland. Economically the potential resources of the less developed partner were laid open to Polish penetration, with immediate effect upon the economic resources of the state. It should be stressed, however, that the union

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was very largely a result of the pressure of the Order upon both partners. By it the balance of military power was transformed, and this in itself brought great fiscal advantage to Poland.

Casimir the Great organized the cavalry forces of the nobility into a military instrument of royal policy. This was a political operation, achieved in the main by insisting strictly on the performance of services by the privileged *szlachta* and by constituting a privileged nobility composed of cavalrymen without landed endowment, whose social prestige depended only upon their military service to the Crown. This reform was inspired by the example of Poland's powerful enemy at the beginning of the fourteenth century, Bohemia. Another southern neighbour, Hungary, provided the model for the organization of the fighting forces of the nobility into 'banners'. Combined with the Lithuanian army, the Polish mounted nobility won the decisive victory of 1410. Already at Tannenberg, however, mercenary soldiers fought in the Polish ranks, and in the course of the fifteenth century, as the new military art of combining cavalry with infantry was introduced into Baltic warfare, the military power of Poland increasingly depended upon the ability of the royal treasury to produce a normal budget surplus in ready cash.

To sustain their ambitious foreign policy, the kings of the Jagellon dynasty were normally able to meet these demands upon their treasury: indeed, up to a point, this was the condition of maintaining their political independence of the nobility. At the same time, they were able in emergency to raise extraordinary supplies in a country where economic life was expanding, and this at a time of general agrarian and commercial stagnation in western and central Europe. The Thirteen Years War in the middle of the century gave Poland a much desired outlet to the Baltic, when the Prussian towns chose as their sovereign for the future the king of their Polish hinterland.

During this era of Polish expansion the Teutonic Order declined politically and economically. This German state had reached the limits of its resources, and by the beginning of the fifteenth century financial strain had become chronic. It could not raise additional revenues to pay for the mercenary troops it required, and even the new and expensive diplomacy of this period demanded too much of its treasury. The very organization of the Order represented an obsolete military pattern. When the towns, which represented the new and expanding forces of society, chose to follow their own political aims, the Order was doomed in its struggle with Poland.

The political renaissance of Poland was, as always in such cases, the outcome of a complex of forces. Much was due to shrewd and fortunate political planning. But in the long run the representatives of the Polish state rode on the wave of economic expansion in the plains between the

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Carpathians and the Baltic. The expansion of Poland followed the inland trade routes. The creation of new wealth, drawn from its cornlands, was the basic condition for Poland's political development.

F. *The Scandinavian Kingdoms in the Later Middle Ages*

In 1389 Queen Margaret of Denmark and Norway, in alliance with the leaders of the Swedish aristocracy, defeated the army of the Mecklenburgian King Albrecht and took the king himself prisoner. The foundations of the Scandinavian union of the later Middle Ages were laid.

The repelling of German infiltration into the Danish and Swedish kingdoms was almost exclusively an achievement of Margaret's political genius. At first she could count on Norway alone, and Norway was at this time by far the weakest of the three Scandinavian kingdoms. It had depended from the very beginning upon sea-power and sea communications; and, when trade in Norwegian waters passed into German hands and the Norwegian aristocracy lost its grip upon maritime commerce, it was not only the aristocracy which almost disappeared from the historical scene. The whole country seemed to dissolve into self-centred and rural mountain valleys, in which few people had even the slightest interest in what was happening in the outside world. There were no forces making for combination in political or economic affairs. Only the Church, with its limited resources, and a handful of landowning noblemen could represent a united Norway, and the interests even of the nobility were now limited to their own provinces. No political figure of the first order could possibly take a hand in the high policy of the later fourteenth century with only Norwegian support.

Margaret had to establish her power in Denmark in order to acquire sufficient political resources. Her father, Valdemar IV of Denmark, had been able to reunite the country by buying out the Holsteiners. He was able to do this because the people, under the leadership of the aristocracy, had felt themselves so oppressed by foreign rule that they spontaneously paid for liberation. If Valdemar succeeded in this design, his efforts to build up an autocratic authority sustained by a steady cash revenue led to disaster. He tried to make the international trade in the Sound and at the great fish mart of Skanör a principal object of taxation; but his policy united the Hanseatic towns from Holland to Prussia against him, and at his death they had annexed the three castles on the Sound which were in a position to dominate the trade routes.

Margaret's policy was to impose her will on one country by holding over it the threat of another. She allied herself with the traditional enemy of Denmark, the count of Holstein, who got the duchy of Schlesvig as reward; and in this way frightened the Danish aristocracy into obedience.

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She forced the nobility to accept a new system of administration for the management of the castles and their districts, involving annual account to the royal treasury; and she introduced a new type of official, the bailiffs, who were often recruited from the ranks of immigrant German noblemen. When she had conquered Sweden the ambitious aristocracy of that country had to bow before her Danish resources. She organized a strong financial administration in Sweden: the taxes were simplified, made permanent and assessed in money instead of in kind. There, the bailiffs were often recruited from the lesser nobility of Denmark. Finally, about 1400, she carried through a large-scale resumption of estates of which the Crown had been deprived in both Denmark and Sweden in the latter half of the fourteenth century.

Thus, in Margaret's reign, a centralized and effective financial administration was created. Its resources are indicated by the fact that the island of Gotland was repurchased for cash from the Teutonic Order in 1408 without the imposition of special taxation. Centralization, however, was the work of an autocratic regime, and not the result of the appearance of new sources of wealth in the Scandinavian countries. On the contrary, the agrarian regression of the period seriously affected Denmark and Norway and to a lesser extent Sweden; this may have weakened the position of the aristocracy in relation to the Crown, but it also narrowed the basis for royal taxation. Taxes in money rather than in kind imposed a great burden upon Sweden, and were one cause of the great rebellion there in 1434. When war broke out against Holstein in the reign of Erik of Pomerania, the royal army of the three kingdoms proved unsatisfactory, though their fleet held the seas against the Hanseatic towns in the later 1420's. In the long run, the financial regime of Margaret and Erik was almost as unrealistic as Valdemar IV's attempt to base his rule upon the taxation of trade, for it over-estimated the resources of their subjects. It was swept away in the great rising against Erik of Pomerania in the years 1434–9. A decentralized system was re-established along with the dominance of the aristocracy in Denmark and Sweden.

In the latter part of the fifteenth century, however, a general trend towards centralization re-appeared in these two countries, although it seemed impossible to create any generally accepted basis for a united Scandinavian kingdom. Two rival kings, Christian I of Denmark and Karl Knutsson of Sweden, tried to establish new extraordinary taxes. In Denmark Christian succeeded, but Karl Knutsson was deposed by an almost unanimous rebellion in 1457. Christian, who was elected king of Sweden by the rebel aristocracy, had to face in his turn the strength of the opposition forces and was driven out of Sweden when he imposed a new tax for war. His hold over Denmark and Norway, however, remained firm in spite of economic troubles which were a target for propaganda on

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the part of his enemies. He inherited Holstein and Schlesvig from his uncle, the last duke of the old Holstein dynasty, and this acquisition solved a good many vital Danish problems. At the same time it removed a powerful enemy from his southern border, added to the military strength of Denmark and made available the wealth of the Holsatian aristocracy for exploitation by the Danish king. A number of Holsatian noblemen acted as Christian's bankers, for the fact that they lived in the hinterland of Hamburg and Lübeck had enabled them to accumulate resources equalling those of the merchants of these Hanseatic centres. Intensified cattle-breeding for export spread from the duchy into northern Jutland; herring fishing in the Limfjord expanded and there was a marked increase in wealth throughout the whole of Danish society. The first kings of the Oldenburg dynasty favoured the Danish towns with privileges and prohibitions, and received some return in the form of charges on trade. Of these, customs duties on sea-borne trade in the Sound (introduced in 1429) were of special importance: as trade expanded between the Baltic countries and western Europe so did the revenue accruing to the Danish treasury. Clearly the customs on the Sound in the fifteenth century were not an unduly heavy burden on commerce, or they would have aroused greater political contention than they did; but they must still have represented a considerable gain to Denmark.

Soon after the union of Denmark with Holstein, Christian I attacked the most powerful and troublesome of the Danish noble families, the Totts, and forced its members to take refuge in Sweden. From that time onwards the nobility served him and his son, King Hans, loyally and well. It seems that, during the reigns of the first Oldenburgs, fiefs ceased to be held in return for service, the holders accounting thenceforward for the proceeds of their offices to the king. Clearly, the interest of the nobility in the decades around 1500 became more and more centred on agricultural improvement. The knights and squires gained in higher land values some compensation for what they had lost in the form of control over financial administration.

We must not overstress the centralized character of Danish royal finance. Central institutions were still primitive and no real administrative treasury was created. Royal leadership of the aristocracy depended more on harmony of interests than on the subjugation of the nobility as a class. But the signs of an expansion in the resources of the central government are clear enough.

In Sweden parallel developments are even more obvious—the more so as no new territory was added to the possessions of the Swedish Crown. It seemed as though the aristocracy had triumphed in its fight for an almost republican independence of all monarchical power when the regent Sten Sture, backed by the Danish Tott family and the majority of the

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Swedish nobility, inflicted a crushing defeat on King Christian and his Danish army at Brunkeberg in 1471. But the army of the regent represented new forces in Swedish society: the mine owners of Dalecarlia, the merchants of Stockholm and the cattle-breeding nobility of the border provinces, who had hitherto played a secondary role in Swedish political life. Many of the representatives of these new forces, moreover, whose appearance is significant of the capitalist development of contemporary Europe, were not unwilling to give permanent co-operation to a strong central government in Sweden. By cleverly combining territories under direct government administration and economically complementary to each other, Sten Sture succeeded in establishing the financial basis for a government disposing of sufficient troops of its own not to be totally dependent upon the good will of aristocratic factions. This work was pursued with caution until the third of the Swedish regents, the younger Sten Sture, felt himself strong enough to undertake a major struggle against the Church and Christian II of Denmark simultaneously. It ended in his defeat and death, but it is none the less certain that the national kingdom of the Vasas was built on the financial foundations laid by the Stures.

In both Sweden and Denmark growing commercial activity, canalized in the later fifteenth century by active commercial legislation, was one of the social prerequisites of financial centralization. The cattle, meat, butter and fish of the Scandinavian countries, and especially the iron and copper ores of Sweden, found their way into the European market. There are numerous indications that in the fifteenth century these countries took a marked step on the way from a natural to a monetary system of exchanges. At all events it is clear that the rising commercial centres like Copenhagen and Malmö in Denmark, and Stockholm and Viborg in Sweden, played a greater role financially than they had done in the past. This is particularly true of the mining districts of central Sweden.

Another prerequisite of financial centralization was the transformation of the nobility from a dominant military class into a class of rural entrepreneurs and landowning state functionaries. The new methods of warfare in this age made castles of the medieval type almost useless as strongholds. The military system of a country could no longer be limited to a certain number of local garrison forces. Money was needed to pay for mercenary troops and artillery. This automatically involved a transformation of the revenue system. Government revenues had to be received in the form of cash, and expended by the central authority, if there was to be any government at all. The central theme of the political history of Denmark and Sweden in the century beginning in 1450 was the alliance of the aristocracy and the Crown against the Church. By this alliance both parties secured the avoidance of serious social disturbance. It simplified the military budget, which no longer had to bear the charge of

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a continuous struggle for power within the country. This in turn, by contrast with the older dispensation, enabled financial surpluses to be created.

There remains the problem of why no similar development took place in the third Scandinavian country, Norway. It was the poorest of the three, though it did not entirely lack resources: the rise of Bergen as an important centre of trade and fishing and the increasing predominance of Oslo in south-eastern Norway are evidence enough of this. But the economic resources of Norway, themselves limited, had never been combined with national political leadership. Trade was dominated by Germans from Rostock and Lübeck, who had no wish to make any sacrifices to increase the internal strength of the country, for this in the first place would threaten their own position. The resources of the small Norwegian aristocracy were too limited to enable them to oppose effectively the king in Copenhagen. There was no economic specialization, as there was in Sweden, which led to exchange between the different provinces—a development which underlay the financial reforms of the Stures. The very geographical structure of Norway made a national rallying of political forces almost impossible. In consequence, there were at times local rebellions but never a national revolt; there were provincial leaders but no national regents. Norway was integrated into the Danish dominion; the Orkneys and the Shetlands were sold to Scotland by Christian I, Iceland was neglected and Greenland was forgotten.

At the end of the Middle Ages, therefore, the financial organization of the Danish and Swedish states was still relatively primitive; but financial reform had made available the resources which were to make possible the later imperialistic policies of these two countries in the Baltic.

G. *Conclusions*

The history of government finance in the Baltic countries during the later Middle Ages follows no simple lines of development. There are, however, some general threads in a complicated pattern. One is the culmination and the decline of the power of the German feudal states, which had flourished in virtue of their centralized financial institutions and military efficiency in the age of feudal cavalry. Another is the late concentration and political resurrection of the Polish and Scandinavian monarchies. In their struggle against the Germans, these monarchies won political victories through dynastic unions. Their further stabilization, however, was due to the use of new sources of capital and credit, chiefly due to the growth of an international trade in foodstuffs and metal ores in northern Europe.

There is a similarity of rhythm in the financial development of Poland and Scandinavia, which was not synchronized but equally not unmarked

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by a common trend. After a period of harsh and autocratic prosecution of the royal interests in the fourteenth century, which was countered by aristocratic opposition, government finances were reorganized in the fifteenth century by king and aristocracy working together in a quieter and more stable manner. This general trend was due in the main to changes in the conditions of military organization, and the financial and social consequences which these changes entailed. Military expenditure came to dominate the budgets of all the northern countries; and while the military problems were settled in different ways in different countries, generally speaking the appearance of mercenary infantry and artillery accelerated the development towards financial centralization. It ought perhaps to be stressed once again that government finance in this age was, as a rule, as much influenced by the technical, administrative and political factors described here as it was by the general development of economic life.

(2) GOVERNMENTS AND TRADE

A. *The Achievement of Hanseatic Supremacy in the Baltic*

It may well be asked in general terms to what extent there existed economic policies in the Baltic countries as distinct from those financial policies which were central and eternal preoccupations for medieval governments. In fact, for the period before 1400, we must accept the fact that the territorial states in this region had scarcely anything that can be described as a trade or monetary policy in the modern sense. The feudal states of medieval Germany had to show some respect for Hanseatic interests, which they could sometimes exploit but never direct. The Scandinavian monarchies at some moments gave backing to the wishes of their trading subjects; the latter, however, seldom showed themselves capable of national action, but appear as a rule in the form of local groups with specialized interests in particular trade routes. The coinage in the main served fiscal purposes and the need of a legal currency for the economic transactions of the ruling classes. There were attempts at a price policy in the fifteenth century, but these, too, were subordinated in the territorial states to fiscal points of view.

Amongst the German and Scandinavian powers, the Hanse towns and the Teutonic Order alone displayed a constant regard for trading interests. This was natural enough in view of the fact that upon trade depended the very existence of the Hanse towns as independent political entities, and because the Order depended economically to so great an extent upon the trade passing through the towns of Prussia. This is not to imply that these two powers had to face no opposition in prosecuting their commercial policies. What is true, however, is that the other powers displayed

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little initiative in this respect before 1400, and their reactions to Hanseatic initiative lacked consistency.

In order to understand the background of this behaviour, we must first take account of the erroneous character of the generally accepted view of the beginnings of medieval trade and commercial policy in the Baltic. The Germans did not organize this trade from the beginning or explore the great east–west trade route in the Baltic. Since the viking age the initiative in Baltic trade had belonged to the Scandinavians, who in the twelfth century kept communications open between the Anglo-Norman west and Novgorodian Russia, which had old Scandinavian connections. Several Scandinavian maritime towns grew up in the twelfth century, among them Visby, trading capital of the Baltic, which seems to have been founded chiefly as a Swedish centre of intenational communications. These Scandinavian towns were not towns in the normal western European sense, but rather concentrations of population with both a rural and a seafaring character. The leaders of Scandinavian trading expeditions were rather the provincial aristocratic families than urban merchants.

About 1200 the Germans rather suddenly assumed the initiative in the Baltic trade. As far as we can see this was in no way a result of political artifice, though the eagerness of Henry the Lion of Saxony to sustain the young town of Lübeck certainly created a base for German economic expansion. It was, on the contrary, due to economic development, probably accelerated by the German revolution in ship-building represented by the 'cog'. From the beginning of the thirteenth century German merchant houses and German colonists gained a firm footing in the non-German towns on the Baltic and on the west coast of Scandinavia. From now on the Hanseatic towns, governed by merchants according to commercial interests, adopted a policy of expansion to secure a stronger hold on trade and the trade routes.

The Hanseatic towns, headed by Lübeck, had the general object of obtaining privileges for their citizens which would enable them to trade in each country on terms as nearly equal as possible to those enjoyed by native traders. In particular, of course, they tried to safeguard their independent rights in the focal markets on the trade route between Novgorod and Bruges. The most important of these was the fair of Scania at Skanör, and Valdemar the Victorious in 1201 was able to subdue the city of Lübeck by imprisoning its merchants at this fair. The fall of Valdemar's empire after the battle of Bornhöved in 1227 was a prerequisite of Lübeck's political independence and the prosecution of its commercial policy. King Valdemar allowed the citizens of Lübeck to hold their own court, applying the law of Lübeck, at the Skanör market. In the mid- and later thirteenth century, Lübeck and the other Wendish towns were able

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to secure their exemption from native customs governing wreck of sea in the Scandinavian countries, and their right to the salvage from wrecked vessels.

In the early 1250's (probably in 1252), Earl Birger of Sweden guaranteed to the citizens of Lübeck by treaty complete exemption from duties in Swedish ports. Lübeck had been supporting a rebel faction in Sweden, andthese privileges were the price paid by Earl Birger for its future neutrality In the years which followed other Hanse towns obtained privileges in Sweden modelled on those conceded to Lübeck. In this way the Hanseatic towns achieved an economic supremacy in the Swedish ports, and especially in the new town of Stockholm from which the export of Swedish iron and copper was controlled. The tactics of Lübeck are typical of the mode of operation adopted by its merchant rulers. When civil war divided any of the states bordering on the Baltic, the Hansards were able to sell economic support to one or other of the factions in return for enlarged privileges. When King Abel of Denmark had driven his brother, King Erik, from the throne in 1250, he adjusted the duties at Skanör in the following year to the advantage of the *Umlandsfahrer* (i.e. merchants using the Sound) while some other Hanse towns received the same privilege of holding courts at Skanör as Lübeck had. When Erik Glipping in 1282 was forced to concede the 'Danish Magna Carta' at Nyborg to his aristocratic parliament, he had to promise amongst other things to abolish all uncustomary burdens on foreign merchants. Next year he had to co-operate with the Wendish towns against the chief opponent of their commercial policy at this time—Norway.

Of the Scandinavian nations only the Norwegians kept up real competition with the Hanse towns on the sea in the thirteenth century. The reason for this was the well-developed trade connections between the Norwegian ports and the North Sea countries, especially England, which made Norway relatively independent of the Wendish Hanse towns and their political leader, Lübeck. In the decade before 1250 the Norwegians kept the Germans out of Bergen, the port for the extensive cod-fisheries off the west coast of Norway; while in 1250 King Haakon Haakonsson was in a position to make peace with Lübeck on the basis of reciprocal rights for each other's merchants. In the thirty years which followed, however, Germans from the Baltic towns seem to have got a firm footing in Bergen and other Norwegian ports. In 1282 the royal government of Norway reacted against the threat of German domination by forbidding foreigners who did not import corn or flour from exporting butter, hides or cod. The conflict thus opened developed in 1284 into naval war. The Norwegian earl, Alf Erlingsson, captured a number of German ships; a Hanseatic-Danish blockade cut off Norway's grain supply and closed the Sound to Norwegian shipping. In 1285 Norway had to give

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up the fight, acknowledge the commercial liberties previously enjoyed by foreign merchants and pay heavy damages. After this the Germans slowly but surely obtained control of Bergen's trade in stock-fish, as well as the trade in animal products at Oslo and Tönsberg.

It is interesting to note how the blockade of the Sound served the purpose, not only of starving Norway out, but also of closing the great east–west trade route to others than German merchants. The *umlandsfahrer* towns of Kampen and Zwoll thanked Lübeck for its resolute initiative in keeping the Gotlanders out of the North Sea as well as the Norwegians, Flemish and Frisians out of the Baltic. The trading peasant-sailors of the island of Gotland, and especially the Scandinavian merchant colony of Visby, were the only dangerous rivals to the Hansards in the Baltic and were engaged almost exclusively on the trade route from Novgorod to England and Bruges. We cannot say how effectively the blockade worked in cutting this vital artery of trade for the Gotlanders, for other events in the 1280's contributed to their decline. The rapidly growing German colony at Visby, which was recognized as a member of the Hanse, got the upper hand in the town. King Magnus in 1285 took advantage of his strong position as arbiter between Norway and the German towns and incorporated Gotland into Sweden. In 1288 Visby launched a war against rural Gotland, probably with the backing of Lübeck and the other Wendish towns. Again King Magnus intervened and forced the victorious burghers of Visby to swear obedience to him. After this Gotland and Visby ceased to exist as independent commercial powers. Lübeck took an unchallenged lead in Baltic maritime trade, and in the fourteenth century the German families of Visby began to move back to Lübeck. In the Novgorod *skra* of 1296 members of the German trade organization of this port were forbidden to enter into association with, or undertake commission trade for, Walloons, Flemings or Englishmen. These potential rivals were to be excluded from the Russian market once and for all.

The policy of Lübeck and its satellites during this period displays a pattern of skilful manœuvre directed to the single end of securing control of trade in the Baltic and on the west coasts of Scandinavia. Of the Scandinavian kingdoms only Norway put up any political resistance to the Hanse. In Denmark and Sweden proper (i.e. excluding Gotland) the impulse to co-operate with the German merchants seems to have been stronger than that to oppose them. It is possible that the Swedish efforts, between 1292 and 1323, to conquer the mouth of the Neva were inspired by the conscious economic (and not merely fiscal) objective of securing control over the trade to Novgorod. Certainly the sea-minded Swedish aristocracy seems to have been deeply involved in the enterprise. But internal disintegration in Sweden and Russian resistance checked this expansion, and Hanseatic voyages to Novgorod, limited by the Swedish

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authorities in the 1290's, were freed from restrictions once more. One early result of this Swedish 'crusade' was the removal from Visby to Lübeck in 1293 of the appeal court of the association of Hanseatic voyagers to Novgorod.

Clearly, so far as furthering trade interests was concerned, the political organization of the free Hanse towns was far more effective than that of the surrounding territorial states. This was the unique objective of Hanseatic external policy, while the royal or ducal governments had to play a game complicated by dynastic entanglements, greed for military glory, social privileges and territorial disintegration. It is no wonder that the Scandinavian rulers had to accept German control of maritime trade, whatever grounds of complaint their subjects had. Politically speaking, however, the Hanse towns were weak in one respect: if they had an overwhelmingly strong territorial neighbour they had to submit to his policy. Thus, during the era of Danish expansion during the reign of Erik Menved, Lübeck lost the political initiative from which it had reaped such advantages in the later thirteenth century. This weakness was to some extent overcome when, in the years 1356–77, the earlier rather loose co-operation between the Hanse towns developed into the powerful and well organized Hanseatic League, which proved its military strength by its victory over Valdemar Atterdag of Denmark. This strength depended on sea-power: for war on land the burghers of the Hanse towns still had to call upon allies—the king of Sweden, the duke of Mecklenburg, the counts of Holstein or the rebellious nobility of Jutland.

The extent to which Hanse policy and especially that of Lübeck was dominated by a commercial viewpoint is particularly clear in the decades after the victorious peace of Stralsund. The Hanse had gained a position which would have enabled it to interfere in Danish domestic policy and to maintain military control over the towns and castles of the Sound, which had been given to it in pledge. Yet it did neither: the confirmation of all its trading privileges in Denmark and Norway and unbroken peace at sea proved more important ambitions than any position as political arbiter or king-maker. Only when territorial lords threatened the safety of the Hanse towns themselves did they have recourse to the normal devices of medieval diplomacy. Hence the co-operation between Lübeck and Margaret of Denmark when the house of Mecklenburg seemed to have grown too powerful; hence the alliance between Lübeck and Holstein against Erik the Pomeranian. The same forces estranged the Prussian Hanseatic towns from the Teutonic Order, when the Grand Master and his stewards developed commercial interests of their own which diverged from those of the Hanse.

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B. *The Commercial Policy of the Teutonic Order*

The Teutonic Order had, in the history of commercial policy, a unique position amongst the Baltic powers in view of the fact that it was at one and the same time a territorial state and a member of the Hanseatic group. This position became more and more notable as Prussian trade expanded rapidly in the later fourteenth century, and the Order itself took on the appearance of a gigantic commercial house overshadowing the merchants of the Prussian towns, which were likewise growing at a rapid rate.

The prerequisite for this position assumed by the Order was the combination of its efficient fiscal system and its political control over the towns in its territory. Its surplus revenue in the form of grain and the state monopoly of amber constituted its initial trading capital, on the basis of which the Grand Stewards of Königsberg and Marienburg established a well organized commerce extending over the Baltic and the North Sea. The need for grain in England and Flanders, and the favourable conditions for corn export thus created, stimulated the Order's trade. Gradually this came to embrace all the main commodities of Prussian export: wax, copper and furs as well as grain and amber. Of imports, chiefly salt, cloth and spices, the Order itself was by far the largest consumer.

In its political relations with the nations with which it dealt, the Order maintained a position of highly practical duplicity, appearing sometimes as a trading partner and sometimes as a sovereign power with the international responsibilities that implied. It had permanent factors in Lübeck, Bruges, England and Scotland for the purpose of acting as branch managers, but always able to pull diplomatic strings when required. The Order could throw into the scales its spiritual prestige, its weight as a power of military importance and, through the Prussian towns, the machinery of the Hanseatic League. The difficulty of playing this complicated game arose from the limited range of manœuvre that was possible if the spiritual powers, state sovereigns or the leading Hanse towns were not to be affronted. In 1383, for instance, the Grand Master reacted against piracy in the southern part of the North Sea by forbidding sailings from the Prussian ports. The non-Prussian Hanse towns, anxious to get their ships out of Prussian waters, protested against this ban. Again in 1388 a Hanse assembly proclaimed a blockade of Flanders to force the duke of Burgundy to pay certain indemnities. The duke appealed to the Grand Master to act as a mediator, which he did for several years without much success; but during these years at least some Prussian ships sailed to Flanders despite the blockade and despite the Grand Master's promises of solidarity with the Hanse. The Grand Master's duplicity was thus clearly

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demonstrated, though probably it was impossible for him to take sides for political reasons. In its relations with England, the Order maintained a sharper policy than the Hanse in face of the attack on Hanseatic privileges during the reign of Richard II; for both the Order itself and the Prussian towns had less to lose from a commercial conflict with England than the majority of the Hanse towns. The conflict even caused the Grand Master during the years 1386–8 to prohibit the export from Prussia of all articles in heavy demand in England, a measure which also affected the Hanse towns outside Prussia and which was basically aimed at preventing a clandestine export via the Wendish towns.

Tension between the Order and the western Hanseatic group over the Novgorod trade in the 1390's raised issues of more general interest. The Prussians did not belong to the Hanse groups allowed by the League to sail to Novgorod; they had to travel overland if they wished to reach this commercial focus of the eastern Baltic area. From 1380 to the beginning of the fifteenth century the Prussian towns and the Grand Master were claiming equality with the Wendish and Livonian towns in the trade to Novgorod. The League met this claim with shifty excuses, delays and objections, and it had not been granted when in 1398 the Prussians got privileges and a new market in Lithuania and thus lost much of their interest in the Novgorod trade. In this instance the political machinery of the Hanse worked to preserve an existing pattern of trade. It served the Flemish interest in keeping Polish cloth out of Novgorod as well as the reluctance of Lübeck and the Livonian towns to accept new competitors in the trade of the eastern Baltic.

These tensions and disputes make it the easier to understand that the Order was a somewhat curious partner for the Hanse towns and not a particularly popular one. Even to the Prussian towns, whose interests were in many ways championed by the international policy of the Order, its combined fiscal suzerainty and commercial competition with the private merchant became distasteful. In the early years of the fifteenth century the two Grand Stewards of Königsberg and Marienburg had a capital of 100,000 Prussian marks at their disposal, an enormous sum compared with the resources of any single merchant house. This enabled the Order, for example, to build ships large enough to challenge Hanseatic shipping. Before 1406 one-third, and after 1406 two-thirds, of the *pfundzoll* levied in Prussia went to the Order, and its capital resources were thus enlarged by charges which were a burden upon the trade of the private merchant. These circumstances probably played a considerable part in the desertion of the cause of the Order by the towns after the battle of Tannenberg.

The loss of political control over the Prussian towns checked the flourishing commercial activity of the Order. Its rapid descent into

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permanent financial difficulties, discussed above, prevented it from rebuilding its commercial greatness.

C. *The Scandinavian Nations and Hanseatic Privileges in the Later Middle Ages*

Hanse policy after the peace of Stralsund continued to be directed towards the conservation of its privileges; the political methods of realizing this policy were alliances, embargoes, blockade and, in the last resort, war. This traditional policy proved effective enough so long as no serious competitors such as the Dutch or English established a firm footing on the shores of the Baltic. The commercial rivalry of the Teutonic Order proved a transient episode. Not until the fifteenth century did the European tendency towards monarchical consolidation give rise in the Scandinavian countries to economic policies governed by some glimmerings of social objectives. When this development did take place, however, the international trade monopoly of the Hanse became a subject of political debate.

The townsmen of Denmark, Norway and Sweden in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were in each country a privileged estate, whose existence depended upon their role as intermediaries in the commercial exchanges within the country. Restricted economically by German commercial supremacy and outshone socially by the landed aristocracy, they had only limited opportunities of making national policies reflect their special interests. This might happen when the king or the aristocracy or both discovered interests in common with the townsmen. Otherwise their privileges were conventionally recognized, but in practice little respected.

In Norway the ship-owning and sea-minded aristocracy had been the chief upholders of pre-Hanseatic trade, and had therefore worked with the Norwegian townsmen in the vain efforts to set limits to German commercial influence. After the decisive clashes of the 1280's, the royal government from time to time issued decrees designed to place obstacles in the way of the establishment of German settlements and commercial associations in Norway. In 1294 foreign merchants were forbidden to sail north of Bergen. In the next year the establishment of gilds was prohibted generally. In 1315 and 1316 the sale of cod and butter to foreigners was allowed only if they brought malt, flour and grain to Norway. In 1316 the king's bailiffs were to have first option of buying all imported goods. In 1317 foreigners were only to be allowed to trade between 14 September and 3 May with certain specially nominated merchants in each town, and then only wholesale. In 1318 King Haakon V abandoned this claim, but laid it down that foreigners were to trade only with

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Norwegian merchants. This ruling was repeated in 1346 together with a ban on all retail trade and on direct trade with the peasantry outside the towns. All this proved in vain. During this half-century of prohibitive legislation the Lübeckers established their great trading factory in Bergen, attracted the fish trade of the west coast of Norway to that town and took the law into their own hands when the bailiffs proved troublesome. They had at their disposal a deadly weapon against a country permanently short of food—the grain blockade. Gradually the Norwegians gave up the fight, though they never fully consented to commercial rule by the Germans. It is significant that the disappearance of this fighting spirit coincided with a general decline in the political activity of the Norwegian nobility.

In Sweden, a general town law promulgated by King Magnus II in 1347 restricted trade to the towns and forbade foreigners to engage in retail trade or direct trade with the peasantry. The merchants of the towns of western Finland (Åbo excepted) and of Sweden north of Stockholm were obliged to sail only to Stockholm with their goods. The king's bailiffs had the first option on all the goods brought to a town for sale. The Norwegian inspiration behind these prescriptions seems clear enough; it may be remembered that Sweden and Norway were joined in a personal union under Magnus. The effort to promote the trade of Stockholm indicates a joint interest on the part of the king and the leading Swedish nobles of the Mälar provinces around the town. At the same time, the attempt by this law to protect the trading interests of the Swedish townsmen against foreign competition was more a matter of theory than practice. The domination of the Hanse towns, and of Lübeck especially, over the foreign trade of Sweden remained unchallenged whenever the country was subject to a native government. No restrictions were placed on the German gilds in Sweden, and the two big merchant gilds in Stockholm were dominated by Germans. Sweden drew profit in the main from German trade, and saw no real alternative to accepting the Hanse as a trading partner. At the same time, the need for political support from the Hanse against Denmark almost always precluded Sweden from stressing national interests in the course of discussion about privileges and customs.

It may seem strange that Denmark, the strongest of the Scandinavian kingdoms, was the last to adopt protective legislation directed against German trade—strange because Denmark felt the effects of German commercial supremacy earlier than Norway. Not until 1396 did Queen Margaret confine all trade in Denmark to the towns. The reason may be that it was not until this date that the Danish nobility was subjugated to an extent that made it incapable of defending its lucrative direct trade in cattle and foodstuffs with the Germans. On the other hand, a real concern

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for the welfare of the burghers of the Danish towns may lie behind Margaret's decree. The cities of Copenhagen and Malmö had experienced less German settlement and felt less Hanseatic influence than other Scandinavian towns of any importance, and they had accumulated wealth in virtue of their proximity to the market of Scania. Even if Margaret and her advisers were inspired by narrow fiscal views in their dealings with the towns, they must have seen the advantage of a rapid increase in the resources of the Danish merchants. Perhaps they may even have anticipated the possibility of gaining a new political ally.

At any rate, a concern for the interests of Danish merchants is evident in an ordinance issued by King Erik of Pomerania in 1422. Besides confining trade to the towns this edict laid down regulations for a number of handicrafts to be enforced by the city magistrates, forbade magistrates to be recruited from artisans in these crafts and strengthened the hands of the burgomasters and aldermen against the craftsmen. At the same time King Erik invited English and Dutch merchants to the new town of Landskrona, and challenged the privileges of the Hanse in 1423 by imposing new customs on trade passing the Sound. During the war which followed he fought the Hanse and for some years had the Dutch as allies. This grand policy of Erik's required all the resources of his centralized Scandinavian kingdom, and ended with his reign. But the protective policy of concentrating all trade in the towns was continued under the aristocratic regimes which followed. Probably it was enforced only against the lower classes, leaving the illegal trade carried on by the nobility quite undisturbed. At the same time, it registers the growing self-awareness of the burghers of the Danish towns.

In 1475 Christian I permitted German merchants to sail to Danish ports while forbidding Danish merchants to sail to Germany, and decreed certain facilities in the export of horses and cattle from the Danish countryside to Germany. In the same edict, however, he prohibited the Germans from wintering in Danish towns and abolished all German gilds. In 1477 the Danes were allowed to sail to Germany, but the restrictions on Germans taking up permanent residence in Denmark were continued. In 1490 King Hans renewed these restrictions in forceful terms and forbade Danish burghers 'to take the money and goods of a foreign merchant, be a commissioner for him or sell to his advantage'. In the same year he made commercial treaties with England and Holland, and in the years which followed co-operated politically with the czar of Russia, the new master of Novgorod. The plan of Christian II in 1520 to unite all Scandinavian merchants into a great trading company was a logical consequence of the growing bourgeois influence on Danish policy.

This influence is displayed in a clearer light when it is set against the commercial policy of the first Oldenburg kings in Norway. There the

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native nobility got Christopher of Bavaria to issue an ordinance in 1444 to restrain the tyranny of the German trading establishment in Bergen: their trade in fish was to be conducted only in Bergen and their direct hold over the fishermen from Nordland was subjected to legal restraints. It required the indignation of some leading nobles about German excesses, combined with the international weight of Christopher's Scandinavian state, to secure the proclamation of these modest principles; yet in the event the ordinance came to nothing, for the Germans protested vigorously and Christopher was afraid to risk international difficulties in order to conciliate local opinion in Norway. During the second half of the fifteenth century the king tended to take the side of the Germans in Norway, and their dominant position was not shaken until the middle of the sixteenth century. In distant Iceland, Christian I overtly allied himself with the Hamburg merchants who, with the help of the royal governors, outrivalled the English in the Iceland waters and took over the trade in stock-fish. In Iceland there were no native townsmen to claim rights of their own.

The protective tendencies evident in Scandinavian trade policy in the fifteenth century were stimulated by a growing preoccupation with revenue from customs, particularly where payment was made in silver currency. A general scarcity of silver, of course, forms a background to the economic policies both of the kings in Copenhagen and the regents in Stockholm. The government of the constitutional council in Sweden, in particular, displayed a major concern for the economic welfare of the people. At the end of the century one of the Swedish bishops drew up a programme which summarizes the economic theory of his generation. Gold and silver ought not to be hoarded; on the contrary, they should be put into circulation in the country. As much bullion as possible should be imported and as little as possible exported. As with bullion, necessary commodities should be retained within the confines of the country, while luxury imports should as far as possible be excluded. In the second half of the century both the Danish and Swedish governments endeavoured to regulate the goldsmith's craft in a somewhat draconian manner in order to establish control over the trade in gold and silver. The Swedish council in 1489 made a whole-hearted but hypocritical attempt to safeguard public morality by prohibiting the payment of soldiers in money and imported cloth—a wage policy doomed from the beginning by general political unrest. In 1493 the council issued a long and somewhat drastic ordinance concerning the country's foreign trade. It prohibited the important and flourishing cattle trade across the Danish frontier; ordered all trade with foreigners in the southern provinces to be concentrated at Kalmar, Söderköping and New Lödöse; and expressed the wish that German merchants should come to these towns and especially that

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they should import articles upon which customs duties had to be paid. In 1502 the old decree, which had fallen into desuetude, that goods from the Bothnian towns must be brought to Stockholm and Åbo and not sent abroad was renewed in categorical terms, on the ground that 'the country and all of us have more sustenance from Stockholm than from these small towns'.

These regulations mainly subserved the fiscal concern of the regent, Sten Sture, to bring inland trade under the control of his bailiffs. At the same time, however, they equally clearly served the interests of Sten's allies, the mine owners of Dalecarlia and the merchants of Stockholm. It would in fact have been impossible to get this policy accepted by the council if it had not been in harmony with generally accepted economic principles. Even in their dealings with the Hanse the Sture regents tried to raise the customs duties in 1480, and to decree in 1505 that Lübeck shippers must take Swedish as well as German cargoes if they wished to import goods into the country. They never dared, however, to come into open conflict with Lübeck on economic matters. Only a few members of the council, who were less concerned about a national, anti-Danish policy, advocated stronger measures against the supremacy of the Hanse. The national monarchy of Gustavus Vasa was the first government strong enough to stand up to Lübeck, though at the end of the sixteenth century Lübeck and Danzig still handled the lion's share of Sweden's international trade.

D. *Conclusions*

Medieval commercial policies in the Baltic region are from start to finish Hanseatic policies, provoking certain counter-measures on the part of the territorial states. Not until the fifteenth century did Denmark, and, in its last decades, Sweden, begin to initiate measures which emanated apparently from the commercial classes in the towns on the Sound or corresponded to the interests of the Stockholm merchants and the Swedish mine owners. The dominating commercial position of the Hanse enabled it to secure from an early date a political hold over the bourgeoisie in all the Baltic countries where German colonists acted as trading intermediaries. The lack of positive commercial policies in Scandinavia reflects the weakness of the native merchants. Not until some groups amongst them in the fifteenth century had gained sufficient strength to make their own policy, and this was met in turn by somewhat more developed economic ideas at the national government level, was the Hanse confronted with real problems in pursuing its Scandinavian policy.

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Representative Assemblies of Mediaeval Sweden

In the leading countries of mediaeval Europe, the assemblies in which the commons are represented, grew out of the change of social balance, which was determined by the growing economic and military importance of the cities, especially of the leading class of merchants. This fundamental condition was lacking in Sweden, whose boroughs and whose merchants were dominated by the influence of German trade and of the merchants houses of Lubeck and other Hansa towns. In spite of this, the Swedish parliament of Estates was created in the later middle ages. The causes of this development are fully discussed by Swedish historians, and so is the moment of birth of the Swedish parliament. In this lecture the common viewpoints and the enduring results of the discussions will be stressed rather than the differences still existing.

As postulates you have to remember two facts of fundamental importance in Swedish mediaeval history. First: we never had a feudal system in the continental sense of the word. Second: fourteenth century Sweden was a federal kingdom and remained legally so to the end of the middle ages. In the thirteenth century the federal units of Sweden, the «landskaps» — corresponding to provinces or counties in other countries — still elected the king separately, although the nucleus of the Swedish state, Uppland, had the first and leading choice. The electoral bodies were the things of the landskaps presided over by the doomsmen and consisting of all free men of the respective landskaps, who were present at the meeting. But from the beginning of the fourteenth century, whenever the throne fell vacant all the doomsmen, each with twelve free men of a certain intellectual standard prescribed by law, had to assemble at the sacred place of king-taking in Uppland, the stone of Mora, and elect the new king. This assembly recognized no distinction of noble or of ecclestiastical status; it represented the undifferentiated agrarian society of old. As a newly created electoral body of the fourteenth century it was an anachronism, but it certainly was a representative assembly functioning for a social purpose.

Why came this assembly into being ? Not as a result of a social development, of a levelling of the estates and classes or of an increase in power of the Swedish yeomen. The beginning of the fourteenth

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century saw the high tide of aristocratic dominance in Sweden. We know that all real decisions when a king was dethroned or created were made by the «proceres» and «meliores» of the country: the bishops and the nobility. From the middle of the thirteenth century a «parlamentum» clearly is mentioned, a consultative assembly of the aristocracy summoned by the king when important decisions of state were to be made. From the year 1280 a special royal council existed with a limited number of members and special privileges, representing a loyal, governing group of the aristocracy. These two assemblies, the parlamentum and the council, had real power. The electoral assembly at Mora stone existed on the presumption that it had only to confirm decisions already made and that its members followed the lead of the aristocratic doomsmen. Its creation stressed in the first place the territorial unity of the kingdom, which had been dangerously imperilled during a long dynastic struggle ended by civil war. But it also gave a useful legal form backed by traditions, to the very act of election and thus served the constitutional principles of the aristocracy against the hereditary claims of the ambitious king of Earl Birger's family.

This does not mean that the opinion of the Swedish commons even at this time was totally insignificant. The peasants and their servants constituted the great majority of the people. Although their active influence on the policy of the Kingdom was very small there was the possibility of passive resistance and even of local military action, which could not be neglected. Their legal rights were considerable. The geographical realities of the vast, sparsely populated country made local popular opinion a power. But their interests as a special class were in no important way opposed to those of the aristocracy. The yeomen were masters of their own soil, and the noblemen kept only a loose hold on their tenants. The manors were few, the burden of daywork was relatively easy. The tenants paid their masters fixed rents and their management of the farm was difficult to control, On the other hand the taxes claimed by the king's bailiffs gave rise to real irritation among the peasants. They had no reason to long for strong and active kings, whose need of income always tended to be considerable. This means that peasants and noblemen had fundamental political interests in common. Swedish society of the beginning of the fourteenth century lacked the conditions for the genesis of a representative assembly, where the commons would stress opinions of their own against the aristocracy.

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But all the same such an assembly was born in the later middle ages. The beginning of the «riksdag», the Swedish national assembly of four estates, was the product of a development of constitutional theory but also of a significant change in Swedish society. The theory of representation of estates, was imported from abroad. In the early half of the fourteenth century Sweden was remarkably open to international influence in legal and political theory. In 1332 the Danish province of Scania went over to the Swedish king by a *coup d'état* by the Archbishop of Lund and some noblemen of the province. As a legal excuse for this transaction was claimed the spontaneous will of the people of Scania, «domini Petri, archiepiscopi lundensis, capituli sui lundensis, militum armigerorum, monasteriorum, ciuitatensium ceterorumque incolarum terre nostre Scanie, clericorum et laicorum». Those were the members of the corporative unit of the Scanian people, which made use of its sovereign right to change king and nation by a unanimous decision. This right was of course accepted by King Magnus of Sweden and his counsellors, who reaped the benefits of the Scanian transaction. And so the theory of the sovereign power of a people composed of cooperating estated entered Swedish political debate.

In 1356 King Magnus' eldest son, the king elect Erik, rebelled against his father with the help of the aristocratic faction and adressed the people of each diocese in a proclamation by enumerating the estates, claiming that he had been elected king by the people's grace. When King Erik died three years later, King Magnus tried to get himself accepted by his followers, and summoned a national assembly of a new king to Kalmar to decide how the country should be ruled: there should meet four men of the common people of each landskap, two men of each borough, the bishop with two canons from each diocese and all the king's and all the kingdom's men, that is all knights and squires who had to serve the king as his sworn vassals. We don't know if this assembly ever came into being. There are different opinions expressed among the scholars. But we know that some weeks later King Magnus made decisions of state at another meeting where only the bishop and the nobility are mentioned as present. And we know that during dynastic disputes in the 1360tes and 1370tes the estates of the Swedish people were referred to in important decisions but without any mention of a representation of the commons. The council and the nobility acted in their name and claimed to perform the will of all the people. The theory was

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generally used, but Swedish society still lacked a basis for a real representation of all the estates. And the theory served the political aims of the aristocracy, whose real representation was the council and who by every means disputed the king's claim to the right to decide on matters of government without interference from his subjects.

The idea, that the commons had the right to take part in important decisions about the government of the kingdom was, however, vivid in Sweden all through the fourteenth century, and the idea was not without a touch of reality. It had the support of the national tradition of constitutional law. It corresponded, somehow, to the role of the peasants as a passive but not negligible power in domestic politics. In the civil wars the aristocratic combatants made up their mind to appeal to the common people in their propaganda. It was only a matter of time before one or other group of the commons would be sufficiently politically minded to demand opportunities of giving voice to their opinions in the representative assemblies.

But at the end of the century, the royal power asserted its dominance in the United Scandinavian Kingdom of Queen Margareta. Neither the aristocracy, nor any other estate of her Swedish subjects, got opportunities to take part in governmental decisions. Half a century of autocratic royal leadership brougt constitutional life in Sweden to a standstill. Not until the country rebelled against King Erik of Pomerania, in 1434, was there again need of a constitutional form for selfgovernment of the people. In the revolt, nobility, clergy and peasants fought together against the bailiffs and loyalists. The council, no longer of the king but of the kingdom, functioned as a governing body, and vital decisions were made by general meetings at which all the estates were supposed to be present. The decisions of these meetings were signed and probably formulated by the council, which during the rebellion swelled to a representative assembly of the whole nobility.

Were the commons really represented in the general meeting of the 1430[ms]? Scholarly debate had focussed on this question: arguments have been stressed for and against. We must remember that the Swedish peasantry had taken an important part in the rebellion, especially in its first phase, and that the leader of the popular movement, the mine-owner Engelbrektsson, had been recognized as commander of the whole rebel army and as member of the governing council. We know that at least some boroughs sent representatives to some meetings and that a representation of the common peasantry,

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at least, was planned at a provincial meeting. Certainly, crowds of common people from the rebel army and from the peasantry often acclaimed the decisions of the meetings. But the sources never mention names or actions of delegates of the commons. Their known leaders belonged to another social class, the gentry. Even if we consider the men of the common people who were present at the meetings as representatives of their estates, we may assume that they acted rather as an audience than as negotiating members of the meetings.

The leaders of the popular revolutionary movement were killed by enemies belonging to the high aristocracy, in the years 1436 and 1437, and the general movement of the peasantry ebbed out. But the principle of the participation of all estates in general meetings had been confirmed. During the years of conflict between Erik of Pomerania and his Swedish subjects the whole people of Sweden was theoretically responsible for the government. The political leaders of the country, bishops and noblemen, proclaimed themselves as champions of constitutional freedom. When the nobility of Denmark had also turned against King Erik, the Swedish leaders discussed a plan for general meetings of the united Scandinavian kingdom for an election of the common king, where all important boroughs and all landskaps of Denmark, Sweden and Norway should be represented together with the clergy and the nobility. The plan was never realized, and when the interregnum was over no need of national assemblies was felt except in connection with the traditional ceremony at Mora stone, when Christopher of Bavaria was elected in 1441, Karl Knutsson in 1448 and Christian I in 1457.

In the 1460'es, however, a triangular conflict between the rival kings Karl Knutsson, Christian and the archbishop of Uppsala, Johannes Benedicti, caused a new interregnum and incessant civil war. In August 1464 King Karl was acclaimed in Stockholm by common peasantry from six landskaps, enumerated by the king in a later proclamation. And two years later in a meeting at Västerås the same king was surrounded by gentry, townsmen, mineowners, peasant wariors from Dalecarlia and official delegates from the common peasantry in nine landskaps. In the following year 1467 the council of the kingdom, the magistrates of Stockholm, nobility, townsmen, peasantry of three landskaps, the two last categories probably represented by delegates, met in Stockholm and swore allegiance to King Karl. And then, when after the battle of Brunkeberg in 1471 the interregnum in Sweden was made permanent and the country

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for half a century was governed by the council, headed by a regent, the general assembly of estates again and again was summoned to dicuss and decide on important matters, especially in connection with the repeated claims of the kings of Denmark and Norway to be allowed to enter their kingdom of Sweden and reign there according to law and treaties.

The representative assembly of estates had been born, but what had happened to stabilize the practice of delegated spokesmen from boroughs and peasantry ? It is easy to prove that in the middle ages the representation of the commons never became strictly and numerically regular; the national assemblies were always rather chaotic and the peripheral provinces never had a chance to keep in constant touch with the high policy of the government junta. But certain categories of the commons always had a very strong representation: the mineowners of Västmanland and Dalecarlia and the merchants of Stockholm. In 1504 the national assembly consisted of 15 members of the council, nobility from Uppland and Södermanland, the overseer of the big copper mine at Falun, delegates from the copper and silver mines and the mayor, the aldermen and 48 delegates from the city of Stockholm. The mineowners and the merchants of Stockholm represented a new social group of considerable economic and military power and with few interests in common with the landowning aristocracy. They would equip trained and mailclad soldiers and they controlled the famous bowmen of Dalecarlia, who did seasonal work at the mines. The regent and the council depended on them as allies.

Already in 1434 the first upheaval of the peasantry had been led by a mineowner and headed by Dalecarlians. In the general agitation of the 1460'es, when the conflicting parties of the aristocracy were wooing the common people to get their support, especially for the paying of taxes and supplying of forces, the leaders of the mining district again took the lead of the popular movement. They and the merchants were capable of political as well as military initiative. For mainly economic reasons they were bitter enemies of the Danish kings. They gave the regent the nucleus of a national army, independent of the nobility and its followers, and the regent's subtly organized propaganda among the peasantry in the provinces kept together a body of popular opinion to support his own government. The assembly of estates served from the beginning the policy of the Sture regents. It rallied the forces of national resistance against the

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kings and the other Scandinavian nations and it neutralized the power of the aristocracy when in the last decades of the middle ages the government of the Sture regents showed dictatorial tendencies. It gave the Stures the moral support of the people's general will, when they discussed the privileges of the church. By its very nature it was a revolutionary creation. Logically its importance faded when at last a national kingdom had been stabilized in Sweden in the reign of Gustavus Vasa.

The riksdag was created out of quite disparate impulses: the international conception of a corporative state, the old federal origin of the Swedish kingdom, long periods of interregnum, and a social and economic development which, at last, gave the commons a natural leader-group. The story of the Swedish representative assemblies in the middle ages confirms the knowledge of the vital importance to Swedish cultural and social life of the intellectual and economic connections with the nations on the European continent and in the British isles. But on the other hand the role of the peasantry in Swedish constitutional life is unthinkable without the specific background of a long legal tradition where the peasantry was more or less identified with the Swedish people.

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ERIK LÖNNROTH:

Gotland, Osteuropa und die Union von Kalmar

Das ohne jeden Vergleich grösste politische Ereignis des Jahrhunderts das in diesem Symposium behandelt werden soll war für die skandinavischen Völker die Union von Kalmar, die mit der Krönung Erichs, des Pommers, im Jahre 1397 den ganzen Norden zu einem Regimen vereinigte. Die grosse Tagung von Kalmar, die Beschlüsse die dort gefasst wurden, die zwei aufbewahrten Dokumente, die die staatsrechtliche Form der Union in einer oder anderer Weise bestimmt haben, sind wieder und wiederum in der historischen Diskussion behandelt worden. So intens hat sich die nordische Geschichtswissenschaft auf die konstitutionellen und diplomatarischen Probleme konzentriert, dass die aussenpolitischen Voraussetzungen der Union gewissermassen in den Hintergrund getreten sind. Das ist auch recht erklärlich: man hat die äussere Gefahr, die den drei nordischen Königreichen gedroht und eine engere Verteidigungsgemeinschaft nötig gemacht haben soll, nicht ganz ernst genommen. Der Königin Margaretas Gegner waren Albrecht von Mecklenburg mit seinen Verwandten und die Vitalianer, die in der Ostsee den Handel belästigt aber nie wirklich gestoppt haben. Der Streit galt formell dem Königreich Schweden, reell aber der Herrschaft auf Gotland, wo die Mecklenburger die Stadt Wisby inne hatten, die Truppen Margaretas das Land ausserhalb der Mauern. Ein nicht geringer Gegenstand eines politischen Konflikts, aber kaum eines Konflikts, der die nordischen Völker wirklich bedroht haben kann. So hat man es gesehen.

Nehmen wir heute die Frage von den Voraussetzungen des Unionsbeschlusses noch einmal auf. Ich will die nächste Vorgeschichte ganz schlicht erzählen, als wäre es eine völlig neue Geschichte, die neu erlebt werden muss.

Sie beginnt an einem Tag im Juli 1396. Ein kleines Geschwader Margaretas unter Befehl der Hauptmänner von Kalmar und Borgholm lag vor Gotland um die See von Vitalianern rein zu halten. Auf der Höhe von Hoburgen begegnete es einem grösseren Geschwader aus Danzig, das mit demselben Auftrag vor Gotland kreuzte. Zwei Schiffe aus Kalmar, von Bürgern der Stadt bemannt, die sich ersichtlich von den übrigen dänisch-schwedischen Schiffen getrennt hatten,

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wurden plötzlich von den preussischen Schiffen angegriffen und gekapert. Die Besatzungen wurden nach Wisby entführt und dort, in der von den Mecklenburgern besetzten Stadt, vor Gericht gezogen, der Seeräuberei angeklagt und sämtliche – 80 Bürger aus Kalmar — hingerichtet. Ihre Schiffe wurden verbrannt.

Das Ereignis löste natürlich in Kalmar eine gewaltsame Erregung aus. Aber auch am Hof der Königin, die sich gerade in Schweden aufhielt, um die Annahme Erichs als König von Schweden vorzubereiten. Mit dem Vorfall von Hoburgen fing eine Periode erhöhter politischer Aktivität im Norden an. Im August begab sich Erich von Mecklenburg, Albrechts Sohn, der noch den Namen ausgewählter König von Schweden trug, mit einer Kriegsmacht nach Wisby. Am 20. September im Rezess von Nyköping, unterwarfen sich der Reichsrat und die Adligen Schwedens der beinahe unbeschränkten Herrschaft Erichs von Pommern. In diesen Rezess wurde ein Punkt eingeführt, der zum Ausdruck brachte, dass die Schweden zu einer Begegnung mit den Dänen und Norwegern bereit seien — wenn und wo immer die Königin und der König dies wünschten — um dabei in einer gegenseitigen Absprache festzulegen, dass die drei Reiche nie wieder untereinander Krieg führen würden.[1] Es war offensichtlich, dass hiermit ein Bündnis zu gegenseitiger Verteidigung gemeint war, und dass die künftige Tagung der Reichsräte und Königsmänner ganz Skandinaviens bei der Krönung des Königs stattfinden sollte.

Die Krönung wurde von Margareta nach Kalmar verlegt — eine peripher gelegene Stadt ohne Domkirche und Bischof, wo kein König früher gekrönt worden war. Der einzige Anlass hierzu war der Inzident von Hoburgen und dessen Verwendung in Margaretas Aussenpolitik. Eine gegen die Preussen gerichtete Greuelpropaganda wandte sich an die wendischen Hansestädte nebst einer Einladung zur Kalmarer Tagung. Es war Margaretas Ziel, die Wenden von den Preussen und dem Deutschen Orden zu trennen. Nicht nur die Mecklenburger sondern auch der Orden, die Grossmacht an der Ostsee, tritt im Gründungsjahr der Kalmarer Union als potenzieller Gegner der Reiche Margaretas hervor. Ein Gegner, der im darauffolgenden Jahre Gotland ockupierte mit der deutlichen Absicht, die Insel endgültig zu behalten.

Die Aktion der Danziger Friedensschiffe gegen die von Kalmar scheint im Lichte der schwedischen und dänischen Dokumente gar

[1] Sveriges Traktater, hrsgg. von O. S. Rydberg, II, S. 659 f.

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unsinnig — von der Gegenseite ist sie wenig beleuchtet worden. Der Hochmeister zeigte den Anklagen gegenüber eine auffallende Sorglosigkeit, und man hat preussischerseits nie zugegeben, dass die Kalmarer Bürger der Seeräuberei unschuldig gewesen seien. Albrecht von Mecklenburg hat später in einer Klageschrift behauptet, dass Untertanen Margaretas „von Kalmar und andere" versucht hatten, ihm Wisby mit Überrumpelung zu berauben.[2] Beide Behauptungen könnten nur der allgemeinen Brutalität der Kriegführung zur Zeit der Vitalianer zugeschrieben werden, wenn man wie bisher immer als ein Postulat annehmen könnte, dass die Preussen die Skandinavier als Bundesgenossen gegen die Vitalianer auffassen müssten. Da es in der Geschichte des Spätmittelalters zwar oft berechtigt ist, mit Brutalität zu rechnen, mit Unsinn aber nicht, ist es ratsam, nachzuprüfen, ob preussische Kriegsschiffe vielleicht Grund hatten, solche aus den drei Reichen als Feinde aufzufassen. Es ist um so mehr begründet, als eine um drei Jahre später gelieferte Aussage von Lübeckern, die Zeugen des Überfalls von Hoburgen waren, bestätigt, dass die Preussen die Kalmariten als Dänen und die Dänen als Todesfeinde auffassten und dass alle Anklagen, die gegen die Gefangenen in Wisby gerichtet wurden, von Bürgern der preussischen Städten stammten.[3]

Ein Faden dieses rätselhaften Knäuels wird in der vor kurzem erschienenen Abhandlung Michael Lintons über die Königin Margareta aufgerollt.[4] Er hat darauf hingewiesen, dass die Vitalianer keine konstanten Anhänger der Mecklenburger waren sondern Berufskrieger zur See, die seit dem Frieden zu Lindholm keine feste Beschäftigung mehr hatten und Stützpunkte für kommende Tätigkeiten suchten. Solche Stützpunkte fanden sie vorzugsweise in den Schlössern an der schwedischen Küste im nördlichen Teil der Ostsee, die von Herren aus dem Reichsrat Margaretas beherrscht wurden: Nyköping, Åbo, Raseborg und Wiborg, besonders aber auf Gotland, wo Sven Sture den Befehl über die dänisch-schwedische Kriegsmacht führte. Es war also begreiflich, dass die Preussen vor Hoburgen den Verdacht haben konnten, dass Schiffe, die von Margaretas Hauptmännern kommandiert wurden, von Seeräubern bemannt sein könnten. Es erklärt aber nicht, warum gerade die Preussen im Gegensatz zu den Lübeckern eine ungehemmt aggressive Haltung

[2] Hanserecesse I, 4, 397.

[3] Hanserecesse I, 4, S. 508 f.

[4] M. Linton, Drottning Margareta, fullmäktig fru och rätt husbonde, Diss. Göteborg 1971 (Studia Historica Gothoburgensia XII), S. 233–246.

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gegen die Untertanen Margaretas eingenommen haben, was auch der Politik der preussischen Städte auf den Hansetagen dieser Zeit genau entspricht.

Es ist notwendig, den Hintergrund in der allgemeinen Situation der osteuropäischen Politik im Jahre 1396 zu suchen.

Der konstante Faktor im politischen Muster des östlichen Ostseeraumes war der Gegensatz zwischen dem polnischen Königreich Wladyslaw-Jagiellos und dem Deutschen Orden. Die unsicheren Faktoren waren die Stellungnahme Witolds von Litauen, der seinem Vetter dem König gegenüber sehr selbständig operierte, und die Herzöge von Pommern, von denen es viele gab und die bisweilen zusammenarbeiteten aber meistens in Gruppen vereint ihre Interessen als Landesherren beförderten. Der aktivste dieser Kleinpotentaten war Wartislaw von Pommern-Stolp; er ist in Detmars Chronik kurz als ein grosser Räuber karakterisiert. Gegen Ende der 1380-er Jahre wurde seine Stellung radikal verändert und gestärkt, indem sein junger Sohn zum Thronfolger der drei skandinavischen Königreiche nominiert wurde. Wartislaw, der sich früher eng zum stärksten Nachbarn, dem Orden, gehalten hatte, war zwar jetzt zu Margareta gebunden, hatte aber dadurch eine Rückversicherung, die ihm in der Ostpolitik eine neue Manövrierfähigkeit gab.

Im Jahre 1390 schloss König Wladyslaw-Jagiello einen Vertrag mit vier der pommerschen Herzöge: Svantibor und Bogislaw von Stettin und Wartislaw und Bogislaw von Stolp. Der Vertrag galt einem neuen offiziellen Handelsweg für Kaufleute aus den wendischen Hansestädten, denen von den vertragsschliessenden Fürsten Schutz zugesichert wurde. Der Weg lief von Stettin nach Zantoch an der Grenze zwischen Pommern und Polen, von da nach Skwierzyna, wo eine Zollstation errichtet werden sollte, weiter der Warthe entlang nach Poznan und schliesslich nach Krakow. Ein eingehender Zolltarif war im Vertrag enthalten.[5] Die Reaktion des Hochmeisters, als er vom Vertrag gehört hatte, verriet, dass es sich um eine ernste Sache handelte: der Handelsweg erbot eine Alternative zu denen, die durch das Ordensland liefen und den aufblühenden Handel Polens von den preussischen Städten und Zöllen abhängig machten.[6]

Der Handelsvertrag wurde von einer Vasallenhuldigung komplettiert, die Wartislaw von Stolp dem polnischen König persönlich seiner Brüder wegen leistete: die Herzöge erhielten Bydgoszcz-Bromberg

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[5] Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski III, S. 624 f.

[6] Codex Diplomaticus Prussicus, hrsg. v. J. Voigt, IV, S. 121 f.

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als Lehn von der polnischen Krone und verpfichteten sich zu militärischem Beistand gegen den Orden.[7] 1393 erhielt Wartislaw das wichtige Schloss Nakel als Lehn von Wladyslaw-Jagiello.[8] Im darauffolgenden Jahr mischten sich die Herzöge von Pommern-Stettin in die inneren Streitigkeiten des Ordensstaates und zwar in Livland, wo der Bischof von Dorpat in offenem Konflikt mit dem Hochmeister stand. Von ihm zum Ungehorsam ermuntert, wählte das Domkapitel von Riga zum vakanten Erzbischofsamt nicht Johann von Wallenrode, den Kandidaten des Hochmeisters, sondern den 14-jährigen Otto von Stettin, einen Sohn des Herzogs Svantibor. Es gelang den Anhängern des jungen Otto, die Unterstützung des Kaisers Wenzel zu erlangen: in einem Rundschreiben vom 14. März 1395 forderte der Kaiser den König von Polen und den der nordischen Reiche auf, den Rigischen Erzstift gegen den Orden zu unterstützen.[9] Die Wahl dieser Beschützer war offenbar gut begründet. Im Dezember desselben Jahres schloss Wladyslaw-Jagiello ein förmliches Bündnis mit Svantibor und Bogislaw von Stettin zur Verteidigung des jungen Erzbischofs aber auch zu gegenseitiger Verteidigung gegen die Ordensbrüder aus Preussen.[10]

Es war eine Einkreisung des Ordens im Gang, um so gefährlicher als dessen mächtigster Freund, Sigismund von Ungarn, vom Kreuzzug gegen die Türken absorbiert war, der mit der katastrophalen Niederlage bei Nikopolis enden sollte. Witold von Litauen stand in offener Verbindung mit den kirchlichen Rebellen in Dorpat und Riga; seine gefürchtete Kavallerie konnte ihn in jedem Augenblick in der Rolle des Schwertes in einer Koalition auftreten lassen. Die Attraktionskraft der Ordensfeinde kann dadurch gemessen werden, dass die Herzöge von Mecklenburg, die bisher um die Gunst des Hochmeisters geworben hatten, sich jetzt dem anderen Lager näherten. Ein unternehmungslustiges Mitglied des Herzogshauses, Albrecht der Jüngere, warf sich im Frühling 1395 an der Spitze von 500 Vitalianern in Dorpat ein, vom Bischof als Sohn und erwünschten Nachfolger begrüsst. Albrecht der Ältere, der ehemalige König von Schweden, und sein Sohn Erich, verbanden sich im Februar 1396 in einer doppelten Hochzeit mit zwei Herzoginnen von Pommern-Wolgast. In der Korrespondenz des Hochmeisters vom Frühling 1396 werden sie als potenzielle Feinde erwähnt.

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[7] Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski III, S. 630 f.

[8] Ibidem, S. 658 f.

[9] Liv-, Esth- und Curländisches Urkundenbuch IV, S. 26 f.

[10] Archiwum Głowne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie, Dokum. perg. 546.

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Wie verhielt sich Margareta, die Frau und Herrin von Dänemark, Norwegen und Schweden in dieser Lage? Die Quellen schweigen fast völlig — es war nicht ihre Art, offene Feindschaft zu zeigen bevor es Zeit war, etwas Beträchtliches zu gewinnen. Ihr Einvernehmen mit Wartislaw von Pommern kann vielleicht nicht als unbedingt aber als unablässig betrachtet werden. Es kommt deutlich zum Vorschein als Wartislaw im Herbst 1394 zwei Komthure, die der Hochmeister zur Unterstützung Albrechts nach Ålholm sandte, sich auf See ihrer bemächtigte. Dass der Kaiser den König der drei nordischen Reiche neben Wladyslaw-Jagiello zur Unterstützung Ottos von Stettin aufforderte, dürfte ein Fingerzeig sein, dass Margareta zur ordensfeindlichen Gruppe gezählt wurde. Sicher ist, dass sie die für den Orden ungünstige Konjunktur unerbittlich gegen die preussischen Städte ausnützte. Deren Forderungen auf Privilegien, Sicherheitsgarantien und Kraftmassnahmen gegen die Seeräuber wurden abgelehnt. Sie übte einen wachsenden Druck auf die vorwiegend preussische Besatzungsmacht der neutralisierten Stadt Stockholm aus; ein Erwerb der Städte Stockholm und Wisby war ihr nächstliegendes Ziel. Im Finnischen Meerbusen kontrollierten die auf den finnländischen Schlössern wohnenden Vitalianer den Handel mit Novgorod; Margareta konnte, ähnlich wie früher in einer analogen Situation, alle Verantwortlichkeit für die Seeräuberei ablehnen und deren politische Früchte ernten. Die Novgoroder Chronik erwähnt unter den Jahren 1395 und 1396 Angriffe von „deutschen Schweden" auf Jama in Ingermanland und auf Karelien.[11] Ein halbes Jahrhundert früher hatte Margaretas Vater die dänische Provinz Estland aufgegeben; hat sie etwa mit der Möglichkeit gespielt, durch Infiltration ins livländische Wirrnis eine neue Schlüsselposition an der Hauptader des Osthandels aufzubauen?

Es bleibt eine unbeantwortete Frage, denn die ganze politische Konjunktur wurde plötzlich und dramatisch geändert. Das bewirkte eine neue und unvoraussehbare Kraft im Spiel: Timur Lenk, dessen Auftreten die Tataren in Südrussland zersplitterte. Witold von Litauen konnte den neuen und verlockenden Möglichkeiten an seiner Südgrenze nicht widerstehen; er musste um jeden Preis seine Streitkräfte im Norden freimachen. Verhandlungen mit dem Hochmeister wurden eröffnet, deren Folge eine Zusammenkunft zwischen Witold und dem Hochmeister am Fluss Tobys wurde. Am 22. Juli 1396 wurde ein Waffenstillstand geschlossen. Die Einkreisung war gebrochen; der Orden konnte sich mit neuen Kräften gegen seine weniger gefährlichen Gegner wenden.

[11] Finlands Medeltidsurkunder, hrsgg. v. R. Hausen, I, S. 469.

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Der Inzident von Hoburgen war kein Zufall, sondern eine erste Wirkung der Kettenreaktion, die Timur ausgelöst hatte. Die Kriegsschiffe der preussischen Städte demonstrierten brutal und eindrucksvoll den verhassten Dänen gegenüber, dass sie jetzt die Möglichkeit hatten, alte Rechnungen zu begleichen.

Wie schnell man sich im Ostseegebiet insgemein der neuen Lage bewusst wurde, ist nicht leicht zu wissen. Gut unterrichtet war aber Albrecht der Ältere von Mecklenburg. Schon am 16. August befand sich sein Kaplan, Herr Hermann, in der Marienburg beim Hochmeister, um Verhandlungen von grösster Bedeutsamkeit vorzubereiten.[12] Gleichzeitig segelte Erich von Mecklenburg nach Gotland, um dort den Krieg erneut in Gang zu bringen. Am 9. September konnte der preussische Befehlshaber von Stockholm, Hermann von der Halle, rapportieren, dass die Hauptmasse der Vitalianer jetzt zum „jungen König" Erich auf Gotland strömten.[13] Das kann nur eins bedeuten: der Kredit der Mecklenburger war plötzlich wiederhergestellt worden. Hinter ihnen stand die finanzielle Macht des Deutschen Ordens.

Margareta hat allen Anlass gehabt, die Kräfte ihrer Reiche zu sammeln und die Misstimmung zwischen Lübeckern und Preussen zu befördern, so wie sie es bei der Vorbereitung zur Kalmarer Tagung versucht hat.

Das hier Gesagte dürfte zeigen, dass die Ockupation von Gotland, die die Streitkräfte des Ordens im Jahre 1398 durchführten, eine lange Vorgeschichte gehabt hat. Der Erwerb von Gotland war dem Orden in mehreren Hinsichten wertvoll; Karol Górski hat darauf hingewiesen, dass der Hochmeister als Herr der Insel das ersehnte Recht zur Novgorodfahrt erworben hat, ohne dass Lübeck es länger zu hindern vermochte.[14] Man kann hinzufügen, dass die Herrschaft über Gotland in Verbindung mit der temporären Schutzherrschaft über Stockholm dem Orden eine zentrale strategische Position in der Ostsee gab.

Wahrscheinlich haben Conrad von Jungingen und seine Ratgeber, schon als sie sich im Sommer 1396 den Mecklenburgern gegenüber für Versöhnung und Unterstützung bestimmten, den Plan gehegt, Gotland von Albrecht durch eine Geldtransaktion zu erwerben. Dass

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[12] Mecklenburgisches Urkundenbuch XXIII, S. 105 f.

[13] Hanserecesse I, 4, S. 354.

[14] K. Górski, La structure économique et sociale de l'État de l'ordre teutonique en Prusse, Napoli 1968 (aus: Annali di storia economica e sociale).

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ihnen dies nicht gelang, muss der typischen Taktik Margaretas zugeschrieben werden – typisch für Situationen, in denen sie sich in militärischer Unterlage befand. Ihr vertrauter Befehlhaber auf Gotland Sven Sture ging zu den Mecklenburgern über, erlangte im Dienst Erichs von Mecklenburg die Stellung eines Admirals der Vitalianer und wurde, nachdem Erich im Juli 1397 plötzlich gestorben war, im Namen der Herzogin-Witwe der wirkliche Herr von Gotland. Am 10. Dezember desselben Jahres teilte Margareta den preussischen Städten mit, dass sie im Begriff stände, sich mit der Herzogin zu versöhnen, um der Seeräuberei ein Ende zu machen. Die Brüder der Herzogin, die Herzöge von Pommern-Barth, sollten die Verständigung vermitteln.[15] Um nicht zuvorgekommen zu werden musste jetzt der Hochmeister den schleunigen und sehr kostbaren Kriegszug nach Gotland unternehmen. Am 5. April musste Sven Sture die Insel aufgeben. Am 10. Oktober wurde er offiziell mit dem regierenden König der drei Reiche Erich von Pommern versöhnt.[16] Dass er das Vertrauen Erichs und Margaretas nicht verwirkt hatte, wird davon bezeugt, dass er einer der drei Befehlhaber des Kriegszuges nach Gotland im Jahre 1403 wurde, als Margareta in einer verbesserten politischen Konjunktur die Insel zurückerobern wollte.

Unterhielt sie Verbindungen mit den Feinden des Ordens? Wir würden davon wenig wissen, wenn nicht die Verhandlungen um die Heirat Erichs von Pommern mit der englischen Prinzessin Philippa eine Reihe von diplomatischen Dokumenten 1402 hinterlassen hätten. In einem englischen Rapport wird erwähnt, dass die Stellung des Königs Erich dadurch verstärkt zu werden schien, als „Poloni" und einige Städte jetzt mit ihm um ein Bündnis verhandelten.[17] England war der mächtigste handelspolitische Gegenspieler des Ordens im Westen; ein Vertragsentwurf aus demselben Jahre zeigt, dass Margareta versucht hat, die eheliche Verbindung der beiden Höfe mit einem Schutzbündnis nach Muster des gescheiterten interskandinavischen Vertrages von Kalmar 1397 zu ergänzen.[18] Im Jahre vor dem Gegenstoss nach Gotland hat sie sich also mit den beiden stärksten Gegnern des Ordens zu verbinden gesucht, England und Polen.

All' dies zeigt, dass der Gegensatz zum Deutschen Orden die Politik Margaretas in den Jahren um die Unionsgründung von Kalmar in entscheidender Weise beeinflusst hat.

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[15] Hanserecesse I, 4, S. 406 f.

[16] Sveriges Traktater II, S. 592 f.

[17] Diplomatarium Norvegicum XIX, hrsg. v. A. Bugge, S. 799.

[18] Ibidem, S. 773 f.

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Gustavus III of Sweden: the Final Years

A Political Portrait*

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The man who was King of Sweden in the two decades between 1771 and 1792 had the gift of attracting the attention of the whole of his nation every day and most nights until his death—and he stirred up phantasies and speculations long after his death. He fascinated the leaders of policy and the diplomats of northern Europe, sometimes of all Europe, made them enraged, astonished or nervous but never indifferent. He wrote much, made many brilliant speeches, talked constantly, very personally about his intentions and his feelings. He should indeed be very well known. The fact is that his intentions, his real thoughts, his pattern of policy still seem to be mysteries.

How can this be? Our sources are overwhelmingly rich. We can catch King Gustav almost every day in one of his many easy but impressive gestures. His letters tell us about his thoughts and deeds, the letters of his counsellers and advisors describe earnest conversations, the diplomats report on everything said and heard. The memoirs—and the memoirs of the Gustavian age are the flower of that literary genre in Sweden—give the background of pastel colours, the taste of witty repartee, the smell of scent and powder. But it is all fireworks, clouds of words where sudden actions cut through like lightning. For King Gustav, the Enchanter, had one dominating feature: that of never telling the truth. And so there can be no revealing sources because Gustav simply did not possess the art of unmasking himself—not even to himself. Least of all to himself.

There remains the pattern of behaviour. And that is likely to make the historian desperate as there are several simultaneous patterns, all different. Which is the real one? We have to know all the sources, dissect them with critical method, put facts together like fragments of a mosaic—and still be modest about the result.

Gustav III always acted in person in the policy of his final years. It was an

* Given as a public lecture in the universities of London and Cambridge, November 1966.

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age of absolutism, but the king of Sweden was a constitutional monarch. In the so-called era of liberty, from 1719 to 1772, the parliament of four houses or Estates, the *Riksdag*, had governed the Kingdom and forced the king to accept the decisions of a council representing the party in power, the Hats or the Caps, in an early national realization of parliamentarism. Swedish policy had been an experimental field of enlightened philosophy; ideas of democracy had been championed by the radical wing of the Caps eighteen years before the French Revolution. But King Gustav had put an end to this development in 1772 by a sudden *coup d'état* without bloodshed. The nobility in the army and in the civil administration had rallied round him to protect their privileges and the national independence against the influence of Russia through the party of the Caps. The royal power had thus been strengthened, but the four Estates of the *Riksdag* still controlled the financial resources: the taxation and the National Bank. The king had to get their confirmation in matters of legislation and on declarations of war.

In the first decade of his reign Gustav kept up the appearance of harmonious co-operation with his official counsellors, leading men from the parties of the era of liberty. In the 1780's his intentions became clearer. With the help of a handful of personal favourites—some of them capable men, others only charming men—he went over to a war policy. His old ministers retired.

Since the defeat and death of Charles XII and the downfall of Sweden as a great power, the position of the Kingdom was exposed and dangerous. It had a long land frontier: Russia had taken the southeastern part of Finland and, after the war from 1741 to 1743, pushed the frontier to the river Kymmene, west of which the country lay open and was hard to defend. In the west, Norway was part of the Kingdom of Denmark; Russia and Denmark were permanent allies against Sweden. South of the Baltic, Sweden still kept the western part of Pomerania, which meant permanent possibilities of conflict with Prussia. The army, the navy and above all the finances of Sweden were inadequate for its needs, for the demand of a long chain of trained and well-equipped regiments to cover the borders and of a navy capable of fighting the joint forces of Russia and Denmark. Sweden was allied to France; the alliance was renewed in 1784 but was hardly effective as the court of Versailles was hampered by the financial difficulties which some years later were to culminate in the great revolution. Sweden was also allied to Turkey, a distant friend who would never be able to give real help.

This was the general background of Gustav's great policy. His aim was to shorten the land frontier by conquest, and the ideal target of conquest was the northern part of the Danish kingdom, Norway. In 1783 and 1784 Gustav

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prepared an attack on Denmark, but a postulate of this plan was that Russia kept quiet and was ready to sacrifice her ally. Catherine the Great and her ministers were not at all willing to play their part in this game, and so the attack on Denmark had to be postponed for better preparations. Gustav summoned the Estates in 1786 to get their consent to several military reforms; a peasants' rebellion broke out in Norway. But the parliamentary leaders of the nobility had become aware of the growth of the king's ambitions and of the dangers involved in the war plans. They tightened their grip on the control of opinion in the country and in the four Estates. In every question of raising money for military preparations or of strengthening the credit of the government they counter-attacked the royal propositions. Gustav was defeated all over the field; when the Estates dissolved he was shorter of resources than before. Peace was maintained in Northern Europe.

It remained until the following year. In 1787 war broke out between Russia and Turkey. Gustav III became restless, "he can't endure his state of tranquillity" the French *chargé d'affaires* reported on 9 October. Instead of war with Denmark, war with Russia was now the great adventure on which his plans were concentrated. In the event of success it would open possibilities to solve the problems of Sweden's eastern frontier by reconquering the strategic position on the Carelian isthmus. In the event of success—but the risks were tremendous.

Many explanations have been given of Gustav's motives for taking these risks, first of all by himself. In splendid rhetoric he told the Swedish Estates in 1789 that he and his people had been menaced by Russian aggression. Not even the people of Stockholm—and they were his most ardent supporters—more than half believed this. Later historians have concluded that Gustav felt compelled to fight, not because of foreign threats but out of desperation caused by the problems of domestic policy. The weakness of this explanation is that Gustav did not show any signs of despair about the domestic situation; he expressly judged it as quiet in a private letter to one of his intimate advisors in the summer of 1787. It simply cannot be proved that he felt compelled to fight at all. But he wanted war.

In July 1787 Gustav still planned in a rather idyllic way to stir up trouble in Norway. The Russo-Turkish war abruptly changed his plans. At the end of October he suddenly organized a visit to Copenhagen and fell over the court of Denmark with declarations of friendship and proposals for an alliance. The Danish ministry was bewildered and split; its final decision can be read in the cabinet leader, Count Bernstorff's own hand in a memorandum "Drei Punkte zu meiner Instruktion": Denmark had no objection to the alliance, if Russia joined it as a third member or if Russia was willing to declare itself "einver-

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standen"—a condition which in itself made the whole thing impossible. The King of Sweden was nevertheless triumphant—he declared to the royal council in Stockholm and to the whole world that Denmark from now on was linked with Sweden in friendship.

In Copenhagen Gustav met the British envoy Hugh Elliot and made an instant approach to the enemy of his French ally. He at once took Elliot aside and declared his esteem for "the eminent public and private virtues of Our Gracious Sovereign", i.e. George III. Gustav told Elliot that, although allied to France, he had never been an enemy of England. "He contrasted with equal delicacy and Wit", Elliot reports, "the respective Conduct of those two Rival Powers to their Allies, and concluded by observing, that were the interests of a third Nation to be held in suspense between Great Britain and France, the Personal Character of the King and Public Faith of the Nation were sufficient motives to decide for the former". Next evening at a great ball given by the Danish court, Gustav again got hold of Elliot, stressed his need of security against Russia and of an alliance with Denmark, sighing "that he had little hopes of any effective steps being taken to ensure the Independence of the Baltick, if Great Britain did not second His efforts for that purpose". Gustav then "expatiated, even with acrimony, against the total desertion of France from her Allies". Elliot was charmed, delighted and a little scared by this unexpected courting. His reports show his confusion.

What if he had known how he shared this personal confidence of the King of Sweden with several very different diplomats and statesmen! The French chargé d'affaires in Stockholm, *le chevalier* Gaussen, nicknamed "den snälla gåssen" (the nice little boy) was for instance in the same autumn charmed almost out of his wits, when before a performance at the Drottningholm theatre, King Gustav suddenly led him away into the darkening park and overwhelmed him with eloquence about his love for France and his trust in France during the present oriental crisis: "la France est une Puissance qui est prête à tous les événements, Vous n'avez qu'un coup de sifflet à donner et dans un moment vous réunissez tous vos moyens d'attaque et de défence . . ." And the hard, dry envoy of Spain in Stockholm, Don Ignaz Maria de Corral, who was usually button-holed by Gustav in the Opera, was pushed out in the wings and honoured with cynical remarks about the inconsistency of the common ally, France, "si el Rey Nostro Señor no la mantiene en su sistema antiguo". Or Count Andreas Peter Bernstorff in Copenhagen, flattered and impressed by Gustav's friendly attention. And always Gustav had ready words to express his sincere admiration for the crowned head represented by his momentary partner—not only George III but also Louis XVI of France, King Carlos of Spain, whose appearance

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inspired Goya to paint one of his most poisonous portraits, and the totally mad Christian VII of Denmark.

What was the meaning of all these approaches, all this play-acting and all these false declarations? Gustav knew for instance very well that Denmark remained loyal to the alliance with Russia and that the Russians knew it. But he worked on the nerves of his friends and enemies to make them unstable and doubtful—it was psychological warfare to get them off their balance, to make it possible to sweep them away by impulsive action. He knew that the two controversial alliances, the British and the French one, were rather fleeting for the moment. He wanted to get help against Russia from either France or Britain, and as the French were paralysed by financial weakness, he concentrated on the Court of Westminster.

British diplomacy in Stockholm was underdeveloped at this moment. The former envoy, Sir Thomas Wroughton, had, according to the bitter remarks of Count Fersen, leader of the Swedish nobility, made an impression on the younger nobility by giving dinner parties with roast beef and porter, but he may have overworked himself by doing so, for he died suddenly in August 1787. The provisional head of the British legation, Mr Keene, had almost no contacts; it is true that he had bought in cash the services of one of the leading royal favourites, Count Munck, but Munck was a dishonest man—later disgraced for embezzlement—and never gave Mr Keene any valuable information. So the contacts had to take place in England, where King Gustav's personal magic was too distant to make any impression. His envoy, Baron Nolcken, negotiated in a thorough and straightforward way about an alliance with Pitt and Carmarthen in the first months of 1788 and was thoroughly and straightforwardly rebuffed. The British statesmen were to some extent tempted by the prospect of a profitable trade agreement with Sweden, but they weren't at all willing to push Russia into the arms of France by sustaining the aggressiveness of its weaker neighbour.

Nolcken's reports reached King Gustav in the days of consecutive and secret war councils at Haga, where only some of his most favoured advisors were present. Without notes, without even a map, he presented a plan of attack on Russia: the Swedish navy was to defeat the Russian one, and then the army would disembark on the coast of Ingermanland and march the shortest way to Petersburg. According to the king, the British aid was practically decided on. When Nolcken's report about the failure arrived, the council was not informed about it. The plan of attack was decided—it did not help that Colonel Toll, who was responsible for the staff work, tried to prevent the decision.

From this moment, i.e. March 1788, Gustav's behaviour is very strange. Preparations for war were going on, and wider and wider circles of military and

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civil officers were taken into confidence. One after another the responsible commanders of the army and navy gave their verdict on the war prospects with an unequalled pessimism. The commanding admiral of the ships of the line recommended a respite of at least six years for armament and reforms and declared that if an admiral went into action before that he would be either a fool or a traitor and in any case there was no hope for Sweden. The commanding admiral of the galleys wrote that he dreaded a war and hoped that his king's wisdom would keep it away. But his king was deaf to all warnings. He tried feverishly to get support in Prussia, in Poland, from oppositional elements in Livonia, but without any result. The preparations for the attack were speeded up in spite of all political failures. On 24 June, Gustav embarked on a small ship from the quay beneath the royal castle in Stockholm with great ceremony, described by himself on the same evening in a private letter to his most trusted confident, Baron Armfelt. His soul was filled, he said, with the idea of the great enterprise he was going into, with the sight of all the cheering people, whose avenger he was going to be and with the thought that it was he himself who was going to save the Ottoman Empire and that his name was to be known in Asia and in Africa.

It may be concluded that on going to war with Russia, Gustav III did not think or act as a responsible statesman. His behaviour cannot be explained on a rational basis. Up to the beginning of March his planning was still controlled by keen intelligence, but from then on he gradually lost his foothold in the world of reality. "As if haunted by ghosts"—so his Chancellor described him. Nothing was impossible for his excited imagination, reported the Danish envoy. He acted with the somnambulistic confidence of great hysterics taking a plunge out into the unknown.

He lived in fiction at that moment, the fiction of a dramatic poet of some importance. He may be analysed as the combined hero of various literary works, above all Gustavus Adolphus in his own comedy "Siri Brahe", and Henri IV of France in Voltaire's "Henriade". He was carried away on the clouds of the classical drama, where *dei ex machina* govern the destinies of mankind.

But on 17 July the Swedish navy, commanded by Gustav's brother Carl, sailed into battle at Hogland not far from Kronstadt. It did more than could reasonably be expected and stood up to the Russians in a long and terrible battle with heavy losses on both sides. But the plan of the war was based on the presumption that the Russian navy would be annihilated, and after the battle the Russian navy was still very much in existence and had a much shorter way to its base for repairs than had the Swedish navy. The heroic dream of King Gustav came abruptly to an end.

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The awakening was painful. At all European courts the friends and enemies of Sweden cried out in horror at the aggressor and called him a fool. The officers of the Finnish army turned mutinous. Denmark declared war. The general mood in Sweden seemed to be for revolution. Gustav's only chance was to work miracles. The odd thing is that he did work them.

At first he had doubts about his role. In a letter to the faithful Armfelt he presented himself as Agamemnon, the Agamemnon of Racine's "Iphigénie", but it was too sad and didn't last very long. After the Danish declaration of war he went over to a better character, King Gustav Vasa, the liberator from Danish tyranny, about whom Gustav himself had written an opera some years earlier. He left Finland, stormed up into Dalecarlia along the same route as Gustavus Vasa once had taken and made flaming speeches to the very honoured and astonished peasants outside the parish churches. It was play-acting but it wasn't madness. Gustav had once again a firm grip on reality. In Stockholm he had met the envoy of France, *le marquis* de Pons, who had returned to his post to reprove and advise the erring ally of King Louis. The reports of Pons indicate, that Gustav already in September had formed his plan to settle the domestic unrest in Sweden: the nobility had all the brains of the opposition—in the army, in the civil service and in parliament, so the nobility had to be crushed. The Estates were to be summoned and the three lower Estates were to be won over by gains from the privileges of the nobility. An intense propaganda was let loose, making the nobility a scapegoat for Russian influence, for the necessity of making war on Russia, for all military failures in the war. Public opinion among the middle and the lower classes slowly turned in favour of the king, who rushed around the country, met everyone, talked gracefully to everyone and dispelled all doubts with his flaming eloquence.

As for the external crisis, Denmark had declared war but it obviously did not want to fight. An army marched from Norway into Swedish Bohuslän and threatened Gothenburg, but its movements and the movements of the Swedish defence forces were more like a ceremonial ballet than serious war. The commanding officers invited the enemy commanders to dinner and the enemy came to dinner. The psychological attack of Gustav one year earlier showed its consequences. Only a mediator was needed. And so the allied powers Great Britain and Prussia came into the picture. They were afraid of Russian predominance in the North and they wanted to restore peace and gain diplomatic influence at the Scandinavian courts.

Hugh Elliot went up into Sweden, eager to play the role of saviour from disaster. Armfelt met him and advised his royal master in a letter: do not treat him as an "homme public"—the character of an Englishman doesn't allow for

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good faith if there is any ceremony. Gustav met Elliot in Karlstad in a well-arranged pose, he seemed to Elliot ill and tired. Elliot reports: "The King's own words were that 'I found him in the same situation as that of James the Second, when He was obliged to fly His Kingdom, and abandon His Crown'. He was upon the point of falling a victim to the Ambitions of Russia, the treachery of Denmark, and the factious treachery of His Nobility. In the sincerity of distress, the King also added, to the mistakes of His own conduct". Elliot at once lived up to the scene and exclaimed: "Sire, prêtez moi Votre Couronne. Je vous la rendrai avec lustre!" And how willingly the king agreed that Elliot should take all the necessary measures! "Je l'ai traité comme il le souhaite", Gustav wrote to Armfelt. The armistice with Denmark was swiftly arranged by Elliot on October 16, 1788. Shortly afterwards the mutiny in the Finnish army was suppressed which meant temporary stabilization on this frontier.

Diplomacy during the following two years of war with Russia was for King Gustav a complicated game but not without possibilities. France and Spain on one side and Britain and Prussia on the other side were all to a certain extent concerned about rescuing him from total defeat, France because he was a traditional ally, Prussia because it had to keep the influence of Russia in eastern Europe within its limits. To this was added a special interest of Prussia: to get hold of Swedish Pomerania in one way or another. King Gustav's tactics were that systematically he played off one group of powers against the other, and all the time tempted the envoy of Prussia with an ever-changing plan of mortgaging Pomerania for the gain of financial or armed help against Russia. This envoy, Count von Borcke who was a conceited man and considered himself to be the special favourite of King Gustav, openly encouraged the king's autocratic tendencies and was rewarded by getting most of the blame for Gustav's reckless domestic policy. In the session of the Estates of 1789 Gustav checked the opposition in the House of Nobility with the help of the three lower Estates and enforced an amendment to the constitution which gave him almost absolute power. The amendment was improvised by himself and rather carelessly drawn up—he had forgotten the control of the national credit, which he never fully understood, and so his financial difficulties remained. The war dragged on with stubborn fighting on the Finnish border and some unfortunate but never catastrophic naval engagements.

In January 1790 Gustav simultaneously engaged the British, the Prussian and the Spanish envoys in peace mediations—*le chevalier* Gaussen was consoled by gracious exclamations, such as "J'ai toujours le coeur français, je le dis aux Anglais euz mêmes". Gustav expressly laid the destiny of Sweden and the Ottoman empire in the hands of the allies in a note of 2 January. Corral was

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systematically fed with rumours of an agreement about Prussian war participation and started a really promising peace negotiation through the Spanish envoy in Petersburg on the basis of the *status quo*. He kept in touch with the new envoy of Great Britain, the prudent and fair-minded Robert Liston—each of them now represented the leading partner of their respective alliance, since France was paralysed by the revolution, and each one wanted an honourable peace for Sweden without too severe loss of prestige. Of course each one wanted Sweden to feel gratitude to his respective court. The Prussian bid for Pomerania gradually faded out of the picture. Gustav still wanted money for an offensive to ensure peace with honour but neither Britain nor Spain promised him anything more than *bona officia*. He then took the offensive without help. Corral raged in his despatches about King Gustav's foolishness in risking all when peace was in sight, and Whitehall at last instructed Liston to offer Gustav £100,000 if he accepted peace on the mediation of the allied powers.

Then an extraordinary thing happened. The Swedish naval offensive had suffered a severe repulse; the coastal navy retired pursued by the Russian galleys. The Swedish navy was forced to engage a battle in Svensksund with the king himself on board. Its squadrons, especially one of them, fought with furious bravery but also with cold efficiency. The Russians tried to meet a Swedish counterattack by going outside the skerries, were brought into disorder and then overcome by bad weather. When the day was over the Russian coastal navy had ceased to exist as a fighting force.

And some days later King Gustav wrote a letter to Liston in the cabin of his ship. It is an unusual letter, calm and realistic—all play-acting was suddenly gone. It states that the prospects for peace are now good. Immediately afterwards the King of Sweden opened direct negotiations with the Russians and concluded the peace of Värälä without mediation. He was now his own master.

So began the last phase of King Gustav's foreign policy. In 1791 he allied himself to the Empress of Russia. He received a formidable Russian subsidy for only keeping quiet and not starting anything, a result of blackmail during a period of tension between Russia and the allies, when Liston reported: "He has more than once declared, that the Moment He hears the Cannon roar, it will be impossible for Him to remain quiet, and that He must take an Active Part on one Side or the other". Of course he couldn't remain quiet, but his ambitions had changed. He was now organizing the crusade against revolutionary France. He wrote an ardent letter to William Pitt in his own hand to flatter Pitt and to point out the dangers of the revolutionary ideas. "It must be confessed that the Empress of Russia and I are better Bourbons than the Bourbons themselves", he told Corral in November 1791. Of course he wanted money from Spain.

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He was in earnest about the crusade. The army archives in Stockholm possess the reconnaissance maps over northern France drawn by Swedish engineer officers, sent there for the purpose in 1791. Even the loyal friend Armfelt was in despair about these preparations. But no exploits or disasters followed, as Gustav was murdered in February 1792 by some opposition noblemen in the opera house of Stockholm, where so many of his diplomatic conversations had taken place.

An adventurer in great policy, an hysterical and irresponsible man, an actor with poetical imagination, a successful political gambler? All of this—and a national leader of courage and great intelligence. The calm and clear-headed Liston gave his verdict in one of his reports in 1791: "I think it is my duty to add that this Prince, notwithstanding the many faulty and even ridiculous parts of His character possesses a Measure of talents, penetration and dexterity, which have acquired Him the entire command of His nation—and that his activity of mind and singular intrepidity must render His friendship or His enmity an object of importance".

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3

Sweden: The Diplomacy of Östen Undén

BY ERIK LÖNNROTH

[THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA was the first international body to distinguish formally between Great Powers and lesser powers. The distinction was sharply challenged at the time and has been frequently debated since;* but, however insecure its legal basis may be, it has without a doubt been validated by international practice over the course of the years. One of the most notable—and, in the eyes of many thoughtful students, most fateful—developments of the nineteenth century was the increasing domination of European politics by the five states which were generally recognized as Great Powers: Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia; and it was clear, even before the coming of the first world war had helped to prove it, that the lesser states had lost that ability to exert a moderating and balancing influence in international affairs which they had possessed and exerted in earlier centuries.

For a brief period after the first world war, it appeared that this development might be checked, or even reversed. At the Peace Conference at Paris, a large number of new states were created which were not, perhaps, Powers of the first rank, but some of which—Poland, for instance, or Czechoslovakia—did not seem to be markedly inferior in strength to self-styled Great Powers like Italy or doubtful quantities like revolutionary Russia.[1] Moreover, the principle of equality of all states was now vigorously asserted, and a new international body, the League of Nations, was established to give it effective expression. In the decade that followed, the newly created states, and the lesser Powers

* At Vienna, the representative of Holland remarked that "of this newly invented term, 'the Great Powers,' he understood neither the precise meaning nor the intention." C. H. Hazen, "Le Congrès de Vienne," *Revue des études napoléoniennes*, XV (1919), 69. See also Federico Chabod, *Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1896: I. Le premesse* (Bari, 1951), 154 and notes.

[1] See Arnold Toynbee, *The World after the Peace Conference* (London, 1925); and, as an introduction to the problems of the Scandinavian countries, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The World in March 1939* (London, 1952), pp. 157-162.

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in general, had a natural interest in the organization and development of the League, for it seemed to offer them both an assurance that their voices would not be unheard when questions of European importance were being determined and a possible means of restraining the dangerous ambitions, and appeasing the dangerous passions, of their greater neighbors.

The hopes entertained with regard to the League were not, in the end, realized; it succumbed to the domination of the Great Powers, and its activities and purposes were shaped in accordance with their desires. It would be misleading, however, to see the story of the League as a tragedy in which the vices of the Great Powers triumphed over the virtues of the lesser. For the small Powers too had special interests which restricted and determined their actions at Geneva. They could no more follow a course of pure idealism or internationalism than could the Great Powers. They too, in formulating policy, had to yield to the dictates of their national tradition and the requirements of their national security.

One of the most instructive examples of the conflict between internationalism and national interest, as it affected the smaller Powers, is the so-called League crisis of 1926,[2] a crisis which arose when the question of Germany's entry into the League precipitated a general scramble for seats on the Council and released animosities which threatened to rip the Covenant asunder. The decision of the Swedish government to sacrifice Sweden's seat in the interests of general pacification seems to offer one of the most shining examples of an altruistic policy which can be found in the 1920's.[3] As this chapter reveals, closer analysis indicates that Sweden's conduct in this affair was always guided by a careful regard for the requirements of national interest, and provides an instructive illustration of the limits within which the lesser Powers were confined in their support of the new world organization. *The Editors.*]

I

During the first world war, Sweden was transformed from a constitutional monarchy to a full parliamentary democracy. The change had

[2] A brief account will be found in F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (2 volumes, London, 1952), I, 316-327. See also G. Scelle, *Une crise de la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1927); and Chapter I, §IV above.

[3] An English journalist wrote in 1926: "It is important to understand that Sweden's concern was for the League only and that, not for the first time, she set aside all claims of separate interests for the sake of that concern." H. M. Swanwick, "Anarchy at Geneva," *Foreign Affairs* (London), VII (1925-1926), 286.

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an immediate impact on the course of Swedish foreign policy, and was reflected in the abandonment of a policy which, while officially neutral, had been somewhat pro-German in tendency, in favor of a policy based upon the League of Nations.

The reality behind the constitutional transformation was an electoral reform which took place in 1918 and which completely changed the character of the first chamber or Senate of the Swedish *Riksdag*. In contrast to the second chamber, which was elected by universal and equal suffrage, the Senate had before 1918 been elected by a voting system in which the right to vote was dependent on the voter's economic status. The Conservatives, who had a large minority in the second chamber, could, under this system, always be sure of a majority in the first chamber and were thus able to check their Liberal and Social Democratic opponents. After the reform of the first chamber in 1918, however, the Conservatives could form no government without the support of the Liberals; and it became impossible to carry out a foreign policy that was not in accord with public opinion as expressed in the *Riksdag*.

The interwar years represent the highpoint of parliamentary power in Swedish history. During the second world war, a renewed concentration of power in the hands of the Executive was to take place and was, especially in the sphere of foreign policy, to limit public debate and parliamentary influence again. But this development was not foreseen, and would have seemed quite unlikely, during the 1920's and early 1930's when Sweden was generally ruled by weak minority governments which had no strong control over parliament as a whole. It is symptomatic of the influence of the parliament on foreign policy that, in 1921, a committee of the *Riksdag* was created for the purpose of discussing foreign affairs with the King and the government. Though this committee never seriously interfered with the actions of the government, its existence clearly demonstrated the claim of the *Riksdag* to control over Sweden's foreign policy. Between 1919 and 1939, no Swedish Foreign Minister dared to disregard the views of the parliamentary majority—with one exception. In 1923, the Conservative Foreign Minister Hederstierna made a speech recommending an alliance with Finland, but the newspapers expressed such strong opposition to the suggestion that he was forced to resign a few days later.

In the period between 1919 and 1932, there was little stability in Swedish politics; governments changed every two years and sometimes at shorter intervals. Alternating coalitions of Liberals, Conservatives, and Social Democrats succeeded each other and it was not until after 1932,

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when the Social Democrats began their cooperation with the Farmer's party, that there was greater stability. Nevertheless, even in the 1920's, during the period of greatest instability in domestic policy, Sweden's foreign policy kept a steady course. This can partly be explained by the fact that no strong partisan feelings were aroused by the issues of foreign policy once the conservative line of policy had been abandoned; although it might have been expected that the ideological differences of the parties would find some reflection in foreign policy, this was very seldom the case. During the interwar years, most of the Swedish Foreign Ministers were prominent lawyers, and party divergences were overbalanced by professional conformity in their approach to foreign affairs. Moreover, the departmental tradition in the Foreign Office seems to have been very strong.

The Swedish diplomats of the 1920's were professionally trained officials recruited from upper-class families; and the key posts in Paris, London, Berlin, Moscow, and Rome were still held by members of the nobility. Some of the diplomatic representatives had risen to prominence in party politics. Baron Palmstierna, the Minister in London, had been Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first Social Democratic cabinet; Count Ehrensvaerd in Paris had held the same post in a prewar Liberal cabinet; and Baron Ramel in Berlin was to serve as Foreign Minister for the Liberals in the early 1930's. But even if they owed their positions to their connections with political parties, they were aristocrats and had the same background as the other Swedish representatives abroad. The diplomats in the field and the staff of the Foreign Office in Stockholm formed a close unit, with the Cabinet Secretary—i.e. the permanent secretary of the Foreign Office—and the head of the Political Bureau as key figures. The diplomats were responsible for gathering the news about political developments in the outside world which touched on Sweden's interests and for its analysis and interpretation. In the conduct of Swedish foreign policy, therefore, the Foreign Minister and the government could rely on the work done by men who were all guided by the same professional "esprit de corps"; and the Foreign Office, with its officials at home and abroad, thus constituted a collective power of considerable importance. Its influence was not much mentioned in the political discussions of the day, but it can be seen in the continuity of Swedish foreign policy in this period, and, occasionally, in differences of opinion between the Foreign Minister on the one hand and his Cabinet colleagues on the other.

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II

The most outstanding figure among the Swedish Foreign Ministers of the interwar period was Östen Undén. Born in 1886, he had been appointed to the chair of Civil Law at the University of Uppsala in 1917. When he had been an undergraduate at Lund University, he had joined the Social Democratic party. In 1917, when for the first time, the Social Democrats entered the government in a coalition with the Liberals, the young professor became a member of this coalition Cabinet. In 1920 when the first purely Social Democratic government was formed, Undén became Minister of Justice; and, in the Cabinets of 1924-1926, he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, first under Prime Minister Hjalmar Branting and, after Branting's death in 1925, under Richard Sandler.

Undén had worked for the Foreign Office as an expert on international law from 1921 to 1924, and consequently was more the specialist than the politician when he became Foreign Minister. He had, indeed, never been a member of the *Riksdag* before he appeared there as a member of the Cabinet. He was a respected, but not a very popular, political personality; his way of thinking, his speech and general behavior were precise and rather formal. His legal education, combined with a certain natural stiffness and shyness, tended to keep others at a distance. On the other hand, his ability and will power enabled him to become a strong head of his department and to assert his influence within the government as the expert on foreign policy. By the parties and press of the opposition who tended to think of him as a rigid, somewhat ineffectual doctrinaire, he was on the whole underestimated.

In the 1920's, the activity of a Swedish Foreign Minister centered on the League of Nations which Sweden had joined in 1920. Two years later, Sweden had been elected member of the Council of the League, where she was given an opportunity to act in her natural role as the leading member of a group of small states, chiefly ex-neutrals, who worked to form a counterweight against the dominating influence of the Great Powers. Within this group, the three Scandinavian countries constituted a natural inner circle by virtue of their geographical proximity, their close cultural relations and linguistic kinship, and their common interest in peace and in moderating European tensions. There was close cooperation among them. They held common views on the chief issues discussed at Geneva; and Sweden, in her position as member of the Council, acted as their spokesman.

From the outset, the Scandinavian countries opposed the use of mili-

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tary sanctions by the League. In the early 1920's, the Swedish government stated frequently that, considering the weakness of the League structure, the employment of military sanctions would be a risky adventure. In the Swedish view, the victors of the first world war were now the leading Powers in the League, and the use of military sanctions would involve sacrifices for a system of security that these Powers had established but that Sweden regarded as by no means perfect. The Swedish alternative to sanctions was compulsory arbitration in international conflicts, an alternative that reflected a belief that arbitration alone could guarantee real impartiality in international conflicts, and which corresponded to that faith in the paramount importance of law which was deeply rooted in the Swedish national tradition. Undén, the former law professor, was a born champion of this cause; and during the League Assembly of 1925, he formally proposed that compulsory arbitration be accepted as a basic principle of League activity. The failure of the Geneva Protocol had stimulated search for other means to strengthen the efficiency of the League, and the committee in which Undén's suggestion was discussed showed great interest in his proposal, although the Assembly, in its resolution of September 25, 1925, confined itself to a recommendation in its favor.

The Swedish prescription for the solution of international disputes obtained a significant success in the Mosul question.[4] In the solution of this problem, Sweden played a leading role; and the Swedish member of the Council acted as *rapporteur* during the hearings. The actual issue here was the drawing of a frontier between Iraq and Turkey, but since Great Britain championed Iraq's cause, Britain and Turkey were the real antagonists. Branting, the Swedish delegate, was responsible for the proposal to invite Turkey to participate in the meetings of the Council in which the Mosul question was to be discussed, and his motion, which was accepted, can be regarded as providing the basis for the successful solution of the conflict. Branting also drew the provisional demarcation line, the so-called Brussels line, which was accepted by both parties and prevented military clashes during the negotiations.

After Branting's death, Undén succeeded him as *rapporteur*. Experts, meanwhile, had worked out a solution stipulating that all territory south of the Brussels line should go to Iraq, provided that Iraq, for the purpose of protection of the minorities, would remain a British mandate. Britain and Iraq agreed to this solution, but Turkey refused and declared that the Council of the League was not competent to make

[4] On this problem see Walters, *History of the League*, I, 305-310.

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a decision. The Swedish Foreign Ministry, where the issue had been thoroughly discussed, recommended a solution *ex aequo et bono*. After Undén's attempts to persuade the Turks to accept the mediation of the Council had failed, he asked the Permanent Court to rule on the nature of the powers which the Council could exercise. The ruling of the Court established the competence of the Council and the Council subsequently gave a decision in agreement with the recommendation of the experts. The caution and precision with which Undén established the legal rights of the Council in this case was an important factor in the peaceful outcome of the conflict and in the strengthening of the idea of arbitration.

III

The final months of the Mosul conflict saw the emergence of another issue, which was of much more vital importance to the League and in which all the great European Powers and the entire European balance of power was involved. Germany's entry into the League and her claim to a seat on the Council inaugurated a thoroughgoing discussion of the whole problem of Council membership and reorganization. Here again Sweden played a prominent role; and it may be said that Undén's handling of this problem represents his main achievement as Foreign Minister. Under his direction, Sweden appeared as a star performer in the Geneva theatre. In the action which Sweden undertook, idealistic internationalism and national interest worked hand in hand and spurred each other to action.

On October 16, 1925, the Treaty of Locarno was signed. Germany was accepted as a member of the European family of states, in return for which she renounced all claims to a revision of her western boundary as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles. Germany, however, did not guarantee her eastern boundaries; her claims to a revision of the Polish frontier, especially with respect to the so-called Polish corridor between Eastern Prussia and the Reich, remained. In recognition of this, France tried to compensate her Polish ally by means of a guarantee against German aggression, but the British government gave no promises to the eastern allies of France, and, because of this, Poland especially could be regarded as the injured party in what was otherwise regarded as a notable peace settlement.

Locarno was only the first step on Germany's way to the full recognition of her title as Great Power. She had now to enter the League of Nations and to receive a permanent seat on the League Council. There could be no doubt that this second move would accentuate Poland's em-

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barrassment. Could Poland and her powerful ally France permit these developments without making a countermove to offset Germany's growing influence? And, if they made such a countermove, would it not weaken Germany's willingness to adopt a policy of international collaboration? In the German *Reichstag*, the Nationalists, the Nazis, and the Communists had voted against the ratification of the Locarno Treaty, and there was considerable popular opposition to it. Any serious blow to Stresemann's policy of understanding with the West might well give the upper hand to the opposition parties.[5]

Sweden had one central interest in the developments on the international scene: pacification of the Baltic. The tension between Germany and France reached into this area: Poland was the ally of France, and had in the early 1920's sought to extend its influence to the north by trying to conclude an alliance with Finland, a development most unattractive to the Swedes. Germany and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, were linked by the Treaty of Rapallo. Together with Denmark, Sweden controlled the entrance to the Baltic, but in a war between the contending Powers in which one of them claimed passage through Öresund, Sweden and Denmark might become involved in a major conflict. If, on the other hand, Germany entered the League of Nations and could be won for peaceful cooperation with the Western Powers, the Rapallo front would be split, and the tension in the Baltic area considerably relieved. In the fall of 1925, things seemed to hang in the balance; the Swedish Foreign Office was receiving indications that Russia, dissatisfied with Germany's moves towards the Western Powers, was doing her best to stir up German opposition. The democratic Weimar Republic was popular in Sweden, and the restoration of Germany's international position was regarded as a question of justice and common sense. But the calculations of the Swedish Foreign Office were not determined by sentimental considerations. The line which Swedish foreign policy pursued was dictated by her position as a small neutral Power in the Baltic area, and by the wish to strengthen the true spirit of peace and collaboration in the League of Nations.

On November 4, 1925, the Polish plenipotentiary in Stockholm asked for Undén's views concerning an eventual Polish claim to a seat on the League Council. A permanent seat, Undén answered, was hardly possible. He even doubted the desirability of a nonpermanent seat; this would be in the interest neither of Poland nor of other countries, because

[5] See Gustav Stresemann, *His Diaries, Letters and Papers*, edited and translated by Eric Sutton (New York, 1937), II, 505-507.

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a simultaneous entry of Germany and Poland into the Council would involve the risk of serious friction between these two Powers.

Two weeks later, on November 21, the German plenipotentiary came to Undén and expressed his concern about rumors of a Spanish claim to a permanent seat, and referred to reports that the Spanish government would make this a condition of her consent to Germany's membership in the Council. Undén was seriously disturbed by this information and, in December, decided to discuss the matter with the British Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain.[6] Chamberlain informed him that the British government had decided to support the Spanish claim, but had not yet made up its mind how to handle the Polish case. Chamberlain's words, however, seemed to suggest that he personally had no objections to the Polish aspirations. Undén was so anxious to change Chamberlain's views about the Polish case that he expressed exaggerated hopes of Polish moderation, but he did not convince Chamberlain, who remained skeptical.

Undén seemed to be working wholeheartedly in the German interest, with the idea of giving Germany a seat on the League Council and refusing entry to that body to any other Power. The line of policy which he pursued in this regard had been previously formulated in agreement with all the Scandinavian Powers and was based on the principle that only really Great Powers should have permanent seats, the temporary seats circulating among the other nations. This program was inspired by the idea of making impossible the formation of permanent combinations of satellite Powers within the Council. But, in this fight for principle, Undén was spurred on by interests of a more concrete nature; the entire Locarno policy seemed to him endangered and he wanted to keep Germany on the course of cooperation with the West. To gain these aims, Undén mobilized all the resources of Swedish diplomacy.

On January 21, 1926, the Swedish Foreign Minister directed an appeal to the governments of Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, and Belgium. Undén explained that probably Spain, and possibly Poland, would claim permanent seats on the League Council; and that Spain had already been assured of British support. Compliance with the aspirations of these states would, however, endanger the fundamental principles which determined the distribution of permanent and nonpermanent seats on the Council. The Swedish view was that, in addition to those Great Powers who already held permanent seats, there were only three Powers who could justly claim permanent seats, namely Ger-

[6] For Chamberlain's attitude, see Walters, *History of the League*, I, 317.

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many, Russia, and the United States. At the coming meeting of the Council, therefore, Sweden was inclined to oppose claims from any other Power. Undén asked whether the governments to which he addressed his appeal could be counted upon to join Sweden in this attitude.

The various governments had answered by February 8. Norway, Finland, and Switzerland expressed agreement with the Swedish position without reservation. Denmark also accepted the Swedish point of view, but was skeptical about the outcome of the projected action; these doubts were influenced by the fact that Denmark possessed information about additional claims: namely, claims of Brazil to a permanent seat. The Belgian government was willing to join Sweden, but Paul Hymans, the Belgian delegate at Geneva, had little hope that the small Powers could hold out if the Great Powers agreed on a definite line of policy. The Dutch government shared Sweden's views about the undesirability of enlarging the Council, but had not yet decided whether to take a stand or to declare itself "disinterested."

As a result of Undén's appeal, therefore, he was in a position, in presenting the Swedish view on the organization of the Council, to act as spokesman for the group of small Powers. But because he acted on the basis of principle, he was forced to deal with the politically innocuous claims of Spain and Brazil on the same level as with the highly significant and explosive claim of Poland. Nevertheless, from now on, Sweden was bound by the principle which Undén had enunciated.

The outcome of the question depended essentially on Great Britain, who held the key position; and Sweden made her main diplomatic efforts in London. The task of dissuading Austen Chamberlain from supporting the Polish claim was given to Baron Palmstierna, the Minister in London. Palmstierna had a personal interest in this question because he was in full sympathy with Undén, who had succeeded him as Foreign Minister in a Social Democratic government, and he went about his task with commendable energy. Palmstierna was in close touch with those groups in England who shared the Swedish opposition to an enlargement of the Council; in particular, he sought the advice of Ramsay MacDonald. The minister was fully aware that opposition against Chamberlain in this question was strong in Britain, and was shared even by members of the Baldwin Cabinet. Palmstierna set his hopes on the combination of the two Social Democratic Foreign Ministers, Undén of Sweden and Vandervelde of Belgium, with the Labor party leader MacDonald. Joint action by Belgium and Sweden, he believed, might stop the project which had by now been submitted to the League Council; and his reports to Stock-

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holm encouraged the Swedish government to put up a fight in the Council. Throughout the League crisis, Palmstierna exerted great influence on the course of Swedish policy, particularly when, in February 1926, a change in Chamberlain's formerly announced position seemed to justify his earlier optimistic evaluation of the situation. At that time Chamberlain seemed willing to delay decision over the Spanish claim and stated that the British government had made no commitments with regard to the claims of Poland and Brazil. It thus appeared, temporarily, that the Swedish attitude corresponded to Britain's real intentions.

This view was shared by the German Foreign Minister, Stresemann, who was in constant contact with Undén, whom he tried to make a wholehearted champion of Germany's interests within the League and on the Council. Stresemann actually claimed that the British government desired Sweden to take responsibility for opposing all claims for additional seats on the Council, with the exception of that of Germany. This argument may have affected Undén, although he tried to keep somewhat aloof from Germany and emphasized the independence of Swedish policy. It was not easy to do this, given the nature of Undén's instructions. For these directed him unequivocally to support the German claim to a seat, while opposing any further enlargement of the Council. In drawing up these instructions, the Swedish government seem not to have realized how far they were sticking their necks out and how exposed Sweden's position was really to be.

Their main error of judgment lay in their analysis of Chamberlain's attitude. In moderating his previous position, the British Foreign Secretary seems to have been motivated by a desire to counter any German threat to abandon the League of Nations and the Locarno policy. He apparently feared that, if Germany made out of this issue a question of prestige, any compromise between the German and the Franco-Polish interests would become impossible. He was perfectly willing, therefore, that Sweden should come forth as the chief opponent of the Polish claim, for the dispute then became one of principle, rather than an issue of national prestige and political rivalry; and it was in Britain's interest to keep the discussion on a somewhat abstract level. But, in taking an uncompromising line of opposition to the Polish claim, Sweden seemed to be acting for Germany, which threw doubts upon her true motives.

In the first days of March 1926, therefore, rumors began to spread that Chamberlain had changed front again and was now preparing a compromise. Simultaneously, the Polish government, which had been very

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critical of Sweden's position, suddenly adopted a different tone and expressed understanding and sympathy for the Swedish attitude.

Undén found himself in Geneva in a very difficult situation. His first task was to explain that Sweden was not acting on behalf of Germany but was following an independent line. But Undén was isolated. Vandervelde informed him that, if the question of the enlargement of the Council led to a showdown, Belgium could not vote against France and Britain. With the exception of Germany, which was still debarred from the League, no other Power shared Sweden's flat refusal to consider any compromise.

When Brazil and Spain presented their claims for permanent seats on the Council, Undén resisted strongly and remained firm even when Chamberlain attempted to influence him to take a less uncompromising line. Then Spain gave way, and the Brazilian delegate consented to ask for new instructions from home. On March 12, then, Undén seemed to have won out and to have prevented the enlargement of the Council. The true crisis came, however, when Vandervelde proposed the establishment of a new, temporary seat for Poland. This suggestion could not be reconciled with Unden's instructions or with the German point of view; but Sweden and Germany had now been placed in a most awkward position. If they remained adamant, they would appear to be the only obstacles to an agreement, for all the other Powers were willing to make concessions. Under the influence of representations by Vandervelde, Undén began to search for a way out of the dilemma. He asked Prime Minister Richard Sandler about the possibility of new instructions; he suggested a plan, which he had already mentioned in January to the Polish Minister in Stockholm. Sweden would resign her own nonpermanent seat in favor of Poland, thus appeasing Polish sensibilities without permitting an alteration of the constitution of the Council. Undén found little understanding in Stockholm. The Swedish press was strongly in favor of Germany's entry into the League, but was equally convinced of the correctness of the attitude of the small Powers in objecting to an enlargement of the Council. Public opinion in Sweden had no understanding of the change in atmosphere to which Vandervelde's compromise proposal had led; and the government refused to amend Undén's instructions.

Meanwhile, the clouds had darkened in Geneva. The Swiss Foreign Minister Motta recommended that the Swedish delegation make concessions. At the same time, in a secret meeting of the Council, Aristide Briand declared that France could not permit Germany to impose condi-

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tions for entering the League. If, as a result of German maneuvers, Poland was refused a Council seat, Briand declared, he would return to Paris and resign as Foreign Minister; and the Locarno policy would be at an end.

Under this pressure, Undén gave way as much as his instructions permitted. He promised to consult the German delegation about the situation, a suggestion which was eagerly accepted by the other members. It was clear that, if Germany too could be persuaded to favor a compromise, Sweden would appear to be more papal than the Pope in resisting any possible arrangement; and the Swedish government might in these circumstances agree to a change of Undén's instructions.

Undén had thus to work along two different lines. He had, in the first place, to get the permission of the Swedish Cabinet to resign the Swedish seat in the Council, so that Poland could enter the Council without enlargement of this body. For two days, telegrams of a truly dramatic character went back and forth between Geneva and Stockholm. But, in addition to his difficulties with his own government, Undén had to secure the German agreement. On March 15 the Germans expressed their willingness to accept Undén's suggestion on the condition that either Belgium or Czechoslovakia would join Sweden in resigning from the Council. Since Benes of Czechoslovakia was prepared to cooperate in order to save the situation, Undén, in reporting to Stockholm, informed his government that he now took it for granted that all obstacles to Sweden's abandonment of her Council seat were removed. The Cabinet gave way. The crisis was over, but it was followed by an anticlimax. Brazil declared her intention of insisting upon receiving a permanent seat in the Council; and the German entry into the League had after all to be postponed until the fall of 1926. But there was no longer any doubt that the real issue had been solved and that Germany would be able to take her seat. The question had been freed from those aspects which were politically explosive and had been reduced to the technical question of the constitutional structure of the League.[7]

Swedish public opinion had still not grasped the twofold aspect of the issue and did not realize that, if Undén had not achieved full victory, he had made an important contribution to European pacification. Swedish public opinion had been interested chiefly in the principle of maintaining the present size of the Council, and Brazil's stubbornness had won out over this principle at the last moment. Sweden's sacrifice of her Council seat seemed therefore to have been made in vain; Undén had diffi-

[7] On the negotiations, see Walters, *History of the League*, I, 323-325.

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culty in defending himself against the Conservative opposition in the *Riksdag*; and, when the Cabinet resigned in May 1926, his personal popularity had quite obviously been diminished.

Undén's policy in the League of Nations crisis of 1926 can be correctly evaluated only if it is seen as an attempt to relieve the tension among the Great European Powers and to make Locarno a success. It can probably be said that the memory of the events of 1926, when he worked for an understanding among the Great Powers, had its influence in shaping the line which Undén has taken during recent years in the United Nations.

But it is important to note that, in his policy of 1926, Undén was not a starry-eyed idealist. He pursued a subtle policy, perhaps too subtle to be understood in all its implications by the Swedish people and the Cabinet. He was constantly aware of the relationship between European peace and Sweden's national interest in peace in the Baltic area. He did not embark on a new course, but continued the traditional line worked out by the professionals of his department. If Undén's performance seemed new and startling, the reason may be sought more in the personal qualities of this resolute, stubborn, and courageous man than in the contrast between a foreign policy of parliamentarism and a foreign policy of professionals.

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The Great Powers and the Nordic Countries 1939–1940

Sweden's Ambiguous Neutrality

Erik Lönnroth

1

Sweden has had the singular good fortune to have been at peace without interruption since 1814. As a consequence she has acquired the reputation of being an exceptionally pacific nation, which is rather exaggerated, as in reality Sweden several times kept out of war by sheer political luck. But all the same the policy of peace has had some solid foundations: strategically favourable frontiers after the loss of Finland to Russia in 1809, and a growing feeling of close kinship to the other Nordic nations, formerly regarded as Sweden's traditional enemies. When in 1905 Norway broke away from the dynastic union with Sweden–enforced in 1814 for chiefly strategic reasons–the royal government and the leading groups of Swedish society had the sense not to use force. This may seem to have been just an act of common decency but it still does some credit to Sweden, as common decency in foreign affairs has been rather unusual in European history.

Since 1870 the neutrality of Sweden in European conflicts has taken the form of something like a doctrine. After the final victory of democracy in 1918 this doctrine has been strongly influenced by the then dominating liberal and social democratic internationalism, but some of its characteristics have deeper roots in historical traditions: those of a great power reduced to the station of a small power but too proud to accept the role of a satellite, and with a certain tendency towards pronouncements of moral superiority to other nations with better possibilities of being selfish.

In 1920 Sweden entered the League of Nations against the strong opposition of the Conservative an Communist Parties, which were sponsoring the interests of the non-members Germany and the Soviet Union respectively. Afterwards, however, the Conservative leaders swiftly adapted themselves to membership and took an active part in the execution of Swedish policy at Geneva. They strongly corributed to the general pattern of Sweden's policy of neutrality, as several of the Swedish representatives in Geneva were prominent lawyers, such as the former Prime Minister Hjalmar Hammarskjöld (Conservative); the Conservative leader Ernst Trygger, in different periods Prime Minister and Foreign Minister; the Social Democratic Foreign Minister Östen Undén; and the Liberal Foreign Minister Eliel Löfgren. The common denominator of their neutralism was a tendency to stress the necessity of settling conflicts by legal arbitration

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instead of by alliances and military sanctions. Mainly, however, the foreign policy of Sweden was influenced by the dominating trends of Liberal-Social Democratic ideology, above all by the idea of disarmament, realized in a radical reduction of the national defence organization in 1925. Sweden could not afford to risk any entanglement in the tensions between the winning and the losing powers of World War I. In particular, her interests demanded a quiet situation in the Baltic, where the northern branch of the French *cordon sanitaire,* Poland, touched the coast between Germany, East Prussia and the Baltic border states. Sweden in the early 1920s therefore declined all temptations towards playing a leading role among the small Baltic powers through assuming responsibility for the security of Finland, Estonia and Latvia. Also, in 1926, Sweden gave uå her seat on the League's council in order to make it possible for Germany an Poland to enter the council simultaneously. As long as the European détente of the 1920s lasted, this foreign policy of almost total passivity had rather an easy course.[1]

Hitler's *Machtübernahme* in 1933; Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the entry into it of Soviet Russia; the German-Polish understanding in 1934; and the naval treaty between Germany and Great Britain in 1935 totally changes the Baltic constellation of powers. The failure of the League to check the Italian conquest of Ethiopia made it obvious that its leading powers offered no security to members who neutral in every sense except being members of the League. To side with the League against the Axis powers from now on meant relying on help from the Soviet Union, the only opponent of Nazi Germany in the Baltic. Swedish public opinion reacted strongly against German Nazism and felt a latent but deep distrust of Stalinidy Russia: the natural course was to steer clear of both of them without any sort of challenge to either of them. Of the ex-neutral bloc of small powers within the League, the four closely related North European democracies were more or less automatically brought into the same situation and felt a natural solidarity. The "Nordic" era of Swedich foreign policy therefore began with a denunciation of the obligation to participate in sanctions in 1936, and with an institutionalized cooperation between the four Nordic governments. It was still a common neutral policy, but a spontaneous wave of feeling of cultural an historical kinship carried Swedish opinion beyond accepting only a technical cooperation with its three neighbours. The government, however, was not carried away into any sort of alliance policy, although the Foreign Minister, Richard Sandler, toyed with the thought, or rather with the feeling, that Sweden, as the biggest and most centrally situated of the four nations, had to meet demands for help with at least an attitude of positive response. The obviously influenced his acceptance of the so-called "Stockholm plan" for a joint Swedish-Finnish fortification of the southern skerries of the neutralized Åland archipelago, which took from in 1938.

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[1]E. Lönnroth, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia,* vol. 5 (Stockholm, 1959), pp. 23–127.

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Technically, it was an extension of Sweden's own coastal defence, but it is hardly possible to deny that the plan implied a responsibility for the defence of Finnish territory, if Finland should fall victim to an unprovoked aggression.[2]

2

There has been a comparatively large amount of work done on Swedish history in the years 1939 and 1940, mostly as a result of the research project "Sweden during World War II", which consisted of a group of young historians of the University of Stockholm, financed by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. Still one can easly get a feeling of treading water when reading the ambitious works published through this project, which is due to the fact that only a limited part of the relevant sources are accessible to scholars, and consequently that scholars are circling round the same blocks of information in their reasoning about various matters. A really enlightening discussion of Swedish policy in these two years has never been possible, as different authors have had access to different documents and naturally are ready to interpret one another erroneously about information given with reference to special sources. Of recent works, Wilhelm M. Carlgren's *Svensk utrikespolitik 1939–1945* (Swedish foreign policy 1939–1945), published in 1973, is by far the best informed, for the simple reason that the author is head of the archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, and has access to all surviving secret documents about government decisions about foreign affairs, as well as to the diplomatic correspondence. Most of the recent authors have had access to some of these documents and to the diary of Carl Gustav Westman, the Minister of Justice, and to the rather cryptic diary of the Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson. The papers of Gösta Bagge, the Conservative leader an Minister for Church and Education, have also been used by some scholars. Naturally this has resulted in an over-emphasis on the importance of Westman an Bagge, and in a not very fertile exegesis of the notes of Hansson. Gunnar Hägglöf, a member of the government in 1939 and a leading expert on trade policy then and later during the war, has published memoirs which of course are very well informed.[3] Already Krister Wahlbäck, in his dissertation on the Finnish question in Swedish politics 1939–1940 (published in 1964), relied to a great extent on the diary of one of the leading and most active military officers during the war years, C.A. Ehrensvärd;[4] all in all, military archives have given the members of the "Sweden during World War II" project their best and most revealing information.

The most strong-willed member of the cabinet, the Minister of Finance, Ernst Wigforss, has published very guarded memoirs; the less important Minister

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[2] Ibidem, pp. 128–149, 183–212.

[3] G. Hägglöf. *Möte med Europa* (Stockholm. 1971): idem, *Samtida vittne 1940–1945* (Stockholm, 1972); idem, *Sveriges krigshandelspolitik under andra världskriget Stockholm, 1958).*

[4] K. Wahlbäck, *Finlandsfrågan i svensk politik 1939–1940* (Stockholm, 1964).

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of Communications, Gustaf Andersson, was more outspoken in his posthumous book of memoirs.[5] The Commander-in–Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces in the early war years, Olof Thörnell, has directed a survey of the defence measures taken which may be regarded as a sort of memoir; ir is still unpublished.

Obviously the general outline of Swedish policy in the period 1939–1940 is quite clear, but inside information about deliberations and decisions is lacking on very crucial points. Until, for instance, the whole of the private papers of the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Richard Sandler an Christian Günther, are open to scholars, most conclusions about their aims and motives must be tentative. Critical analysis of later statements, made by the leading men of those days, gives some good examples of how rapidly their impressions and views have changed through subconscious adjustments of their memories. A report on Swedish policy in 1939 and 1940 consequently must be constructed over unknown depths until all relevant documents are known in all details.

This means that pretty much of what was going on in Sweden remains unclear. The belligerents and the occupied countries knew which nations were friends and which were enemies. In neutral Sweden some groups were clearly distingueshed by their sympathies and antipathies, but most people of importance kept their distance from the fighting camps. Later declarations, when the outcome of the war was clear, do not count for much, as they were born out of wishful thinking. There remains a difficult task to be carried out: not to take words for granted and to wash facts out of the gravel of declarations.

3

With Swedish foreign policy limited in its outlook to the problems of northern Europe, and especially to the situation of the kindred nations Denmark, Norway and Finland, there remained two issues of a potentially dangerous nature. Each of them meant tension between one of the Nordic states and a Great Power, and each one could develop into a major threat to more than one of the Nordic states. One was the question of the national controversy in Slesvig between Danes and Germans, which could lead to a German demand for a revision of the border 1920. The Slesvig question really concerned the position of Denmark as a whole, and consequently the control of the inlets to the Baltic, which also directly concerned Sweden. The other question was that of the fortification of Åland, involving the coastal defences of Stockholm, the communications between Finland and Sweden in case of war and, primarily, the neutrality of Finland in case of war between Germany and the Soviet Union.

In 1939 the Slesvig question had ceased to be a problem to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, or rather was kept out of reach of the Swedish government

[5] E. Wigforss, *Minnen*, vol. 3 (Stockholm, 1954); G. Andersson, *Från bondetåget till samlingsregeringen* (Stockholm, 1955).

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by the Danes. The situation of Denmark nonetheless was a problem, as her attitude of consistent appeasement towards her German neighbour made her the weak link in the Nordic chain of solidarity resisting diplomatic pressure from the great Nazi power. But as it was obvious that nothing, except help from one of the Western Great Powers, could save Denmark from being easily occupied by the German army if and when this became desirable to the German Führer, and as it was likewise obvious that such help would never be offered, there was nothing Sweden could do except to offer sympathy. As the Danish government after 1937 never asked for support in resisting German pressure, but on the contrary rejected even the idea of such support, no moral pangs were felt in Sweden on account of passivity in this direction. This, however, did not mean indifference to the fate of Denmark. In German diplomatic circles the prime Minister of Sweden, Per Albin Hansson, was regarded as passionately pro-Danish in the Slesvig question, which may have been ture although he never in words or deeds gave way to such sentiments. And Swedish public opinion was strongly pro-Danish.

The question of Åland and of the position of Finland in general was on the contrary a major problem in Swedish foreign policy in 1939. The initiative for cooperation and for Swedish support came from Finland, and the position of Åland in case of a war in the Baltic was vividly discussed not only in Finnish and Swedish papers but also in the German and Soviet press.

The initiative for the fortification of the islands had been taken by the Marshal of Finland. Mannerheim, in 1934, clearly as a measure of security against Soviet aggression. The suggestion was strongly supported by official opinion in Germany, but at the beginning it met with little response in Sweden. In 1937, as Finland moved closer to the neutral Scandinavian countries, the Swedish Foreign Ministry began to reconsider the matter in cooperation with the central defence staff. Possibly the later took the lead in this initiative, but it is also possible that the Chief of Staff acted as a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry. The result was, anyhow, a new opening in the Åland question, and a change of attitude on the part of the leaders of Swedish foreign policy. It seems likely that the beginning of this development can be traced back to April 1937, when the Foreign Ministers of the four northern countries met in Helsinki. But not until 1938 was the new attitude suggested to the Swedish government through an official memorandum by General Thörnell, Chief of Staff of the Swedish Armed Forces.

The significance of this engagement in the defence of Åland has never been made fully clear, especially as the Swedish-speaking inhabitants of Åland from the beginning to the end were violently opposed to any fortification of the islands. There may have been sentimental reasons mixed into the political considerations, especially if the military chiefs, with their traditional sympathy for Finland and distrust of Russia, pushed the scheme behind the scenes. Sandler himself was not the model of a politician forming his opinions in cold blood, and his pro-Finnish attitude in the later 1930s was unmistakable. But the Stock-

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holm plan for joint fortification of the southern skerries of Åland certainly could be justified by rational arguments. Russian distrust of Finland and suspicions of a growing German influence in that country was obvious and was noted in the Swedish Foreign Ministry; Sandler had a serious discussion with Litvinov on these matters in July 1937. Finland's new course of solidarity with the Scandinavian countries on the basis of strict neutrality was not unanimously supported by Finnish public opinion; the opponents were few but rather noisy, and especially among the army officers an understanding with Germany for defence purposes was not at all considered out of the question, if the Scandinavian neighbours should fail to offer any real measure of help and security. Sandler and his inner circle of advisers–the identification of whom is one of the many tasks of future historians–seem to have been certain that a proven integration of Finland into the Scandinavian concert of strictly neutral policies would convince the Soviet leaders that they had nothing to fear from German attempts to draw Finland into an extended anti-Comintern pact. Very serious reports and urgent warnings from the Swedish envoy in Helsinki in the autumn of 1937 that the position of the Foreign Minister, Holsti, was weakened and that a wilful mood of self-reliance was gaining ground, stimulated by news of the extermination of Soviet military leaders, may have contributed to the later consent of the Swedish government to a measured accomodation of the Finnish desire for a fortification of Åland. After that the military staffs took over the detailed work of reaching an agreement, and after rather difficult negotiations the Stockholm plan took form.

The further development of the Åland question is primarily a question in the development of Finnish–Soviet relations, but the mark of the specifically Swedish policy of neutrality stuck to it as long as it remained a question of practical diplomacy. Sandler from the very first discussions of the Åland question had claimed that not only the signatory powers of the Åland convention of 1921, but also the Soviet Union, should consent to the partial refortification of the archipelago. The spokesmen of Stalin's Soviet Union had, since Mannerheim had raised the question in 1934, constantly dismissed the very thought of refortification as having been inspired by anti-Russian elements in Finland. "We are extremely opposed to any fortification of the Åland islands, either by Finland or by any other power", Litvinov had said on 19 April 1938 to Winther, the Swedish envoy in Moscow. At the beginning of 1939 the Russian attitude seemed to have become less negative, but the reason was unknown to the leaders of Swedish foreign policy: the Åland question had been linked with the highly secret negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union concerning some form of guarantee for Finland's friendly intentions towards its eastern neighbour. When in March 1939 Finland finally rejected the Russian proposal of a surrender of four islands in the inner part of the Gulf of Finland, the Swedish government intervened in support of the Finnish standpoint, on the mistaken sassumption that this question had been introduced in order to create difficulties about the Åland fortification. This démarche was rejected with

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indignation by Litvinov as an unfriendly act. It was made clear that everything depended on the attitude of the Finnish government concerning the islands in the Gulf of Finland, and as this remained negative, the Stockholm plan in reality was doomed.

Nevertheless the Swedish government on 5 May presented to the *riksdag* a bill providing for the acceptance of the plan on the condition that the council of the League of Nations approved it, which would also involve the approval of the Soviet Union. On 22 and 27 May the question was debated by the council. On the second occasion it was made abundantly clear that the Soviet Union rejected the proposal of the Finnish and Swedish governments, and on 31 May Molotov officially declared that the Soviet Union was opposed to the fortification plan for Åland and regarded it as a threat. On 2 June the Swedish government consequently withdrew the proposal it had laid before the *riksdag*.

It remains a problem why Sandler did not back out of the plan earlier in face of the stubborn and presistent Soviet opposition. It seems to be a fact that as late as in Geneva in May 1939, he still hoped to get the consent of the Soviet Union. In conversation with the author of this paper he quoted some remarks by Russian spokesmen, expressed before the Geneva meeting, which he interpreted as a veiled promise of success. But his deeper considerations are unknown, and there remains only the fact that he hoped to convince the Soviet diplomats of the neutral and peaceful attitude of the Finnish government. His policy was squarley based on the assumption that the antagonism between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia was constant and unfaltering, and that consequently the Russians had to understand that a neutralization of Finland through Swedish influence was in accordance with their own interests. This again presupposed the general view that Germany was the only aggressive power in the Baltic region, and that Russia would act more or less in accord with the Western Powers.

When the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact of 23 August was announced, the basis of this policy was destroyed. It remained for the Swedish government to adjust its views and actions to a totally new and potentially catastrophic situation.

4

Since 1932 Sweden had been governed by the Social Democratic Party, which in 1936 had entered into a coalition with the Farmers' Party to secure a majority in the *riksdag*. In 1939 the internal political situation was uncommonly stable compared with almost all other countries in Europe. The Social Democratic leaders, who constituted the majority of the government, had proved themselves to be a very capable team, champions of a moderate and successful reform policy with the proclaimed slogan of making Sweden a "Home of the People". In 1938 the central organizations of the industrial employers and the trades unions had concluded an armistice in the so called "Saltsjöbaden pact", which created a regular system of negotations between the two parties to avoid strikes

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and lockouts. Swedish economic life prospered after the world crisis, to a certain extent as a result of the hectic rearmament in Europe. All this cooperated to make the soil rather arid for subversive propaganda from the right-wing and left-wing extremist parties. The small Nazi parties in Sweden never obtained one single seat in the *riksdag,* and were even by Hermann Göring characterized as a rather ridiculous phenomenon. The Communists held a few seats, but had all through the inter-war period been seriously hempered by internal conflicts and by the strange commands of the Russian mother party; the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact made their ideological position quite impossible.[6] There existed small groups of Nazi sympathizers, defeatists and generally bewildered fools, and a few paid traitors to the Swedish nation, but in all the internal front was very reliable.

This must be kept in mind as a general background to the confused debate on foreign policy in the very first year that foreign policy had become a matter of central importance to the people of Sweden. Until the outbreak of the war public opinion was formed according to general ideological sympahties and antipathies, which meant that a solid majority had strong anti-Nazi feeling. It is remarkable that the Conservatives, who were traditionally pro-German, had resolutely purged the party of people with fascist sympathies and had taken their position on the democratic side. After the outbreak of the war, when in rapid succession one country after another was swallowed by Germany and the Soviet Union, public voices in Sweden were with some exceptions hushed into a frightened murmur. This did not signify a change of opinion, but rather a realization of the extreme dangers threatening small nations.

Sweden had to face this situation with very unsatisfactory defence forces. After the period of faith in a lasting peace, guaranteed by the international security system of the League of Nations, there followed a period of slow and cautious rearmament, starting with the new defence organization of 1936. This development, however, had not come very far by September 1939. The army, based on general compulsory service, was trained and equipped more to deal with minor violations of neutrality than for war. The navy had a few modern destroyers, but its main asset, three ships of a character between miniature battleships and slow cruisers with heavy artilley equipment, dated from the years around 1920. The air force consisted of imported second-rate machines, few and mostly lacking in radio installations. Sweden had her own gun factory in Bofors and would develop her own aeroplane industry; her industrial potential was comparatively large, but this was of no considerable importance in the years 1939–1940. All these facts about Swedish defence possibilities had to be taken into consideration by the government in its decisions about foreign policy.[7]

The German *Blitz-krieg* and total victory over Poland was a frightening de-

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[6] On this subject see Y. Hirdman, *Sverges kommunistiska parti 1939–1945* (Stockholm, 1974).

[7] On these matters see Å. Holmquist, *Flottans beredskap 1938–1940* (Stockholm, 1972) and E. Norberg, *Flyg i beredskap. Det svenska flygvapnet i omvandling och uppbyggnad 1936–1942* (Stockholm, 1971).

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monstration of the efficiency of the German war machine, but did not change the situation of Sweden in any decisive way. The Soviet Union's advance into the Baltic states and its demands on Finland in the first week of October 1939, however, was a step into the very neighbourhood of Sweden. The consequences of Sandler's Åland policy became obvious when the Finnish government on 4 October requested the consent and cooperation of Sweden in the re-fortification and defence of Åland. In the following weeks, differences of attitude and opinion developed inside the Swedish government which in the end made a reorganization of the cabinet inevitable.

Until then Sandler had taken care of foreign affairs without much interference from his colleagues in the government. Östen Undén, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and the leading expert in the Social Democratic Party on international law, in 1937 had published an oracular statement of criticism against Sandler's Nordic activities, but since 1936 he was no longer a member of the cabinet, and did not enjoy the same loyalty and confidence from the Prime Minister and party leader, Per Albin Hansson, as did Sandler. However, within the cabinet, Ernst Wigforss, the Minister of Finance, had gradually acquired a leading position by virtue of his superior intellect and will power. Wigforss now entered the debate on the Åland question as a strong champion of absolutley strict neutrality, seconded in this respect by Karl Gustaf Westman, the Minister of Justice, and formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Farmers Party's "Summer ministry" of 1936. The Finnish request for Swedish consent to a purely Finnish fortification of the southern skerries of Åland according to the Stockholm plan, and of material help from Sweden for these installations, met with no serious objections. But the request that Swedish troops be sent to Åland caused a split in the cabinet as well as in the secret committee for foreign affairs on which all parties of the *riksdag* except the Communists were represented. Sandler met opposition not only from Wigforss byt also from the Prime Minister, Hansson, and with that his appeal for direct armed intervention on Åland failed. Another controversial question, concerning the mining of Swedish waters north of Åland up to the border line of Finnish territorial waters, thus contributing to a closing of the Gulf of Bothnia, was held in suspense and was the subject of heated discussions within the cabinet.

On 18–19 October 1939 a very spectacular manifestation took place: the three Scandinavian kings and the president of Finland met in Stockholm and were acclaimed by a multitude of about 100 000 persons–a demonstration particularly cherished by President Kallio. A wave of feeling was generated, and the press fell in with general proclamations of common Nordic solidarity. The meeting of chiefs of state had been first proposed by Sandler–whether on his own or inspired from outside the cabinet is difficult to say. The purpose must chiefly have been to put the pressure of public opinion on the cautious neutralists in the government. If so, the effect was minor. The communiqué from the assembled heads of state only expressed the solidarity and neutrality of the four nations, and made rather a poor impression, as it amounted to a public

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announcement that Finland had Sweden's sympathy and could hope for little more. But in one respect the demonstration had results: the destiny of Finland from now on was a matter of overwhelming importance to the Swedish public. A new political climate enveloped the country, and the politicians had to take it into consideration, even if they were not converted.

Sandler at this stage clearly wanted to give Finland aid by political and even military demonstrations; he was ready to take the risks involved in such a course of action. It is hard to reconstruct the considerations behind his policy when the military weakness of Sweden is taken into account. He may not have taken the threat from the Soviet Union as seriously as it deserved, possibly influenced in this respect by his colleague in Helsinki, Erkko. He may also have been pushed by the leading spokesmen of the defence staff. It seems that the commander-in-chief, Thörnell, and his chief of staff, Axel Rappe, were confirmed activists and filtered all information between the subordinate military commands and the government so that all information unfavourable to their views was eliminated.[8] From the defence staff's point of view a Russian threat to Finland was also a threat to Sweden, and the best policy was to make an effort to check the threat as early as possible. Sandler's mind was certainly not a military one, and his calculations about Soviet considerations and planning probably differed considerably from those of the generals, but he may have been influenced by their attitude.

Some days after the meeting of the Nordic heads of state the internal crisis within the cabinet reached a temporary climax when Sandler, supported by the Minister of Defence, Per Edvin Sköld, proposed several measures of help to Finland in the event of a Russian attack, such as mining Swedish territorial waters north of Åland. They had both negotiated with Erkko on this matter with the consent of the Prime Minister, Hansson, and had bound themselves by promising that these mines would be laid. In this situation Wigforss declared that he was resolved to resign from the government in order to be free to start a campaign of warning against the warmongers. Sandler and Sköld on the other side also threatened to resign. The Prime Minister only succeeded in keeping the government together by declaring that the cause of the split was a hypothetical situation, and that it would be unreasonable to unveil the controversy to the world until that situation had become a reality. So the whole question again was held in suspense while the negotations in Moscow proceeded. But the crisis had stressed an important fact: Ernst Wigforss was the strong man of the government, and was more or less to remain so all through the war period.

On 3 November Sweden undertook a démarche in Moscow to support Finnish resistance to the claims of the Soviet leaders for Finnish territory, especially the peninsula Hanko/Hangö from where the Gulf of Finland could be blocked west of Helsinki. The démarche emphasized the earnest Swedish desire that

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[8] Holmquist, op, cit. pp. 146–148.

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Finland should remain an independent and neutral state, and that the Soviet Union should avoid proposals that would diminish the possibility of a peaceful solution. The démarche was made at an unfortunate moment, coming as it did just after Molotov had made the Soviet demands public. Molotov's reaction was very harsh, denouncing the Swedish action as an impertinent intervention, a hostile act, and the outcome of a policy which could bring Sweden herself into danger. After the end of the negotiations on 8 November, nothing happened for a while, and the governments in Helsinki and Stockholm were lulled into false optimism. The theory that the Russians were just bluffing was at least not being disproved.

The outbreak of the Winter War on 30 November was a new shock to Sandler's foreign policy. The proclamation of the Kuusinen government in Terijoki made it still worse. The remains of the Swedish inter-war trust in a peaceful and rational world were crushed to pieces.[9]

5

The broad Russian offensive over the whole length of the Finnish frontier, and the clear intention of Stalin to turn Finland into a Communist satellite state, generally impressed the Swedes as meaning that Sweden herself was in imminent danger. The defence forces were partly mobilized. The government had to be reconstructed to include all democratic parties, which meant that a solution to the internal conflict in the cabinet could to a certain extent be hidden by the curtain of national unity. Sandler had to go as the spokesman and symbol of active Swedish aid to Finland. But Sköld stayed on as having been much less implicated in the earlier plans of cooperation between the two countries, and he also scored a bictory over Wigforss when mines were laid north of Åland. Under the leadership of Per Albin Hansson and Wigforss the new national government was determined to remain neutral although its attitude of sympathy for Finland was open and unquestioned.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs a new man was chosen, the Swedish envoy in Oslo, Christian Günther, one of the leading Swedish diplomats and unconnected with any political party. It is somewhat uncertain how his name came up for appointment to one of the most difficult and prominent posts in the government. He was recommended by Sandler, but another and quite different personality has also claimed to have been his advocate: the Governor of Stockholm, Torsten Nothin, who according to Wigforss' memoirs was proposed by unknown elements to King Gustav as an appropriate national leader instead of Hansson.[10] In any case, Günther was generally accepted as a conveniently colourless but competent executor of a policy of neutrality–a policy adapted

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[9] In sections 4 and 5 I chiefly follow W.M. Carlgren, *Svensk utrikespolitik 1939–1945* (Stockholm, 1973).

[10] T. Nothin, *Från Branting till Erlander* (Stockholm, 1955), p. 253; Wigforss, op. cit. p. 143.

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to a peculiar situation: not only had no declaration of war been issued, but after the proclamation of the Kuusinen government, the fighting was officially regarded by the Soviet Union as an internal Finnish conflict. Sweden therefore had no need to declare herself neutral, but only to stress her position as a non-belligerent. Nonetheless a delicate problem of balance remained.

Gradually this problem became extremely difficult, also with regard to public opinion in Sweden. The miraculous Finnish victories in December 1939 released a wave of enthusiasm for aid to the brother nation, which was fighting in a war which now seemed to offer a possibility of success. A wave of demonstrations and meetings swept the country, and especially Stockholm, with the intention of putting pressure on the government to do more and to show a more daring attitude. The government, which already was giving Finland massive support with material, including war matériel, did not want to announce this publicly. An organization for recruiting volunteers came silently into being, and on 21 December the first contingent went off just as the existence of the organization was made public. When the *riksdag* opened in January, Richard Sandler took the opportunity to attack the Åland policy of the government in a formally brilliant speech, which made him the hero of the day and confirmed activist opinion in its critical view of the government. The situation was extremely confused, as all normal party divisions in Sweden were null and void: the leaders of all four democratic parties were members of the government and responsible for its policy; the Nazis and the Communists shared a common devotion to the interests of the big pact-brothers Germany and the Soviet Union; and the amateur policy-makers who voiced opinions in opposition to the governments's found it almost impossible to be explicit in their demands as no one wanted to advocate going to war with all that that might involve. To all this was added the further complication that the real position of Germany in the conflict between Finland and the Soviet Union was obscure: officially German spokesmen absolutley refused to intervene on behalf of Finland in any way, and threatened German intervention if the Western Allies obtained any foothold in Scandinavia as a result of offering help to Finland, but unofficially Göring gave hints about the possibility of an understanding. Germany was the traditional sponsor of Finnish resistance to Russia, and her totally new role as a pro-Russian moralist, complaining of the inadequate neutrality of the northern states, was hard to take.

The Western Allies had tentatively discussed aid to Finland in different forms and the possibilities of using Swedish territory for this purpose. These plans were regarded as very dangerous for Sweden, as their realization might provoke a German attack on that country, especially as the primary aim of Anglo–French policy obviously was to stop the transports of Swedish iron ore to Germany over Narvik. But the very existence of such Anglo–French plans could be used as a means of putting pressure on the Soviet Union to open peace negotiations. The Finnish government had not been very eager to ask for Swedish mediation in the war, as it wanted some great power to assume

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the role of mediator. But Günther considered it necessary to approach the Soviet envoy in Stockholm, Mme Kollontay, and emphasize Sweden's willingness to promote peace, in the interest of his own country. His main argument was the danger of Anglo–French intervention, which might involve the Soviet Union in the European war on the side of Germany. On 29 January Mme Kollontay delivered an answer which stated that an agreement between the Soviet Union and the Finnish Ryti–Tanner government could be regarded as possible. This was the first sign that Russia might be willing to drop the Kuusinen government and let Finland remain independent. Peace negotiations were thus opened through Swedish mediation, to which Molotov was now remarkably positive. Shortly afterwards Soviet troops began a new and better prepared offensive on the Karelian Isthmus.

The history of Swedish foreign policy during February 1940 is the history of Swedish mediation in the peace negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union, which in their turn were to a great extent influenced by military events on the Karelian Isthmus. The efforts of Günther and of his spokesman in Moscow, the Swedish envoy, Vilhelm Assarson, were concentrated on arguing for a moderation of the Soviet claims on Finnish territory and, on the other side, on trying to convince the Finnish government of the necessity of making peace before the Finnish defences on the Isthmus were broken.

A severe complication from the Swedish point of view, from the first days of the month onwards, was the new determination of the Western Powers to give Finland military aid, which led to a growing pressure from their side on the governments of Norway and Sweden to allow the transit of men and arms across their territories. For Sweden this would have meant immediate German intervention which, as the Swedish authorities already then realized, would have been fatal for both Sweden and Finland. The Swedish pressure for swift decisions in the negotiations therefore had a strong egotistic motivation, but it was neverheless sincerley believed that it served the interests of Finland as well. In the meantime, a Finnish appeal on 13 February for aid from Sweden, not only with volunteers but also with regular military units, had to be refused. The very substantial Swedish military aid to Finland already accorded ill with the role of a mediator, although the Russians closed their eyes to this in a remarkable way. The attitude of the Swedish government to the brother nation, fighring for its life, on the other hand gave rise to a wave of indignation among the Swedish people, fomented by an almost unanimous press and by the organizations for Nordic solidarity where prominent personalities outside the usual and narrow political circles flocked together.

The strength of opposition opinion became so threatening that the Foreign Minister thought it necessary to mobilize the authority of the old King of Sweden, Gustaf V, who on 19 February spoke to the nation over the radio and expressed both his warm sympathy for Finland and his solidarity with his government, which in his opinion had adopted the only possible standpoint. The King's speech quickly calmed the atmosphere, thus showing that activist opinion was

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strongly influenced by more or less subconscious traditional and conservative sentiments. The active part played by the Swedish government in the peace negotiations was of course unknown to all except the political inner circles. The last two weeks of Finland's "winter war" saw a dramatic race between the Russian advance towards Viborg, hardening Russian peace conditions, and Allied preparations for an invasion of northern Scandinavia. The governments of Norway and Sweden were in accord in their decisions not to give way to the Allied demands, but their decisions were made separatley, and their behaviour in the event of an armed confrontation with invading Allied forces might have been different, if put to the test. They were saved from this test when the Finnish government in the end resigned itself to the terrible loss of south-eastern Finland and other territories. A British note was delivered just as the peace document was ready, asking for Swedish agreement to the trasit of Allied troops: it came decidedly too late.

As an aftermath of the Finnish war, Sweden had to consider a Finnish proposal for an alliance of the Nordic states, which had been put forward during the days before the conclusion of the Moscow peace treaty. It was up to Sweden to carry the proposal further to Norway and Denmark, and the rather confused discussion of it in the Swedish cabinet conveys a clear picture of mixed feelings of moral obligation and lack of enthusiasm for the project. The idea was, however, quashed by Molotov before it could reach the stage of real negotiations–the Soviets had received information about the alliance proposal, and declared their veto of it. Molotov gave his answer to Assarsson on 25 March, and the subsequent disasters of Denmark and Norway made the plan obsolete.

6

After the Moscow peace treaty, Sweden's reputation was very bad among public opinion in the democratic world. She was abused for having sacrificed Finland to the co-operating Nazi and Communist powers in order to save her own skin; especially odious was the accusation of having served the policy of Hitler.

The policy of Sweden had to some extent been selfish, but decidedly not pro-German. Nor did the Nazi leaders look upon Sweden as an active or potential friend. In the buoyant misconceptions of the Führer about nations and races, Sweden belonged to the outskirts of a Greater Germany, a degenerate but decidedly Aryan people, misled by an outrageous press. The neutral policy of the Swedish government, and its disengagement from the League of Nations, made relations between the two states tolerable. When on 28 April 1939 Ribbentrop made his proposal for a non-aggression pact with each of the northern states, Sandler had taken the lead in the opposition to it. All the same his pro-Finnish attitude made him reliable in the eyes of German diplomats up to the time of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact.

As long as Sweden's policy remained free from Allied influence, her attitudes of sympathy and antipathy were anyway of minor importance. Sweden's real

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importance was due to the iron ore from the mines in northern Lapland, of which the German steel factories were the chief costomers. The Swedish iron ore represented in the years before the war 50% of the total German import of ore, and still more if the high quality of the Swedish ore is taken into consideration. As the German Foreign Ministry official Grundherr said to the Swedish Naval Attaché in Berlin at the time of the Munich crisis, the delivery of ore was the neuraligic point of German–Swedish relations. Its importance to the German war industry was obvious. This fact was understood, and perhaps over-emphasized, in the British Foreign Office. Before the war, attempts were made by the British to hamper German iron imports by business competition; after the outbreak of war, plans were made to stop the transports over Narvik and along the coast of Norway by military means. This would be impossible without violating the neutrality of Norwegian territorial waters, which would give an odious example to the rest of the world. The Finnish appeal for help seemed to offer an opportunity, but it was frustrated before it could be used. The history of encroachments upon Norwegian waters belongs to the history of Norwegian foreign policy rather than to that of Swedish foreign policy. When the Allied mining of Norwegian waters was announced on 5 April, Sweden supported the Norwegian protests in the interest of common neutrality, but considered further action unnecessary. It should be remembered that Swedish troops were still concentrated near the border with Finland and thus on the spot if any attempts were made to occupy the iron mines or the railway from the ore fields to Narvik. The Swedish government took the Allied threat to Scandinavian neutrality with a calmness that proved to be justified, since the Allied military preparations for a Scandinavian enterprise were very incomplete. More surprising is the marked phlegm in the teeth of evidence about an imminent German expedition by sea which could not possibly have any other objective than Scandinavia. At least from 1 April the Swedish authorities had clear information about the loading of war matériel and the embarkation of troops in the Baltic ports of Germany, and in the following days secret hints trickled in from German offiecers opposed to the Nazis about an imminent attack on Norway. The reaction of the Swedish Foreign Minister was that it was necessary to avoid any far-fetched conclusions and to accept the explanations, offered by official German spokesmen, that it only was a case of innocent defence measures. On 4 April General Thörnell asked for an immediate mobilization of troops in the south of Sweden, and got a blank refusal. On 9 April all the south and west of Sweden was thus open to any attack from outside, and a sudden mobilization took place under terrible confusion. Several eloquent explanations have been given on later occasions concerning this passivity, which after the event could be justified by the knowledge that Sweden emerged from the thunderstorm with only a fright, but none have been very convincing.[11]

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[11] Kungl. utrikesdepartementet (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), *Handlingar rörande Sveriges politik under andra världskriget. Förspelet till det tyska angreppet på Danmark och Norge den 9 april 1940* (Stockholm, 1947), pp. 186–218.

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A simple explanation may be that Günther and his colleagues in the Swedish cabinet did not possess the psychological imagination to take in the reckless brutality of behaviour by which Hitler and his men numbed political minds attuned to standard norms of action. In this inability they were not at all unique: other statesmen all over Europe shared it, and this may well be the overriding explanation of Hitler's initial successes in the first years of the war.

It is easier to explain why Hitler did not attack Sweden: by the conquest of Norway and Denmark he got what he wanted of Sweden – total control over the iron ore export. The Lapland mines could continue to work uninterrupted by military destructions, and the passive neutrality of Sweden was unquestionable.

7

Sweden in the spring of 1940 was a singularly unanimous nation. The people felt strongly for the brother nations, victims of aggression, and were enraged against the aggressors. The mobilized youth of Sweden, insufficiently trained and badly equipped, never questioned the need to put up resistance with every means, if an attack should come. And the very heterogeneous national government worked together without noticeable frictions.

It was, however, a unique conjuncture for unanimity. The ideological enemies of democracy cooperated and attacked the nations most kindred to Sweden. The Western Allies, champions of European democracy, had not yet been struck by the Nazi war machine and seemed still to be formidable opponents of Germany. There were great changes to come with the collapse of France, which seemed to make German victory inevitable, and then the attack by Germany on the Soviet Union in 1941, which put Finland in the opposite camp to that of the occupied Scandinavian states. The spirit of resistance in Sweden temporarily lost ground, and anti-Nazi and anti-Communist Swedes had no longer the same friends and the same enemies.

Within the government a new structure gradually took form, which in moments of crisis was to make its solidarity questionable. By the force of circumstances the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Günther, a man hitherto unknown to the general public, came to play a leading role. He proved to be a very cool and skilful player of the game of diplomacy, totally uninhibited by any ideological considerations. His single aim was to keep Sweden out of the war at practically any cost, and he succeded. This meant that he from time to time had to give way to demands from Hitler's Germany, even at the cost of Sweden's formal neutrality, which for that staunch democrat Ernst Wigforss and his circle within the cabinet was hard to accept. On the other hand the old King of Sweden had been asked to play decisive role in the February crisis of 1940, and from then on was conscious of his posibilities of exerting power in critical situations. It is clear that Günther became the King's special confidant in the cabinet,

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possibly associated with a dimly visible circle of other special confidants such as General Thörnell, Governor Nothin and the famous explorer Sven Hedin, all of them more pro-German than the people of Sweden in general. The Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson, occupied a mediating position between the King and Günther on one side and his old friend and supporter Wigforss on the other. Late in June 1941 there was an open clash over the German demand for the transit of the Engelbrecht Division to the Murmansk front from Norway across Sweden, but the national government nevertheless was kept together. But then there remains quite a lot to be known about the internal history of Swedish politics during the Second World War.

Erik Lönnroth, *born 1910, Member of the Swedish Academy since 1962, Professor of History at Uppsala University 1942–1953 and at Gothenburg University from 1953. Among his most important publications are* Sverige och Kalmarunionen 1397–1457 *(1934).* Statsmakt och statsfinans i det medeltida Sverige *1940), and* Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, *vol. 5, 1919–1939 (1959).*

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En bibliografi över Erik Lönnroths tryckta skrifter 1931–1976

sammanställd
av
Ola Christensson

A bibliography of the works of Erik Lönnroth 1931–1976

compiled
by
Ola Christensson

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Bibliografien över Erik Lönnroths tryckta skrifter är uppställd på följande sätt.

Bidragen äro ordnade årsvis. Inom varje år redovisas bidragen i bokstavsordning efter titel, och titlarna äro numrerade.

Recensioner med särskild titel stå alltså i bokstavsordning efter titeln, medan recensioner utan särskild titel stå sist under ifrågavarande år.

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Omarbetningar och smärre ändringar, vilka företagits av Erik Lönneroth i samband med nytryckning av tidigare utgivna arbeten, ha i regel ej anmärkts.

Sidhänvisningar till dagstidningar utgivna i Stockholm avse A-upplagan (Stockholms-upplagan).

Bibliografien omfattar inte tidningsintervjuer med Erik Lönnroth eller tidningsreferat av hans uttalanden. Svar på rundfrågor ha medtagits endast i undantagsfall.

Bibliografien redovisar inte recensioner av Erik Lönnroths tryckta skrifter.

Bibliografien avslutas av två register, ett titelregister och ett personnamnsregister.

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Introduction

Erik Lönnroth's printed works are listed in chronological order year by year. Within each year the entries are arranged in alphabetical order according to their titles.

Thus reviews with special titles are listed according to their titles, whereas reviews without titles are put at the end of the year in question.

For quick reference every item has been numbered.

Articles in the reference works "Svensk uppslagsbok" and "Svenska män och kvinnor" are grouped together under the title of the reference work. The volumes are listed under the relevant year of printing.

References are generally given to reprints of Erik Lönnroth's works, but this does not apply to the articles in "Svensk uppslagsbok".

Articles in "Svensk uppslagsbok" which have been revised by the editors are shown in brackets.

The bibliography does not indicate revisions and minor changes made by Erik Lönnroth in reprints of his own works.

References to pages in Swedish daily newspapers printed in Stockholm always apply to the A-edition (the Stockholm-edition).

As a rule the bibliography does not list either statements in reply to interviewers or reviews of Erik Lönnroth's printed works.

The bibliography has two indexes, one of titles and one of personal names.

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Förkortningar – Abbreviations

A.D.	ante diem
Akad.	akademisk – university
avh.	avhandling – dissertation
Bd., bd.	band; Bind; Band – volume
Bearb., bearb.	bearbetad, bearbetning – revised, revision
Bemynd.	bemyndigad – authorized
bl. a.	bland annat – inter alia
D.	del – part
DN	Dagens Nyheter. Stockholm (A daily newspaper)
DN:s	Dagens nyheters
d. y.	den yngre – junior
d. ä.	den äldre – senior
e. g.	for example
Ed.	edited
el.	eller – or
Ergo	Ergo. Organ för Uppsala studentkår. Uppsala (A periodical)
f. d.	före detta – former
förf.	författad, författaren – written, the author
förf:s	författarens – the author's
GHT	Göteborgs handels- och sjöfarts-tidning. Göteborg (A daily newspaper)
GMP	Göteborgs morgonpost. Göteborg (A daily newspaper)
Götheborgske spionen	Götheborgske spionen. Organ för Göteborgs högskolas/universitets studentkår. Göteborg (A periodical)
H. M.	Hans Majestät – His Majesty
Historisk tidskrift	Historisk tidskrift. Utg. av Svenska historiska föreningen. Stockholm (A periodical)
Hsg.	Herausgegeben – edited
Huvudred.	huvudredaktör – chief editor
illustr.	illustrated
Jahrg.	Jahrgang – annual volume
J:r	Junior
K.	Kunglig – royal
Kungl.	Kunglig – royal
m. m.	med mera – et cetera
medred.	medredaktör – co-editor
no	number
nr.	nummer – number
omarb.	omarbetad – revised
ordf.	ordförande – chairman
orig:s	originalets – the original's
p.	page(s); pagine
pag.	pagine – pages
prov.	provins – province
PS	post scriptum
publ.	published; publiées
Rec.	recension – review
Red., red.	redaktion, redaktör, redigerad; redigiert – board of editors, editor, edited
red.-kommitté	redaktionskommitté – board of editors
red.-kommitténs	redaktionskommitténs – of the board of editors
red.-sekr.	redaktionssekreterare – secretary of the board of editors
rev.	reviderad – revised
s.	sida(n), sidor(na) – page(s)
S.	Seite – page

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Samtid och framtid	Samtid och framtid. Tidskrift för idépolitik och kultur. Stockholm (tr. i Norrköping) (A periodical)
Scandia	Scandia. Tidskrift för historisk forskning. Stockholm, København, Oslo (A periodical)
sept.	september – September
SOU	Statens offentliga utredningar
sp.	sp. – column
t. ex.	till exempel – for example
tr.	tryckt – printed
transl.	translated
tryckn.	tryckning – printing
U 68	1968 års utbildningsutredning (An educational reform)
udg.	Udgave, udgiven, udgivne – edition, edited
ungdomsuppl.	ungdomsupplaga –special edition for young people
univ.	universitet – university
uppl.	upplaga(n) – edition
uppl:s	upplagans – the edition's
utarb.	utarbetad; utarbeidet – prepared
Utg., utg.	utgivare, utgiven, utgåva; utgitt – editor, edited, edition
utvidg.	utvidgade – enlarged
v.	vuotna – year
vol.	volym; volume – volume
Årg.	årgång – annual volume
Övers., övers.	översatt, översättare, översättning – translated, translator, translation

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Franken sp. 251
[Frankrike. Historia. 987–1483] sp. 285–289
Fredrik I av Pfalz sp. 485
Fredrik III av Sachsen sp. 494
Fredrik II av Tyska riket sp. 497–498
Fredrik III av Tyska riket sp. 498
Fredrik IV av Tyska riket sp. 498–499
Freeman, Eward Augustus sp. 525–526
Fugger sp. 789–790

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Fustel de Coulanges, Numa Denis sp. 857–858
Bd 11.
Gardiner, Stephen sp. 281–282
Gardiner, Samuel Rawson sp. 282
Gascogne sp. 311
Gedimin sp. 399
Georg Podiebrad, konung av Böhmen sp. 535–536
Georg den skäggige, hertig av Sachsen sp. 538
Gerhard III greve av Holstein sp. 565
Gherardesca sp. 628
Ghibelliner sp. 629–630
von Giesebrecht, Wilhelm sp. 652
Gottfrid av Bouillon sp. 1010
Gregorius VII sp. 1157–1158
Gren, Magnus sp. 1240
Gren, Ivar sp. 1240–1241
Gren, Magnus († 1520) sp. 1241
[Grimaldi] sp. 1277
Bd 12.
Guiccardini, Francesco sp. 248
Guido (Wido) sp. 249
Guyenne sp. 401
Gyllene bulla sp. 417
Gyllenstierna, Erik Eriksson d. ä. sp. 424
Gyllenstierna, Kristina sp. 424–425
Günther av Schwarzburg sp. 452
Gädda sp. 477
Hadrianus IV sp. 654
Hardenberg, Eiler sp. 1067
Harfleur sp. 1078
Bd 13.
[Henrik IV av England] sp. 233
[Henrik V av England] sp. 234
[Henrik VI av England] sp. 234
Henrik (Järn-Henrik), greve av Holstein sp. 239
[Henrik den stolte, hertig av Sachsen] sp. 242
[Henrik Lejonet, hertig av Sachsen] sp. 242
[Henrik II av Tyska riket] sp. 243
[Henrik IV av Tyska riket] sp. 244–245
[Henrik V av Tyska riket] sp. 245–246
Henrik Karlsson sp. 248–249
Herman, pfalzgreve av Sachsen sp. 298–299
[Hermandad] sp. 299
Herse sp. 337
Hugo den vite el. den store, hertig av Francien sp. 889–890
Hugo Capet, konung av Frankrike sp. 890
Hugo . . . greve av Vermandois sp. 890
Hugo, konung av Italien sp. 890

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Hövitsman sp. 91
[Innocentius III] sp. 444–445
Innocentius IV sp. 445
[Isabella, drottning av England] sp. 678
Isabella, drottning av Frankrike († 1435) sp. 678–679
Jagiello sp. 953
Jagiellonska ätten sp. 953
Jakob I av Skottland sp. 965–966
Jakob II av Skottland sp. 966
Jakob IV av Skottland sp. 966
Jakob V av Skottland sp. 966
[Jakob Ulvsson] sp. 974–975
Jerusalem, Konungariket sp. 1180–1181
Johan, konung av Böhmen sp. 1234
[Johan utan land, konung av England] sp. 1234–1235
[Johan II av Frankrike] sp. 1235
Johan av Brienne, konung av Jerusalem sp. 1236
Johanna I av Neapel sp. 1249
Johanna II av Neapel sp. 1244–1245
Johannitorden sp. 1261–1262
Bd 15.
de Joinville, Jean sp. 43–44
Kalmar recess sp. 622
Karl (VIII) Knutsson (Bonde) sp. 821–823
[Karl, konung av Navarra] sp. 875
Karl I av Neapel sp. 875
Karl IV av Tysk-romerska riket sp. 881
Kasimir III av Polen sp. 1000
Kasimir IV av Polen sp. 1000
Bd 16.
Konrad, konung av Jerusalem sp. 659
Konrad III av Tyska riket sp. 660
Konrad IV av Tyska riket sp. 660
[Kristian I av Danmark] sp. 1148–1149
[Kristian II av Danmark] sp. 1149–1150
Kristina, dansk, norsk och svensk drottning sp. 1172
Bd 17.
[Kumlien, Kjell] sp. 131–132
Lamprecht, Karl sp. 682–683
[Langlois, Charles Victor] sp. 767
[Langton, Stefan] sp. 769
Lawrence, Thomas Edward sp. 992–993
Laxmand, Poul sp. 1001
Leijonhufvud, Erik Abrahamsson sp. 1090–1091
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Louise, regentinna av Frankrike sp. 653–654
Luchaire, Achille sp. 685
[Ludvig IX av Frankrike] sp. 699–700
Ludvig X av Frankrike sp. 700–701
Ludvig V av Tyskland sp. 711–712
Lunge, Vincents sp. 873
[Lusignan] sp. 902
Bd 19.
Manfred, konung av Sicilien sp. 230
Margareta, dansk, svensk och norsk drottning sp. 339–341
[Margareta av Anjou, drottning av England] sp. 341–342
[Marsk] sp. 470–471
Martin, Henri sp. 488–489
Bd 20.
de Montfort, Simon († 1218) sp. 214
[de Montfort, Simon († 1265) sp. 214
Natt och Dag, Knut Bosson sp. 974–975
Natt och Dag, Nils Stensson sp. 975
Natt och Dag, Måns (Magnus) Bengtsson sp. 975

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193. Vikingatid i Halland
[Rec. av] Albert Olsson, Goda gudar. Stockholm 1951
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196. Avunden
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197. Ericus Olai som politiker
Kungl. Humanistiska vetenskaps-samfundet i Uppsala. Årsbok. 1952. Uppsala och Wiesbaden (tr. i Uppsala) 1952, s. 149–171
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Percy, Henry sp. 739
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Pole, Reginald sp. 1260–1261
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Provence sp. 418–420
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Rikard, hertig av York sp. 94
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Thierry, Augustin sp. 185
Thüringar sp. 265–266
Thüringen sp. 266–267
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Tomas Simonsson sp. 598
della Torre sp. 678
Tott, Erik Axelsson sp. 735
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Tott, Åke Hansson sp. 736
Toulouse sp. 740–741
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